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ABSTRACT
In this thesis further consideration is given to the theory and 
application of disequilibrium models in econometrics. Since the important 
work by Fair and Jaffee (1972) there has been a substantial body of 
literature dealing with this topic. Typically much of this research has 
been devoted to increasing knowledge about the estimation techniques for 
these models and applications are less common. An analysis of the Official 
Short Term Money Market attempts to redress this imbalance and to show how 
a disequilibrium approach has the potential to enrich the specification of a 
model. However, before proceeding with this application a number of 
theoretical issues arc considered. Firstly, the economic framework of 
disequilibrium models is considered, especially where it has an influence on 
the econometric framework. It is a weakness in some applications that closer 
attention is not paid to the economic aspects of disequilibrium in the 
markets under consideration.
While estimation of models of markets in disequilibrium is well 
established in the literature, there arc some issues not dealt with entirely 
adequately, and where this is the case an attempt at resolution is made.
Some of these issues lead on to a simulation study of three stage instrumental 
variables estimators. Also examination of estimation techniques indicate 
problems in estimating some disequilibrium specifications and so the Score 
test is examined as a means of avoiding estimation of disequilibrium models 
whenever possible, by using a test based on equilibrium estimates.
Finally, attention is focussed on specification and estimation of a 
model of the Official Short Term Money Market. Compared to other applications
of disequilibrium in individual markets this model is somewhat larger, with 
disaggregation of supply and introduction of unplanned behaviour being 
features peculiar to the model. The problem of hypothesis testing in the 
model is also given special attention. The results obtained give some 
support to the use of a disequilibrium approach in a monthly model of the 
Official Short Term Money Market.
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1CHAPTER 1
THE THEORY OF DISEQUILIBRIUM
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Disequilibrium is a word that lias been used to describe many behavioural 
phenomena in economic theory, so much so, that it is worthwhile considering 
such phenomena and attempting to establish some criteria for distinguishing 
between behaviour that might be regarded as consistent with equilibrium and 
that which might be best described as disequilibrium behaviour. Because the 
term disequilibrium has been used to encompass so many different aspects of
economic behaviour, a useful starting point is to provide a very general
definition.
The Oxford English Dictionary (1969) describes disequilibrium as the 
"... absence or destruction of equilibrium..."1 and describes equilibrium as 
"... the state of equal balance between powers of any kind..."2. This is a
very general definition of equilibrium. IVebsters (1976) provide a more
specific definition: "... a ... position toward which economic forces impel 
or about which fluctuations occur..."3.
Assuming that a decision maker attempts to reach this state of balance 
the question often arises as to the dynamic process involved4. One argument
1 The Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford University Press, Vol. Ill, 1969, 
p.446.
2 The Oxford English Dictionary, op.cit., p.257.
3 IVebsters Third New International Dictionary, G. f, C. Mcrrian T, Co., 
Massachusetts, 1976, p.768.
4 There are, of course, cases where interest is in the comparative statics 
of a model - i.e. a comparison of the characteristics of two equilibrium 
situations - in which case little attention is paid to the process by 
which economic units get there.
is that the process is immediate and any fluctuations about equilibrium are 
purely random effects. Such a viewpoint is not generally accepted, the more 
usual approach being to distinguish between different types of equilibrium 
(such as long run and short run).
At the centre of most economics is a choice theoretic structure in which 
decision makers attempt to optimize some objective function subject to 
constraints. The solution to this optimization problem is based on information 
available about the items or goods in the choice set. In a market economy the 
most important information is that of price. Given a vector of prices and 
initial endowments,the decision makers attempt to obtain the desired bundle 
of goods by trade in the various markets. As this trade takes place it is 
likely that the price vector will change,in which case the decision makers 
also revise their choices. It is a feature of an equilibrium model that such 
revisions take place quickly (instaneously) so that at no stage are decision 
makers forced into the position of not being able to satisfy their desires at 
the prevailing prices. Thus the state of balance is being continuously 
attained, with fluctuations about that state never being observed.
This is still the case even after common concepts such as short-run and 
long-run are introduced, since the notion that certain quantities can be 
readily adjusted, while others can only be adjusted after some time, can 
still be built into the choice theoretic structure by including various short 
term costs (e.g. by accounting for installation costs associated with capital 
equipment or for adjustment costs associated with an asset portfolio). The 
model will, as a result, allow for equilibrium changing over time. The 
allowance for a moving, rather than a stationary, equilibrium is the rule 
rather than the exception in most of the literature (e.g. partial and 
generalized adjustment models), with writers such as Frisch (1936) being
among the first to stress such a distinction. However in none of the fore­
going analysis does the decision making unit ever find itself in an undesired 
position; if they are not at the long-run equilibrium it is because they 
have chosen not to be there. More will be said about this in the next 
section.
The next development to be considered is that of the Walrasian equation 
explaining dynamic price adjustment. The equation evolves from the reasonable 
assumption that prices rise in response to excess demand and fall in response 
to excess supply. Samuelson (1941) writes this more precisely as:
(1.1) p = ^7 = H(q^-q^) where 11(0) = 0 and II' > 0 .
However it is still possible to regard (1.1) as simply an artifice designed 
to describe the behaviour of an auctioneer who "... registers the buy and 
sell offers. If .... there is excess demand, a higher price is called out; 
if excess supply is registered, a lower price is tried. The process is 
repeated until a market clearing price is found. Only then are actual
exchanges allowed to he carried out.....Such markets always clear ..."5.
In the continuous time framework this means the tatonnement process is 
instantaneous; if the model is in discrete time the process occurs between 
one period and the next. As pointed out by Leijonhufvud no transactor faces 
quantity constraints at the market price nor arc they required to find terms 
for themselves.
With the work by Clowcr (1965), Leijonhufvud (1968) and Alchian (1970), 
the possibility of non-clearing markets has been given a stronger basis.
The essential feature of such a notion is that information on the best
5 Leijonhufvud (1968), p.75.
4obtainable price is not available instantaneously or at zero cost to the 
individual transactor. In such cases it is optimal for a transactor to 
carry out a search for a favourable price and it may be preferable to do so 
"... while the good or person is not employed, and thus able to specialize... 
in the production of information"6. Some transactions will take place as the 
market moves gradually toward the new market clearing position and so 
equation (1.1) will now represent observable behaviour (manifested, for 
example, by labour market unemployment or commodity market inventory changes). 
To make the search and information cost analysis completely logical, the 
assumption in atomistic markets that all transactors are price takers is 
replaced by one that some traders have the option of making price offers and 
so are transitorily monopolists or monopsonists when the market does not 
clear, this power disappearing when all traders have full information at 
their disposal7. Thus there are transactors, usually either the sellers or 
the buyers, actually making a decision on price. Finally, Gordon and Hynes 
(1970) have indicated that the continuous time formulation with a perfectly 
divisible commodity would imply search is instantaneous and costless, in 
which case markets will always clear. This means that the individual's 
decision process is better formulated in a discrete time framework. If the 
various individuals make decisions at different moments then aggregation may 
lead to acceptance of the continuous time formulation of equation (1.1); 
however, when analysing economic data, observations are only available at 
discrete time intervals, so for practical considerations the discrete form:
( 1 . 2 )  Apt  = pt - p t _x = l l (qD t - q S t ) ; 11(0) = 0 , 11' > 0
is preferred.
6
7
Alchian (1970), p.110.
See Arrow (1959), pp. 45-47.
5Having argued for the possibility of non-clearing markets, the question 
arises as to the determination of actual quantity observed. It is possible 
to make no assumptions about this so that actual quantity remains 
indeterminate. Bowden ((1978a), chapter 3) examines such a model. However 
it has been more common to make additional assumptions which are usually of 
the general form:
(1.3)
with kDt > ks t e
made:
(i) kDt + k:
p.498) . If kDt ’
(ii) kDt + k;
aid kDt = k(qDt-,
= kDt ’ V  + kSt ‘ ‘'St
St
St 1 , kt = k(xt)
or c*t qst
1 if oVX t
0 if xt > o
Jaffee (1972):
( 1 ' 4) l' t  = mi n (qD t . qs P
which is just a special case of (i).
(iii) kDt + kSt = ß £ 1 ’ kt = k(xd  = 
and kp^ = k^pt'^St^ fivcs the condition
0 if xt < o
0 if x > 0
C1-5) qt ^  min(qnt»qSt)
as proposed by Muellbauer (1978).
There are other possibilities which are not considered here. Bowden (1979)
6adopts a slightly different approach by writing:
(1.6)
(1.7) yS ’ PS ~ 0 '
( 1 . 8 )
If a , 3 , C are all non-zero (1.5) is obtained while if a = 1 , 3 = 1  
and C = 0 then (1.4) is obtained. This approach has advantages in 
considering multimarkct models discussed in section 1.3 and in handling the 
likelihood for particular disequilibrium models discussed in chapter 2.
In each of the examples given, the actual quantity traded will differ 
from the notional quantity demanded and/or the notional quantity supplied.
The result of this may be unexpected inventory changes or quantity rationing 
of one side of the market (or possibly both). Y.'hile major interest in this 
thesis is focussed on the type of model with a dynamic price adjustment 
equation like (1.2) and some scheme determining quantity of the general form 
(1.3), it is worth noting that alternative approaches are often available.
If either quantity produced or traded plus inventory levels arc observed, it 
is often possible to build a model in which suppliers determine price, output 
and desired inventory levels while buyers determine quantity demanded at that 
price. The difference between actual output and demand will be reflected by 
inventory changes, some portion of which may be undesired8. In economic 
modelling this approach, when possible, may bypass problems associated with 
the alternative that does not, or cannot, account for inventories and instead 
uses (1.2) and (1.3) together with notional demand and supply curves. In
8 Examples of these types of models arc discussed by Anderson, Pearce and 
Trivedi in Chapter 2 of Pearce, Trivedi, Stromback and Anderson (1976).
section 1.2.2 the type of models which have made use of information on 
inventories will be discussed.
The disequilibrium model to be examined in greatest detail from section 
1.2.3 onwards consists of the following equations in the case of a single 
market:
(1.9) Dt = D(pt,Xlt)
(1.10) ' St = S(pt,x2t)
(1.11) Apt = ll(Dt-St)
(1.12) Qt = min(Dt,St)
where D, is quantity demanded, Sf quantity supplied, X and X^  
vectors of exogenous demand and supply variables, 0^ is actual quantity 
traded and p is price, all variables being observed at time t . Such a
model will be of value in econometric modelling when it is suspected that 
market clearing is sufficiently slow to occur, enabling non-clearing prices 
and quantities to be observed, and when information on inventories is 
unavailable. On economic grounds this type of model is ad hoc but a rigorous 
explanation of market search introducing costs of acquiring information into 
the decision makers utility function (in the short run only) has yet to be 
developed. A model that includes these factors will fall within the 
equilibrium framework in that it will explain choices subject to all the 
associated costs that are incurred. However even if a satisfactory economic 
theory is developed, problems in incorporating this theory into econometric 
investigations may still remain, leading to preference for the disequilibrium 
approach in estimation.
8In trying to define disequilibrium, it becomes apparent that it can be 
defined out of existence as one modifies the definition of equilibrium to 
account for new categories of costs previously not considered. Once adjust­
ment costs are allowed for, the generalized (or partial) adjustment model 
can be termed an equilibrium model with the equilibrium position changing 
over time. If economic theory introduced search costs and information into 
the choice theory an equilibrium model would replace the disequilibrium 
model (1.9) - (1.12). This would leave random fluctuations as the only 
source of true disequilibrium, with any other behaviour completely explicable 
given all costs, prices and initial endowments. In the absence of this 
framework the behaviour embodied in a system such as (1.9) - (1.12) is 
hereafter regarded as disequilibrium behaviour. To the extent that many 
models such as generalized (or partial) adjustment models have an underlying 
framework they will be termed equilibrium models. However since it is 
possible for these models also to be derived from equations (1.9) - (1.12), 
they are of significance when considering disequilibrium models.
In section 1.2 some non-econometric aspects of modelling individual 
markets in disequilibrium arc investigated. In section 1.2.1 partial and 
generalized adjustment models are examined and the relationship to the 
disequilibrium framework elucidated, while in section 1.2.2 models which 
avoid the disequilibrium framework by introducing inventories or unemployed 
resources are briefly discussed. In section 1.2.3 the type of model from 
now on regarded as a true disequilibrium model is examined - in particular 
the equation for price dynamics and aspects that have implications for 
econometric estimation, finally, because of the recent developments in 
multi-market disequilibrium models and their potential importance for 
macroeconomic problems, in section 1.3 some aspects of these models are
outlined.
91.2 A P P R O A C H E S  T O  THE M O D E L L I N G  OF D I S E Q U I L I B R I U M
1.2.1 Pa rt ial and G e n e r a l i z e d  A d j u s t m e n t  M o d e l s
An assumption of partial adjustment is very commonly included in 
economic models. That is:
U-13) yt ' yt-i = 5(y^-yt_i)
where y* is the long run desired level of y at time t and is usually 
some function of other variables:
(1.14)
The quadratic adjustment and disequilibrium cost framework underlying (1.13) 
is well known and not repeated here9. However it is worth noting that the 
quadratic disequilibrium costs, which are designed to account for profit or 
utility foregone as a result of being away from the long-run desired 
position, are only an approximation. To avoid this approximation a better 
derivation of the partial adjustment process is to include adjustment costs 
in the original utility function. For example:
(1.15) v r - t t
b 2 2 
2 GRyt I (yt - y t - d
where r^ is the rate of return on the activity under consideration,
the variance of r , b and c are positive parameters. Then maximization
yields:
cy
(1.16) t-1bo^ +c b0R+C
which is the same as first maximizing y r^. b 2 2 2 °R>t to obtain y* and
9 Sec Grilichcs (1967).
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then forming
(1.17) c = <y;-yt)rt - + 1 C v W 2
and minimizing C . The first two terms represent utility foregone as a 
result of y*  ^y . By using (1.15) and (1.16) it is clear that y* is 
a contrivance, since only if c = 0 is y* ever chosen in period t . The 
decision maker correctly accounting for all benefits and costs (rate of 
return, risk, adjustment costs) and initial conditions chooses y^ to 
maximize current profit or utility. In this respect partial adjustment 
models may still be classified as equilibrium models.
However the system (1.9) - (1.11) (i.e. (1.12) excluded) can lie used to 
derive a partial adjustment equation (provided D , S and II are replaced 
by linear functions of right hand side variables). This is the basis of 
the PAMEQ specification suggested by Bowden (19’78a, 1978b) :
(1.18) pt = pp£ + (l-y)pt_l 0 < p < 1
which is an alternative to (1.11) and is sometimes much easier to interpret
c(see section 2.5.1). The other equation in this model explains p by 
solving (1.9) and (1.10):
(1.19) p® = nzt
where II depends on the structural parameters of demand and supply curves
and Z. includes all the variables in X^  and X„ t It 2t
Vector generalizations of this form of model are possible as in Nadiri 
and Rosen (1969), Brainard and Tobin (1968), Parkin (1970) and Sharpe (1975). 
Hunt and Upcher (1979) provide a treatment of the generalized adjustment 
process assuming full adjustment and disequilibrium cost matrices. The model
11
is of the form:
( 1. 20) Bxt
(1.21) Ayt = D(y*-yt_])
where yt is a vector of observed endogenous variables, x^. is a vector of 
exogenous variables, and B and D are matrices of appropriate conform- 
ability. Equations (1.20) and (1.21) are combined as:
where C = DB and A = I - D and this is the type of model usually 
estimated in econometric applications. Hunt and Upcher (1979) show that 
a model of this form,based on quadratic adjustment and disequilibrium costs, 
must be stable and also show how standard errors of the eigenvalues of the 
system can be obtained to test for stability. If the modification suggested 
in (1.15) for the scalar case is adopted for the vector case the stability 
property can be verified just as before10. As mentioned before these models 
can be regarded as equilibrium models with adjustment via short-run 
equilibria to a long-run equilibrium.
The vector generalization can also be used for a multimarket PAMEQ 
specification:* 11
where if P is a k x 1 vector of prices and a G x 1 vector of
10 See Hunt and Upcher (1979), pp.313-317.
11 See Bowden (1978a), chapter 3.
(1.22)
(1.23) pt = MPj; + (I-M)Pt_]
(1.24) P® = BZ t t
12
exogenous variables then M is k x k and B is k*G .
The problem with models of the form (1.18) - (1.19) or (1.23) - (1.24) 
is that the quantity traded is left unexplained and the exogenous variables 
cannot be separated into demand determining or supply determining 
variables in any way unless the model builder has strong a priori grounds 
for particular classifications. Additional information in a model or 
additional assumptions may be desirable to overcome these problems. This is 
essentially the approach used in the models in the next two sections.
1.2.2 T h e R o le o f  A d d i t i o n a l  I n f o r m a t i o n
There are a significant group of models where the presence of 
disequilibrium, as manifested by inequality between notional demand and 
notional supply, can be handled by using stock-flow models where information 
on inventories or unemployed resources is available. For example Muellbauer 
(1978), Bowden (1978a) and Kooiman and Kloek (1979) have worked in the 
labour market context where unemployment and vacancies are used as indicators 
of market disequilibrium. However their treatment, while of value in explain­
ing the familiar unemployment-vacancies trade-off, may be recast to obtain 
the underlying supply of labour and demand for labour functions so that they 
can be estimated normally. That is, given employment, N , unemployment,
Ut , and vacancies, , real wage, w^/p , and supply and demand
exogenous variables and the model may be set up as:
(l - 2 5) Lst - N t ♦ U t = Ls (wt / p t ,Xs t )
u-26) St = Nt + h ■ W v T d
with no extra difficulties in overall approach than an ordinary supply and
13
demand model. This is an oversimplification in reality, since unemployment 
and vacancies are rarely accurately collected and some of the stock of 
unemployed labour is outside the workforce but able to move in very readily. 
Also unemployment and vacancies are collected as numbers of people or numbers 
of jobs while employment is more correctly measured as total manhours.
Models of commodity markets may also may also make use of inventories 
to avoid using a disequilibrium model. For example a supplier may be able 
to set price (at least in the short run), output and desired inventories.
If price is set according to the supplier's perception of the demand curve 
the output-inventories decision may be inconsistent with the quantity 
demanded. However, if inventories are observed, the difference between 
output and quantity traded is observable using the identity:
(1.27) xt = Qt + AIt
where X^ is output, Qt quantity traded and I inventories. Observing 
Qt enables X to be deduced or vice versa. This is under an assumption 
that producers never close up shop when declines in inventory become 
excessive or never ration buyers, for example, by only selling to regular 
customers. If such behaviour is possible or if inventory observations are 
unavailable then the use of additional assumptions,such as the addition of 
(1.11) and (1.12) to the equations (1.9) and (1.10), becomes useful.
1.2.3 The D isequ i l ib r ium Model
In this section the disequilibrium model (1.9) - (1.12) will be 
examined more closely in order to provide a stronger basis for such a model. 
The equation explaining the price dynamics lias usually been regarded as the 
weak link in the model, for example Gordon and ihnes (1970), and so is
14
singled out for specific attention. Since the other equations cause little 
difficulty they are considered first.
The demand and supply relationships of the model can be derived from 
choice theory assuming no monopoly or monopsony power - that is, all 
transactors are price takers. They can be regarded as notional supply and 
demand relationships, determining notional equilibrium price and quantity, 
and can even include lagged quantities (partial adjustment),12 although the 
choice between lagged notional and lagged effective quantities is one which 
has considerable implications for estimation of the model, as demonstrated 
later in this section and in section 2.3.1. At this point imposition of the 
condition:
(1.28) Qt = °t = St
would result in an equilibrium model13. However instead it is assumed that 
if one of the curves shifts then the necessity for market search imposes 
short term costs on decision makers. As information is assimilated there 
is a gradual movement back to equilibrium as implied by (1.28); meanwhile 
the short side of the market determines quantity traded thus giving rise to 
the minimum condition (1.12).
Now turn to the actual adjustment process. Assume that in the short 
run each firm has the ability to quote prices in response to observed 
imbalances in quantity demanded and supplied but has no overall monopoly
12 The incorporation of lagged variables can overcome the problem of the 
model suggesting that in response to a fall in demand quantity traded 
first falls then rises. This problem is demonstrated by Chow (1977).
13 The equilibrium model if solved will show price and quantity as a 
function of lagged quantity in the case where lagged quantity is 
included in the demand or supply equations. Thus there will be short- 
run and long-run equilibrium positions in this model.
15
power. Some suppliers quote above the competitive price, others below, but 
within a certain band. Outside this band, a high price results in the 
supplier gaining no additional trade while a low price results in the 
supplier being swamped by additional buyers. The overall effect is assumed 
to be that suppliers are at some point on the aggregate supply curve. 
However movement toward the equilibrium will not be instantaneous because 
disequilibrium costs and future search costs are offset by adjustment costs 
and present search costs. Assuming quadratic costs the adjustment and 
current search costs will depend on the magnitude of the movement from the 
original position to the current short run position. The disequilibrium 
and future search costs will depend on the magnitude of the adjustment that 
still remains. Thus:
a-29) Ct = I (St-st_ p2 ♦ I (Dt.r st)2
which is minimized with respect to S .
3C 1
That is = a(St-S^ )^ - b(Dt_^ -S^ _) = 0 . The solution is
(1.30) a c + — — Sa+b t-1 a+b t-1
which can be written as:
(1.31) A  - h-i (D ,-S ,)a+b t-1
The first thing to note is the similarity of (1.30) to a partial adjustment 
process, but with S* replaced by D  ^ . Next, if it is assumed that the 
supply curve is of the form:
(1.32) st = s(i’0
then:
16
(1.33) S(>V - sfPt-P = (D
or
(1.34)
But this is just a Walrasian equation with price adjustment to lagged 
disequilibrium as has been suggested by Laffont and Monfort (1977). The 
interval between successive observations may in practice make the version 
depending on current disequilibrium more appropriate. In econometric 
studies the choice between (1.11) and (1.34) may be set up as a choice 
between competing hypotheses although one may be ruled out on a priori 
grounds.
To the extent that the adjustment costs may depend on other variables 
that affect the supplier it may be feasible to respecify (1.11) as:
For example in certain circumstances if a new production technique is 
available it may mean that rather than increasing output and supply by 
increasing employment a more lengthy adjustment process involving new 
capital may be chosen. However,in general the property 11(0,Xp ) = 0 should 
be maintained as it is logical to expect no price variation when equilibrium 
is attained. One possible exception to this is administered pricing 
schemes where a central authority sets prices "... perhaps with a 
genuflection to the current state of demand"14. Another is where an 
oligopolist sets price as a mark-up on average costs, with the state of demand 
having a secondary effect. These situations are allowed for when issues 
concerning estimation of disequilibrium models are discussed in chapter 2
(1.35)
A p t =  " ( V W  •t f  Pt
1 4 Bowden (1978a), p.7.
17
but for the application in chapters 5 and 6 there are a priori reasons 
for forcing this function to pass through the origin.
In the original work by Fair and Jaffce (1972) it is argued that the
price variable appearing in the functions should be the relative price of
the good, i.e. the actual price normalized by a general price index (p.498).
This argument may be based on the fact that in a general equilibrium
consumption model it is only relative prices that are important. Apart from
the effect of the particular price on the general price index, usually
sufficiently negligible, the general price index is exogenous to the
particular market. Write as the price level of the particular good and
as the general price index so that relative price is P^ /G^ . (=pt) . If
G rises as a result of general inflation and P^  does not rise at the
same rate then P /Ci < P /G but ceteris paribus I) > S. due to the t t  t-lt-1 t t
slopes of the demand and supply curves. This is in direct contradiction 
with (1.11). Therefore it must be the case that in response to a change in 
Gj. , P^ also changes in such a way that p (=P^ ./Gt) does not change and 
Df = S is maintained. This means it must be assumed that the response of
the price level to the general price index is instantaneous with no 
disequilibrium resulting. Unless G^ is also included separately in demand 
and/or supply equations the existence of short-run money illusion is ruled 
out. It is not clear why the specification with actual price level 
responding to disequilibrium should be ruled out and money illusion is 
likely to be a feature of a model using price levels as opposed to relative 
prices. The major argument against price levels arises from practical 
considerations. In the face of general inflation partly due to a downward 
rigidity in general prices it may be empirically difficult to observe 
actual prices falling, which will lead to the incorrect conclusion that a 
particular market is always experiencing excess demand.
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A further consideration with the Walrasian equation for price dynamics, 
arising from empirical considerations, is that when a market is growing in 
size the impact of one unit of excess demand or supply will be much less as 
time elapses. Thus some modification to (1.11) may provide a better 
explanation of market behaviour. For example, if the equation is linear, 
the specification:
(1.36) Apt = Y(Dt-St)/Qt 0 < y  < ~ 
or
(1.37) Apt = Yt(Dt-St) Yt = Y/U+r)1 , 0 < Y < 00
may be superior although estimation becomes more complicated. An advantage 
of the PAMEQ specification is that it avoids these problems.
Finally, the possibility of asymmetrical adjustment is worth consider­
ation. If it is expected that suppliers respond differently to excess 
supply than to excess demand then:
(1.38) Apt = Ht (Dt-St) ; Ht (0) = 0 , > 0
f H+ if Ap^ > 0
where II = j is hypothesised and may be tested for in
( II" if Ap < 0
econometric models. If suppliers are the price setters, it is reasonable 
to hypothesise that their responses will differ in each case simply because 
they arc not being rationed when there is excess demand and so are on their 
supply curve, while they arc rationed and so arc not on their supply curve 
when there is excess supply.
Having discussed some of the issues that relate specifically to the 
Walrasian equation, the full model is now examined. For convenience, a
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linear version is considered, especially since this is the form used in 
the empirical work reported in subsequent chapters.
(1.39) Dt = aiPt-i + xitb
(1.40) St = a2Pt-j + X2tß2
(1.41) Al’t+k = Y(Dt-St}
(1.42) Qt = min(Dt,St)
where the possibility of lags in responses is introduced via the integers 
i , j and k . The case i = j = k = 0 is the most common version and if 
equations (1.39) - (1.41) are combined it is easy to show that if 
a9 - > 0 and y > 0 then the model is stable with monotonic convergence
of price and quantity towards the equilibrium. (i.e. when = S^. and
Apt = 0) . If y -* co (or 1/y = 0) then the model degenerates to the 
equilibrium model. If i = j = 1 and k = 0 or i = j = 0 and k = 1 solving 
(1.39) - (1.41) gives:
(1.43) Pt = ♦ d-Y(a2-a1))Pt_1
and if 1 > y(a?-o^) > 0 then the model is stable with monotonic convergence
of price towards the equilibrium; i f 2 > y (cl, -a^) > 1 then the model is
stable with oscillatory convergence towards equilibrium. If y(a9-a^) > 2
the model is unstable with explosive oscillations. All three types of
behaviour are possible given a9 - > 0 and y > 0 although as
y -> oo(l/y=0) the model becomes an equilibrium model. Quandt (1978) claims
that a large value of y may have nothing to do with rapid convergence to
equilibrium. However y -* °o still implies equilibrium since
D . -  . = — Ap. 0 as y -v oo so IT . ->■ S^. . . Quandt's conditiont-1 t-1 y 't ' t-1 t-1 x
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for a stationary solution is not correct as all that |l-y(a^-a^)| = l ensures
is that p.  ^ which implies equilibrium is never attained unless
pt = pt-i (which onIy occurs if (xitBr x2tB25 ■ •
A feature of many models is a partial adjustment mechanism introduced 
via a lagged dependent variable in a particular equation. For example, in 
(1.39) a lag on D could be included. This causes no problems in an 
equilibrium model since Q = D for all t , so that the lagged variable is 
both quantity demanded as well as quantity actually traded. However in the 
system (1.39) - (1.42) this is no longer the case. Sometimes Q = but 
other times Qt < D . Therefore a choice between using the lagged quantity 
demanded or the lagged actual quantity is necessary. In chapter 2 it will 
be shown that the choice has a significant bearing on the ease of 
econometric estimation of disequilibrium models but before doing so it is 
worth considering the economic basis for each of the possible choices.
First consider the buyer of the particular commodity. In period
t - 1 , D is demanded but only Q of this is satisfied. Thus if t-1 V l
D* is the desired long run level of demand in period t , the amount of
adjustment is  ^ while the distance from equilibrium is D* - .
If quadratic costs of adjustment and disequilibrium are introduced then the
solution will include Q „ rather than D . Thus it seems moret-1 t-1
sensible to have lagged actual quantity traded in the demand equation on 
these grounds. However there are some situations such as the introduction of 
expectations into the model that lead to the lagged notional demand being
0  j rincluded. For example if demand is a function of expected price p^ :
(1.44) Dt = Vt + xith
15 Here and in equations (1.45) and (1.46), p refers to expected price 
whereas generally it is defined as the equilibrium price.
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and expected price is generated as:
(1.45)
i.e. a mixture of extrapolative and adaptive expectations, as in Turnovsky 
(1970) and Valentine (1977), then (1.44) becomes:
The presence of D  ^ in this equation can cause problems for estimation as 
shown in chapter 2. However it is argued here that if the lagged variable 
arises from hypothesising partial adjustment the lagged actual quantity is 
the better choice while if it arises from an expectations scheme such as 
(1.45) the lagged notional demand is to be preferred.
Next consider the supplier of a commodity. The same arguments as for 
demand seem appropriate despite the possible complications of inventory 
decisions and output decisions. It can be argued that the most important 
decision the supplier makes is that of planned supply (as this has a major 
bearing on revenue), a decision which will be based on current assessment of 
market conditions as well as past information. In this latter respect,
 ^ , the quantity the supplier was able to sell at the price quoted in 
period t - 1 , has greater relevance than S^ __  ^ , the quantity the supplier
behaviour, as well as in determining unintended inventory changes which will 
affect current desired output rather than current desired supply. The 
upshot of these considerations is that there are good reasons for using 
lagged actual quantity in supply equations, although lagged notional supply 
is preferred if it is an expectations scheme that generates the lagged
(1.46) D. = a (1+0 +0 )p - a  ^ J t r  i 2U  t
would have liked to have sold. In fact the importance of S^_  ^ will have 
been in determining p^_  ^ , if (1.38) describes the firm's price setting
variable.
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This completes the discussion of the economic aspects of the single 
market disequilibrium model, some of which will be revisited in chapter 2 
when their implications for estimation are analysed. Before doing this, the 
extension to multi-market and, more importantly, macro-economic models will 
be reviewed.
1.3 DISEQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS IN A MULTIMARKET FRAMEWORK
In the multimarket framework most of the disequilibrium analysis has 
been applied to simple macroeconomic models. Patinkin (1956), Clower (1965), 
Leijonhufvud (1968), Barro and Grossman (1971,1976) and Malinvaud (1977) 
investigate disequilibrium properties of such models. The problems of 
obtaining an estimatable model are examined by Ito (1980), Gourieroux,
Laffont and Monfort (1980a)15 and Bowden (1979). A spillover analysis has 
been suggested by Jaffee (1977) for a flow of funds model in the financial 
sector, and Bowden (1978a) for the general multimarket model as mentioned in 
section 1.2.1.
If the analysis of Clower (1965) is taken as a starting point for 
analysis of the macroeconomic models then a crucial feature of such models 
is the dual decision hypothesis which distinguishes between a transactor's 
unconstrained and constrained optimization problem and yields notional and 
effective supply and demand schedules. In this respect the theoretical 
papers coincide, but the papers of Ito, GLM and Bowden differ. Ito and GLM 
assume that the constrained optimization problem of the transactors in a 
particular market is carried out with knowledge of the constraints operating 
in other markets but not that particular market. Bowden's analysis is
16 Hereafter abbreviated as GLM.
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carried out with all constraints being recognized ("binocular" as opposed 
to "monocular" vision, to use his terminology), including the one in the 
own market. His argument for this approach loses some cogency if it is 
realized that in the Ito and GLM model simultaneous determination of the 
constrained demand or supply functions will automatically account for all 
constraints in all markets, but behaviourally is much more sensible.
At this point the approaches diverge. Ito assumes a Cobb-Douglas type 
utility function for households and a Cobb-Douglas production function for 
firms in order to obtain equations of the form:
(1.47) y = yj + a.(£ -£N )7dt 7dt H  t stJ
(1.48) yst = yst + ^V^dd
(1.49) bt = £dt + M V b d
(1.50) b t  = *st + ß2(V ydd
together with minimum conditions
(1.51) yt = min(ydt’ysd
(1.52) b  = min(b t ’?'sd
where y ^  , y and yt denote effective demand for, effective supply of 
and actual traded amount in the commodity market and similarly for £ ^  ,
£ and £ in the labour market. The superscript N denotes notional 
rather than effective quantities and these are functions of prices, wages 
and initial endowments.
GLM specify linear relationships with spillover effects and later show 
a relationship between the coefficients on spillover effects and first and
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second derivatives of utility functions and production functions. The form 
of (1.47) in the GLM model is, as an example:
Perhaps most interesting is Bowden's approach which makes use of slack 
and dual variables used in linear programming. His treatment is therefore 
looked at in more detail. As with all models the household has an 
unconstrained maximization problem and a constrained one. The constrained 
one is
(1.53)
and 6, (p. ,w 1 explains y^ ' and £ ^  . 1 1 t t dt st
max U = U(y,£)
s . t . py = M + w£
y < y
£ < £
Forming L = U(y,£) - X(py+w£-MQ) - nd (y -y )  - Ys U-&)
and maximizing w.r.t. y and £ gives
uy = px + na
U. = wX + Y £ 1 s
which when solved gives:
(1.54) yd = y(P,w,M0,nd ,Ys)
Äs = Ä(p,w,M0,nd ,Ys) •O ’ 'd* 's(1.55)
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Now from Kuhn-Tucker optimizing theory:
nd(y-y) = y s U-&) = 0
so that a number of situations may arise:
(i) pd = y = 0 neither goods or labour constraints are binding so
which are the notional goods demand and labour supply functions y^ and
£ N  • s ’
(ii) rij = 0 , Ys > 0 or > 0 , = 0 in which case one constraint
is binding while the other is not;
(iii) Pd > 0 , Ys > 0 in which case both constraints are binding.
Expanding (1.54) and (1.55) about p^ = 0 > Ys = 0 using a Taylor 
scries expansion of order one gives:
(1.56) yd = yd ^ W ’V ° ’0)
(1.57) £s = ^ d ^ ’^ O ’0,0^
N
N
and if Vid = an nd , 0S = a22Ys , a y£ = a u / a 21 , a £y = a12/ a 22 then:
(1.58)
(1-59)
Similarly for firms:
(1.60)
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(1.61)
and
(yd>0,ys>0)
(Od>O,0s>O) .
The values of yd , ys , 0^ , 0 map out the four regimes that are common 
to all models. For example, y > 0 and 0s > 0 imply that firms are 
constrained in the goods market while households are constrained on the 
labour market (Keynesian unemployment).
Given notional demand and supply functions it is then possible to
construct the joint density for each regime. For example, when yg > 0 ,
0 > 0 s
N
yc = ys s s
£ = £N - 0s s s
so that if, as Bowden assumes, &d = = i and yd = y^ = y
and if
y p y . O  = Jo Jo h(y,^,yi,0j)dyid0^
then
f(y>£) = fsd(y,£) + fds(y,JD + fss(y,Ä) + fdd(y,ß)
and
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Thus Bowden's approach uses dual and slack variables which play the same 
/\
role as the more conventional spillover terms in other models.
The next step in these models is the addition of price dynamics.
Bowden shows how the adjustment process may be extracted from the optimising 
conditions in the constrained problem, i.e.
ui = A p i + y i
from which a shadow price
Pi ■ Pj + (VJ i / (3u/3Mq))
is obtainable. So if17:
then:
D • = Ai(Pi-Pi)
Pi = qui
and for the model in question
(1.62) p = Vd if p > 0
= V s otherwise
(1.63) " = Vd if w > 0
= V s otherwise .
In such a model Ap^ and Aw^ can be used to identify which of the four 
regimes is operative so that the likelihood is easy to set up - being the
•his price adjustment equation is still arbitrary, as there is still no 
underlying theory as to why the price movement is not instantaneous.
It has simply changed the problem of explaining straight away why 
Pi = k^y^ onc of explaining why p. = A.(p^-p^) .
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result of the transformation h(yj,y^,£j,£^) to f(y,£,p,w) for eachcl s a s
regime. With sample separation available the likelihood is:
4 1(i.64) l = n n f.(y,&,p,w) .
i=l [ta.i
While there lias been some development of these types of models, they 
are of necessity very simple. A limitation of such models is the 
proliferation of possible regimes as the number of markets included in the 
model is increased. The number of possible regimes is 2m where m is the 
number of markets. Therefore even a very simple macro-economic model with, 
say, consumer goods, investment goods, labour, money, and bonds has 2J or 
32 possible regimes. If sample separation is available the problem can be 
readily resolved since, using the two market case as an example:
* + .
p = p if p > 0
= 0 otherwise
• Cll1II
1
if p < 0
= 0 otherwise
and similarly for w . Then in (1.58) - (1.61), p^ , p^ ,
may be replaced by —  p+ 1 ’ k w and
1
0D and 0S 
The remaining
g g £ £
problem is the Jacobian term when transforming from structural disturbances 
to the variables y , £ , p and w . It will take on different values 
according to which regime is operative, but is not difficult to evaluate. 
For the case of m markets there would be 2m different values for the 
Jacobian.
The essential features of multimarkct models have been outlined here.
It is an area which requires further research and in particular some attempts
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at estimation may be worthwhile; however this is outside the scope of this 
thcsis.
1.4 CONCLUSION
In this chapter the economics of disequilibrium has been examined with 
the aim of establishing a basis on which to build the analysis of the 
following chapters. In doing so the definition of disequilibrium has been 
narrowed quite considerably and models frequently termed disequilibrium 
models have been classified as equilibrium models. Any models that lie 
outside a satisfactory choice theoretic framework are regarded for practical 
purposes as true disequilibrium models. Those models arising from concepts 
such as information costs arc in this category, as allowance for such costs 
is usually made after some utility and/or profit maximization problem has 
been solved. Economic agents may still be optimizing, but with respect to 
a wider assortment of costs than is built into the theory.
Major attention has been given to aspects of economic models where 
there are implications for the econometrics of succeeding chapters; however, 
a rigorous account of the economics is beyond the scope of this thesis. In 
examining these aspects a more thorough approach to developing the econo­
metric model of the Official Short Term Money Market in chapters 5 and 6 is 
possible, whereas in the past the economics has been given less detailed
treatment.
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CHAPTER 2
THE THEORY OF ESTIMATION OF MARKETS IN DISEQUILIBRIUM 
2.1 INTRODUCTION AND NOTATION
The most important paper, from which all subsequent disequilibrium 
econometric models have evolved, is that by Fair and Jaffee (1972), although 
the origins of many of the techniques they discuss may be traced back to 
Page (1955, 1957), Quandt (1958, 1960) and Goldfeld, Kelejian and Quandt 
(1971). While the paper by Fair and Jaffee has been shown to contain a 
number of errors, the ideas put forward have been generally accepted for 
analysis of markets in disequilibrium. It should be noted that some of the 
techniques discussed have a much wider application in economic theory to any 
models where, according to some (known or unknown) variation in certain 
economic variables, the parameters of a particular relationship switch from 
one value to another.1 On the other hand, are those techniques using some 
form of Walrasian price adjustment, either as an indicator of the regime 
that is operative, or as a separate equation with estimat able parameters, 
which are specifically applicable to the markets in disequilibrium model.
It is the latter that are of main concern in this thesis and so discussion 
of the theory will be directed in such a way as to be always closely related 
to such models.
The notation to be used in this chapter and in chapters 3 and 4 is now 
outlined. The model will always consist of a demand equation and a supply 
equation:
l For example llammermesh (1970), Davis, Dempster and Wildavsky (1966, 
1971), Silber (1974), Ilierl and Jen (1975).
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( 2 . 1 ) I = V t  + xitßi + ult »j S 0 , t = 1(1)T
(2.2) ’t = V t  + X2tß2 + U2t a2 > 0 , t = 1(1)T
where Dj- is quantity demanded in period t ,
S is quantity supplied in period t ,
pt is price in period t ,
X , arc vectors of demand and supply exogenous variables1 L Z L
respectively,
, an , and B2 are parameters of the model, and u^t , u?^
are disturbance terms.
If ut = (ult,u7t) then E(u£ut) = E1 =
Sometimes it may be convenient to rewrite the model as:
Ö 11 °12 
o 10
(2.la) ylt = ajPt - q tq  + ult = Zlt6j + It
(2.2a) Y2t = a2Pt + X2tß2 + U2t = Z2t62 + U2t
In equilibrium models it is assumed that
t = l (l)T 
t = l(l)T .
(2.3) St
where Q is the observed quantity traded in the market and with (2.1) and 
(2.2) this closes the model, and p^ being the endogenous variables.
However one may not wish to assume equilibrium in which case a number of 
alternatives to (2.5) are possible. First, one may assume
(2.4) Qt = ktDt + d - pt)St t = l (l)T
where = l for t ( f)j for which , S^_ f
' Qt • Dt * Qt0 for t £ 4>2 for which S
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Such a model carries very weak assumptions which leads to problems, the
Tmajor one being that 2 evaluations of the log-likelihood become necessary. 
Alternatively, the inclusion of a minimum condition
(2.5) Qt = min(Dt,St) t = 1(1)T
as outlined in chapter 1 is possible. Note that this is merely a slight 
restriction of (2.4).
Also useful is the inclusion of a Walrasian equation for dynamic price 
adjustment
(2.6) Apt = h(Dt-St) + u,t h* > 0 , t = 1(1)T
where if u„^ E 0 and the functional form is not specified one obtains
Fair and Jaffee's Directional Method 1. If h is specified in linear form
and u„ E 0 , then:.■>t
(2.6a) Apt = y(Dt-St) y > 0 , t = 1(1)T
which is the basis for the Quantitative Method outlined by Fair and Jaffee 
(1972). If u % 0 one can consider:
(2.6b) Apt = y(Dt-St) + + u„t Y > 0 , t = 1(1)T
which is the stochastic multivariate specification originally given more 
specific attention by Fair and Kelejian (1972) and Maddala and Nelson (1974). 
For convenience (2.6a) will be referred to as the Basic Walrasian 
specification (abbreviated hereafter as BW specification) and (2.6b) the 
Stochastic Multivariate Walrasian specification (abbreviated hereafter as 
the SMW specification). If ß„ = 0 then (2.6b) is abbreviated as the SW 
specification. Hartley (1973a,1973b), Maddala and Nelson (1974), Hartley 
and Mallela (1977) and Hartley (1977) have discussed models which consist of
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equations (2.1), (2.2) and (2.4). Bowden (1978a) has developed a model which 
consists of (2.1), (2.2) and a reformulation of equation (2.6a) which he 
calls the PAMEQ specification (price adjustment to a moving equilibrium).
Fair and Jaffee (1972), Maddala and Nelson (1974), Laffont and Monfort (1977) 
and Laffont and Garcia (1977) have dealt with models consisting of (2.1), 
(2.2), (2.4) and (2.6) with h not specified and u = 0 . However by far 
the most popular model is that consisting of (2.1), (2.2), (2.4) and (2.6a) 
or (2.6b). Fair and Jaffee (1972), Amemiya (1974), Maddala and Nelson (1974), 
Fair and Kelejian (1974), Goldfeld and Quandt (1975), Bowden (1978a,1978b), 
Laffont and Monfort (1976), Laffont and Garcia (1977), Rosen and Quandt 
(1977), Quandt (1978) and Upchcr and Walters (1978) have all 
discussed or used this model.2
It would not be possible to discuss all of the outlined models in 
this thesis and the major interest is in models of markets in disequilibrium. 
Consequently only two of the models are given close attention in the 
following sections. The first is the qualitative or directional short side 
model consisting of equations (2.1), (2.2), (2.4) and (2.6) with h not 
specified and u„^ = 0 . The second is the quantitative model consisting of 
(2.1), (2.2), (2.4) and (2.6a) or (2.6b). These are focussed upon as they 
make full use of reasonable a priori economic assumptions about market 
behaviour and it is the analysis of markets that is the centre of attention 
in the applications of chapters 5 and 6.
2.2 THE D I R E C T I O N A L  M E T H O D  OF E S T I M A T I O N
This method is used when the model consists of (2.1), (2.2), (2.5) and 
(2.6), with no assumption about the functional form other than h* >0 and
2 This is not designed to be an exhaustive list of such articles.
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h (0) = c where c is a constant
Then if kt = 1 when Ap^ > c
= 0 when Ap^ < c
(2.7) T = kt»t - d - q ) s t
= ktCV t - i +Xl t V V t - r X2tß2) + V t-j + x2tß2
+ kt(ult~u2d + u2t
where lags of i and j on the price variable have been imposed on demand 
and supply equations respectively (usually these are zero or unity).
2 . 2a L e a s t  S q u a r e s  E s t i m a t i o n
Given the known sample separation which has been obtained using Ap^ ,
it is feasible to estimate (2
when Ap > c and D >t st =
V t - i  + V i + u-, It > a2pt-j
large and Xo^ and U2t arc
particular, if Xlt and X2t
large and un 2t smal 1 so that
that
11 It
It
E(Xituit) f 0 for t E is likely, so that least squares estimation
will be inconsistent. An instrumental variables technique does not appear 
feasible as no set of instruments is obvious. Thus least squares 
techniques do not possess desirable properties and one must consider a 
maximum likelihood (hereafter referred to as ML) approach.
2 . 2b M a x i m u m  L i k e l i h o o d  E s t i m a t i o n
Provided price is exogenous in the demand and supply equations one can 
apply ML techniques as discussed by Maddala and Nelson (1974). While this
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is a restriction that one might usually be reluctant to impose the most 
feasible model that fits into this framework is:
(2.8) Dt = Ojp
(2.9) St = V
(2.10) h  -
(2.11) &P , I 11 + 1 <
In this case the likelihood is:
t
t
+ X ß + u It 1
+ + u2t 2
min(Dt ,St) .
as D I S
It '
2t '
t '
( 2 . 12 )
where
and
l = n y q p  n q c Q t ) 
AV r c APt+i-c
00w f(Dt ,Qt)dDt and q  (Qt) f(Qt ,st)dSt
f(W>sJ  = 5--—  exp{-tup) ut)t ’ t It ’ 2t (2u)|E.
By completing the square in the exponent term of f(D ,S^ .) it is possible 
to evaluate the integrals numerically using the cumulative normal 
distribution. First and second derivatives of L will contain integrals 
and so the likelihood must be maximized using numerical first and second 
derivatives or by avoiding their use altogether.3
Note that the value of c may be known (or at least specified a priori) 
or alternatively one might search over a range of values of c and choose a 
value that gives the maximum of maximized likelihoods. However it is 
conceivable that c itself may vary over time and this further complicates
3 The use of an optimization algoritnm such as PRAXIS is one way of 
avoiding use of such derivatives. See Brent (1973).
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the approach - requiring specification of how c varies as well. In 
particular it may require c to vary according to some linear combination 
of exogenous variables with the exact combination to be derived during 
estimation. However this approach will not be pursued further in this 
thesis.
The Directional Method avoids making precise assumptions about the 
magnitude of price adjustment to market disequilibrium,but at a cost. Least 
squares techniques will be generally inconsistent (also they discard part of 
the sample for each equation) and maximum likelihood is only available for a 
restricted choice of models. There appears to be a strong case for making a 
slightly stronger assumption as in (2.6a) or (2.6b) - an assumption that is 
common in the economics literature - as it is shown to result in a number of 
operational advantages over the Directional Method. Therefore, in what 
follows, specifications with a Walrasian equation are considered. These are 
the ones that are chosen in the application in chapters 5 and 6 and so are 
singled out for special attention.
2.3 LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATION OF MODELS WITH A WALRASIAN EQUATION 
2.3.1 Introduction
In section 1.2.3 a number of economic considerations in relation to the 
Walrasian specification have been considered. It is the major purpose of 
this section to deal with least squares estimation of such models. It 
transpires that the form (2.6a) is the most amenable to least squares 
estimation - that is the Basic Walrasian (BW) specification:
It(2.13) Vt + hth + u: oij < 0
37
(2.14) st = a
(2.15) Qt = min(Dt,St) .
(2.16) Apt = Y(Dt-St) Y > 0 .
In section 1.2.1 it was also pointed out that (2.16) can be respecified as:
(2.17) pt = yp° + (l-p)pt_1 0 < y < 1
Y(a2-a1)
where y = --- j ----- —
1+Y(a2-al)
Bowden (1978a, 1978b) has argued y is easier to interpret and test than 
Y . Since y = 1 implies an equilibrium model and corresponds to y ,
the hypothesis of equilibrium is II : y = 1 in the former case and 
II : y in the latter. While it is true that the latter specification
looks awkward it can be respecified as : 1/y = 0 which overcomes this
problem, although it is agreed that y is easier to interpret than y 
(or 1/y)• This is borne out by the fact that for given y , which implies 
a proportion y of the adjustment to equilibrium takes place in one period, 
y can take on numerous values depending on and a0 .
The advantage of the PAMEQ specification is lost in some alternative 
specifications. If instead of (2.16):
(2-18) &Pt+1 = Y(Dt-St)
it is easy to show that
(2-19) Pt+l = UPI * (l-U)Pt
where y = y(a?-a.) . If y + ® (or 1/Y=0) , (2.18) implies the 
model is an equilibrium model, but as y -> co so does y .
2l\ + x2tf;2 + u2t a 2 J 0
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0
(All t h a t  y = 1 im p l ie s  in (2.19)  i s  t h a t  p = p^ r a t h e r  than 
p^+  ^ = Pt + j ) -  S i m i l a r l y ,  i f  p r i c e  i s  lagged  in  (2.13) a n d /o r  (2.14) and 
(2.16)  i s  used ,  t h i s  same s i t u a t i o n  a r i s e s .  This  l e ad s  to  a p r e f e r e n c e  f o r  
th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  f o r m u l a t io n ,  a l though  the  PAMEQ i s  o f t e n  o f  g r e a t  va lue  in  a 
s u p p o r t i v e  r o l e  in  c a se s  where y p o s s e s s e s  advan tages  o f  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .
2.3.2 The Basic Walrasian Specification: Least Squares Estimation
Equa t ions  (2 .13)  - (2 .16)  may be r e c a s t  as :
(2.20) Qt  = “ l ^ t  + xu ß i - ( 1/y )Ap^
(2.21) ° t  = a 2Pt  + X2 t ß2 ( 1/y)Ap~
(2.22) Ap^ = Apt  i f APt  " 0
= 0 o th e rw is e  .
(2.23) Ap~ = 0 i f  Ap > 0
= - Apt  o th e rw is e  .
This  system c o n s i s t s  o f  fou r  e q u a t io n s  and fou r  endogenous v a r i a b l e s :
Qt  , pt  , Ap* and Ap . However the  system i s  c l e a r l y  n o n - l i n e a r  in  the  
endogenous v a r i a b l e s  as ev idenced  by the  i d e n t i t i e s  (2.22)  and (2 .2 3 ) .  The 
i d e n t i t i e s  may be ignored  so t h a t  (2 .20) and (2.21)  a r e  e s t i m a t e d .
The f i r s t  l e a s t  squa res  approach to e s t i m a t i o n  o f  (2.20) and (2.21) i s  
sugges ted  by P a i r  and J a f f e e  (1972) and in v o l v e s  e s t i m a t i n g  th e  fo l low ing  
reduced form e q u a t io n s :
(2.24) Apt  = X ir + v Vt S . t .  Ap > 0 (ttil) )
&Pt  = Xt u^ + v? t  Vt s . t .  Apt  < 0 (tft|<2)(2.25)
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where consists of exogenous variables and includes X , X and
. Then using Ap^ , Ap^ and p^  ^ , p^ is constructed and (2.20)
and (2.21) estimated using these instruments. Neither the IV or OLS
estimator of (2.20) and (2.21) is consistent as Amcmiya (1974) has pointed
out. This results from the fact that even if plim ^  X!u. = 0 for i= 1,21 1 1
1 V 4this will not necessarily be true for plim —  ) X. u. .
1 lZ 11
The regressions:
(2.26) +Apt - V l  + Vlt t = 1 (1) T
(2.27) Ap' - V 2 + v2t t = 1 (1) T
will yield consistent estimates with IV and OLS estimation of (2.20) and (2.21) 
being identical. Having obtained Ap* and Ap^ , p^ is obtained using 
the identity:
(2.28) pt = Pt _1 + Ap* - Ap”
or often more conveniently by estimation of:
(2.29) pt  = xt 1'o + vot
where X must include pt -1 If X XT )
other variables, then using (2.29):
and similarly for
(2.30) p = X(X'X) ]X'p = X(X'X) ] X' (p +Ap+-Ap )
and if p _ . is included in X , it is easy to show that X(X'X)  ^X' p = p  , J “  1  ~  1.
so that it is clear that (2.28) and (2.30) give the same result for p^ .
*♦ The condition plim j X'u is sufficient for consistency although 
Amemiya considers E(X’u) = 0  which would require X to be non- 
stochastic .
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This technique,from now on called the non-linear estimator (abbreviated as 
NL estimator), forms instruments for the non-linear functions Ap^ and Ap^ _ 
by regressing the functions on the exogenous variables of the system.
An alternative is suggested by Bowden (1970a) and entails estimation of
^ A /X *4"(2.29) to obtain p^_ and then the use of p^ and p^_  ^ to form Ap^ and
/\ —Ap^ . This technique is called the NAIVE technique.
Also suggested by Bowden (1978a, 1978b) is a conditional expectations 
technique (CE technique). This also, as a first step, requires estimation
/Nof (2.29) from which it is possible to obtain m (conditionally on X-| t 
and Pt_j) as Pt - Pt _I where m = E(Ap^ _ | X^t,X2t ,Pt_ i) • After some 
manipulation it is possible to replace Ap^ by the instrument:
A a  /\ 2 -v O  ( 1 .A , N 91m tN(0,mt ,0") - -j== expj- y  (mt/o) j
or:
(2.31)
where
m [1-N(m 0,O2) ] - cxpj-y(m /o)2t t /2tF l 2 t
N(x,u,cr)
.2
2tt*ö
expj - \ (y-u/o)2 J^dy .
The estimated o" is obtained as the estimated variance of Ap^ _ from (2.29) 
The instrument for Ap^ _ is then:
(2.32) n\ N(nV ° ’S } + ox,,|-i(mt/5)2
By using a slightly revised notation it is possible to examine the 
properties of these alternative estimators. Some of the results stem from 
those in Kelejian (1971), Edgerton (1972) and Bowden (1978a). Write the i^1 
structural equation of a simultaneous model as :
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(2.33) = 8i(Yi’Xi)0i + xi^i + ui
where
(yi 1 yiT) (Y,il Y ) ' iTJ (xil xiT) '
and = (u^...u^.)' and are TX1 , TXH^ , TxlC and Txl respectively. 
Also is a functional operator for the i^1 equation and g^(Y^,X^) is
TxG. . Then 0i is G^l and 3- is K^l . Also define X = (X.:Xt) 
as the full set of exogenous variables in the system. Assume that
X ’u i v
---- ---x N(0,^) and 1 im — X'X = Q which is finite and non-singular.5
/F T-x» 1 XX
Equation (2.33) may be written even more compactly as:
(2.34) y. = Z.6. + u.i l i  l
where Zi = [g^ (Y^, X^) : X F  and 6^ = [0|:ßM .6
5 By ---> itismeant convergence in distribution.
6 The correspondence between this model and that in (2.20) - (2.23) is easy to 
show. X will include p_^ and if h is a function such that
h(x) = x if x > 0
= 0 otherwise
then g1(p,X1)01 = o^p - (l/y)h(p-p_1)
(p:h(p-p_1)) 1
1 / Y
and g2(p,X2)02 = a2p + (1/y) (p-p^ - h(p-p_1)
(P: (P-P.p - h(p-p_1)) U / y J
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The simultaneous estimation approach first chooses Z. , the instrument 
for , and then at stage two obtains the OLS estimator:
(2.35) 6 p 3 = (Z!Z.) 1Z.yi 
or the IV estimator:
''TV " -l"(2.36) 6|V = (Z!Z.) Z.y. .
Mechanically none of the three techniques in question differ at stage two; 
it is at stage one that they differ, and this may result in different 
properties in relation to consistency, efficiency and asymptotic distribution. 
These properties are now considered, as well as the effects of some possible 
modifications to the specification of the underlying model.
a) Consistency
The NL technique forms instruments for g^(Y^,X.) by using a 
matrix At of chosen numbers so that XAt replaces g.(ih,X.) while X^ is 
its own instrument. Thus if XA^ = (XAt’:X^) :
(2.37) 6W  = 6. + (A.'X'Z.)-1A!X’u.l i i l l l
and:
(2.38) plim(6^-6jL) = plim
= 0
As long as the reduced form of the model is linear then this result is easy 
to show, but in non-linear cases with no closed linear reduced form, such
A X ' Z.l l plim
A.'X'u.l l
if plim
A ! X ' Z .l l is finite
7 See Schmidt (1976), pp.123-125, especially proposition 5.
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a condition is not obvious. For example, in the model (2.20) - (2.23) the 
reduced form is obtained as follows:
(2.39) n = X TT + Vpt t o  Ot
where Xt = (x31»x2t >pt-l^ ’ ^0 = 13 ( 1+Y (c^-0^ ) (o^ -o^ ))
1/ (l+y(a2~a1) ] and vQt = y (u] t -u2t) / (1+y (a2 -o^ ) ) .
But then:
(2.40) Apt -  hjCAp ) -  hd V o - P t - l +vOt)
where h^(x)
and: 
(2.41)
x if x > 0 
0 otherwise ,
A p t" = h 2( V o - i >t - l + v O t )
where h?(x) = x if x < 0
= 0 otlierwise.
Finally:
(2.42) Qt = X^cu + v^a. + X^ß. -- I'i (V o A - W  + U it
= hq (Xt ’P t -l ’V 0t) + V  '
If Z. = [pih.(Ap):x.] and 6. = [a.:-1/y:$']
then A.'X'Z. = [A!X' (Xtt + v q ) : A! X' h. (Xi^-p 1 +v()) : A! X ' X. ] for i = 1,2 and
X' Xthe term A!X'h.(Xn -p +v ) causes problems since even if ——  is finite
X'hi(X)
and non singular, it is not clear whether ---—--- satisfies this
condition. Some simple examples may clarify this problem. Consider the
T1 y 2case where X is Txl such that lim p X'X = lim I x /T = q and the
T-x» T-x» t=l
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following c a s e s :
(i) li(xt) 2= Xt (i.e.
xt - V t .
Then 1im
T-H»
, T
i  y
1 t--i
xth ( xt ) = 1 im 
T-*»
(ii) h(xt)
t= XXt (i.e.
xt = v/q V t .
Then 1im
i ' - K O
1  T  
1  y
1 t=i
xth(xt ) = limf-X»
(iii) h(xt) = -xt if xt
3/2
(t+1/2)
m  = <
00 if q > 1
1 if q = 1
0 if q < 1
othcrwise.
1 vIf plim - I x = q 
T-x» t = l
2 . 1 r 2then it is clear that 0 < plim — / x < q
T-x» x >0 1
i
Then lim ^ £ xth(xt) = lim j  \ (-x~)
T^-oo t = l T-*» x^cO
-q + plim ^  I x~ 
T-x» xt>0
which lies between zero and -q .
(iv) h(xt) as in (Hi) but now x^
T
/q with probability 1 - (1/T) 
Vq with probability 1/T
T
Then plim ^ £ h(x ) = 0 and plim qr  ^ x = Jq so, using Slutsky’s
T->oo t = 1 T-x» t = 1
i Ttheorem, plim qr  ^ x • h(x ) = 0 
T-x» t = l
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These examples show that for continuous or discontinuous functions one can
T
find examples for which £ x * h(x )/T converges to zero as T -+ 00 so in
t=1 %
the scalar case the condition that £ x * h(x )/T a finite constant is
t= 1 ^
violated. Returning to the full model this means that before consistency
X' Z.
can be established the assumption plim A! — -—  = A!Q , where A! Q is
rr> 1 1 1 AL  . 1 Xl -
1-X» 1 1
finite and non-singular, must be made. Furthermore A^ is (G^+K^) x K
and Q^v is K x (G.+K.) , therefore A^Q is non singular only if 
i 1 1  ^ i
rank(A.) = rank(Q ) = (G.+K.) . Having established this additional 
1 1 1 
1
necessary assumption, it is possible to consider each estimator in turn.
The NL method using IV estimation at the second stage is consistent
by virtue of (2.58). If the Instrument for is Z^=X(X'X) ^X'Z^ then
/\ /\ /\
clearly ZjZ^ = so that the IV and OLS estimators at stage two are
equivalent.
A A
The NAIVE method obtains and then forms Z^ by using
^  /N
[giC^i’Xi)•Xi] where is obtained from the regression:
(2.43) Y. = X tty  + vy .
If the disequilibrium model is being dealt with Y^ is equivalent to p 
which has a linear reduced form and g^ depends on p and Fu (Ap) . The 
IV estimator is:
(2.44) 6;IV
IV0 :1 0.1 M W  W V  gi(Vi>X.l'Xi> < +
]
f • H 
CO.
__
1 _ ß i_ Xi M W  X!Xi
— r - 1
8i(Yi’XiV u i
Xiui
46
While Bowden (1978a) has proved consistency when g^  is continuous, in 
disequilibrium models g^ is usually discontinuous and so does not admit 
to the normal Taylor series expansion used in his proof.8 For example, if 
in the model (2.20) - (2.23) Ap is obtained as Ap = X(X'X) ^X'Ap then 
h.(Ap)'ui = h. (X tt* + X ( X ' X ) ’Vv*) ' • u. where Ap = Xtt* + v* is the reduced 
form for Ap . It therefore follows that:
h.(Ap)’ h ix 'X(X’X) V
where h^ = 1t (X tt*) , h ^  is a TxT matrix of first derivatives of h^ 
evaluated at X tt* . But, if X tt* > 0 then h ^  = X tt* , h ^  = 1 and if 
X tt* < 0 then h = 0 , h = 0 . So an exact piecewise expansion is:
A  1 A
- h.(Ap)' • u.
TT*,X ,u i + j v*'X(X'X) ]X'u. if X tt* > 0
otherwise
Even if plim 4- X'u. = 0 when all T observations on X and u. are 1 T l i
considered this result need not hold if a subset of observations is chosen.
This is similar to the situation in section 2.2.a in relation to E(X.J.u. )it it
for t £ ijj. . This is the case even if it is assumed that the X's are 
bounded.9 Thus consistency is not guaranteed for the NAIVE technique, even 
using IV estimation - although it may be that counter examples are rather 
pathological and that usually conditions for consistency are met.
The CE technique is consistent for both IV and OLS estimation at 
stage two as shown by Bowden. However the estimates will differ, unlike the 
NL technique. Where IV and OLS estimation differ the IV estimator is
8
9
This is recognized in a more recent paper by Bowden and Turkington 
(1979).
The boundedness assumption is necessary but not sufficient.
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1chosen as the  c o n d i t i o n  pl im — Z|u^ = 0 only  i s  r e q u i r e d  fo r  c o n s i s t e n c y
I  A A 1 ^
while  i f  t h e  OLS e s t i m a t o r  i s  chosen pl im ^  ZjZ^ = pl im — ZjZ^ i s  a l s o  
r e q u i r e d .
b) Efficiency
Following Dhrymes (1970,p p . 296-298) an e f f i c i e n t  in s t ru m en t  w i l l  
be one t h a t  i s  h ig h l y  c o r r e l a t e d  with  the  v a r i a b l e  i t  i s  r e p l a c i n g ,  where 
e f f i c i e n c y  i s  measured in te rms o f  th e  g e n e r a l i z e d  v a r i a n c e .
For t h e  NL e s t i m a t o r  i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  a n o n - l i n e a r  fu n c t io n  o f  
endogenous and exogenous v a r i a b l e s  i s  r e g r e s s e d  on a l i n e a r  combinat ion of  
exogenous v a r i a b l e s  in o b t a i n i n g  in s t ru m e n ts  t o  r e p l a c e  th e  f u n c t i o n .  That 
i s  the  r e g r e s s i o n :
M W  = X7Ti  + v i 
~  _ 1
i s  performed to  o b t a in  g^ = X(X'X) X'g. . K e le j ian  (1971),  Fdger ton (1972) 
as well  as  Bowden (1978a) sugges t  t h a t  e f f i c i e n c y  w i l l  be enhanced i f  h ig h e r  
powers o f  exogenous v a r i a b l e s  a re  a l s o  chosen ( i . e .  squa re s ,  cubes e t c . )  as
A
then g^ w i l l  be more h ig h l y  c o r r e l a t e d  wi th  g^ . Thus t h e r e  a re  a number
o f  NL e s t i m a t o r s  a v a i l a b l e  depending on what o rd e r  of  h ighe r  powers and
c ro s s  p ro d u c ts  o f  exogenous v a r i a b l e s  a re  chosen.  The s im p le s t  but  l e a s t
e f f i c i e n t  w i l l  be the  l i n e a r  NL e s t i m a t o r  where h ighe r  powers a r e  exc luded .
The o th e r  e s t i m a t o r s  a rc  the  polynomial  NL e s t i m a t o r s ,  h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d
to  as P0LY(d)-NL e s t i m a t o r s  where d i s  the  o rd e r  o f  approx im at ing
/ \
polynomial .  As d i n c r e a s e s ,  e f f i c i e n c y  w i l l  i n c r e a s e ,  s in c e  g^ -* g^ .
In t h i s  r e s p e c t  K e le j ian  (1972) i s  i n c o r r e c t  as reg a rd s  the  requ i rem ent  o f  a 
s u f f i c i e n t l y  l a r g e  va lue  o f  d fo r  c o n s i s t e n c y ;  as long as pl im ^  X'u = 0 , 
c o n s i s t e n c y  i s  ensured  fo r  a l l  d . Of g r e a t e r  concern  i s  Bowden's (1978a)
48
suggestion that the order of the approximating polynomial may have to be 
quite high given the non-linearity in g^  , especially because this leads 
to a proliferation of independent variables in the reduced form equations 
(c.g. with K=4 exogenous variables and d=3 there are 34 such combinations).
However the justification for such polynomials (argued rather 
heuristically in the literature) is the underlying Taylor series expansion 
of the function g^  . Returning to the disequilibrium model, because In in 
(2.40) and (2.41) arc no longer continuous they can only be expanded piece­
wise. Moreover they are piecewise linear, for example:
ah.
AP, hjCApp = hj (a) + (Apt-a) • 9x x=a
a + (Ap -a) *1 if Ap , a > 0
I
0 otherwise .
1
Higher order polynomials do not play any part in determining Ap^ _ , so 
although they may enhance efficiency it is not clear what other effects may 
result from their use (for example small sample bias). Furthermore, in 
reality, economic data may be highly multicollinear so only using d=l may
A
result in no great loss of efficiency.10 Finally, as g^ g^  the two 
stage IV or OLS estimator becomes very close to the basic OLS estimator 
which is known to be biased. Thus a high value of d may introduce small 
sample bias. A final consideration on the use of polynomials is that if the 
OLS estimator is used at stage two the order of the approximating polynomial 
must be the same for all reduced form equations for endogenous variables in
One means of assessing this is to apply various model selection criteria 
in order to choose an optimal d . Such criteria are discussed by 
Sawyer (1979a, 1979b). In particular, some criteria penalize 
increasing number of regressors more heavily than others and so more 
parsimonious equations may be preferred.
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a structural equation in order that consistency be maintained, while this
is not necessary for the IV estimator,as is now shown. If is
partitioned into Z,. and Z^ . and Z.. = P Z., and Z„. = P..Z., where 1 li 2i li N ll 2i M ll
Pj = Xj (X^Xj ) *X^ with d representing the order of the polynomial chosen 
and Xj representing a matrix of l,...,dt  ^ order terms of exogenous 
variables then the OLS estimator is:
:ols IV 1:6 = + (Z!Zi) Z!(Zi-Zi)6i
Now / \  S\
7 ! 7 -
Z ! i P» PKZ. i 11 N N 11 Z ? 1 P ü PM Z -7ll N M i2
Lt • Li . ~1 1 7 i p i p 7
1 i2 M N il Z- V mPm Z-o i2 M M i2
Z'Z 11 11 Z' P'P..Z il N M i2
7 t p \ p 71 i2 M Nil 7 ' 7 i2 i2
since P'.P. = P\ . d d d
and
Z! Z.l l
) plim (6^-6i)
/\
Z! Z Z’ Zil il il
A
Z! „Z
/N
Z! 7i2 il i2
If plim ^ (Z ! Z . - Z ! Z.) = 0 then plim (6OLS-6.IV) = 0
T-h »  i l l  i 1 l
But plim — (Z!Z.-Z!Z.) * T i i  lI-K»
plim y
T-x»
ZhPN(I-VZi2
_Z' P'(I-PM)Z., i2 M N ll
0 iff P' = P'PM and P'P.. = P' M M N N M N
which in general is true only if M = N .
While the NAIVb technique may be inconsistent it may be efficient 
relative to the linear NL technique, since it estimates the one reduced 
form equation (that for p in the disequilibrium model) that is exact and
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uses the exact functional form on the resultant prediction. However there 
is no way of ascertaining this other than through simulation experiments. 
Bowden (1978a, 1978b) and more recently Bowden and Turkington (1979) have 
performed some experiments but in the process left a number of questions 
unresolved. These will be revealed later and provide the justification for 
the simulation experiments of chapter 3. The CE technique has great appeal 
in that not only is it consistent, but also, by replacing the non-linear 
functions by their expcctations,using the true reduced form for p in the 
disequilibrium model, it may lie expected to provide good instruments for 
these functions. The evidence of previous simulation studies supports this 
contention.
While chapter 3 provides an assessment of these techniques which differ
in the first stage of estimation it is important to consider a number of
factors which affect efficiency during estimation of the structural equations.
First, if the disturbances are contemporaneously correlated across equations
(i.e. Z^ is not diagonal) then two stage IV or OLS will be inefficient
^OLS /SIVrelative to three stage IV or OLS. Having obtained 6^ or it is
/N /N /N
possible to obtain u. and then S. . = —  u.'u. where S. . is row i1 ij T l j ij
/\
column j of S and S = Z . Then if:
(2.45) y* z +
where y^ =
r ^
u • zi ° ■ ' « 1 ' ’ U 1 '
> z* = , 6* and u* =
. y2 . . 0 Z2 J . q  . > U2 >
2Txl 2Tx (K1+K2) (G +G )xl 2Txl
then:
= Lz* (S_1C4I)Z*]_1[Z^ (S_1®I)y*](2.46) 7GLS 0 *
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and
- G T V - -1 _ 1 -(2.47) 6* = [z;(s 0I)Z*1 [z;(s 0I)yJ .
More significantly, in the markets in disequilibrium model the demand and 
supply equations will contain a common parameter, 1/y , in the symmetrical 
adjustment case, so that the imposition of an across equation restriction is 
necessary. In doing this the choice of restricted three stage least squares 
estimation is in general superior to two stage least squares. In the 
simulation experiments performed by Bowden it is assumed that there is zero 
correlation across equations and that adjustment is symmetrical, but use of 
the restriction is not made at stage two. This clearly results in a loss of 
efficiency and could even affect the relative performance of the different 
estimators in small samples. This is one reason for performing the 
simulation study in chapter 3.
c) Asymptotic Distribution
For the model of general form
y . = Z. 6 . + u .7 1 l i  i
it is easy to show that if the IV estimator is used in the NL case
(2.48) - IV a /T(6^-6.) ~ N 0,o‘
l
plim
Z! Z.l i
-1
plim
Z! Z.l l plim
Z! Z.l l
-1
where Z^  is the instrument for Z^. If three stage least squares is 
used
(2.49) /f(6^IV-6.) ~ N 0, plim
Z|(E 10I)Z.n 1
However /f(6^J^ -6^)
Z! Z.l l
-1
plim
plim
Z! (£ 10I)Zi"
Z^(I 10I)Z/
T
-1
Z!u.l l
/f
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X'u
If Z. = XA. then since — —  l i  T
. a A !X u . a
1 - N(0,^) , ~ N(0,A^A.).
/ f
(2.50) /F(6°LS-6.) ~ Nl l 0 ,o‘ plim
Z! Z.l i
-1
However when Z. is formed for the NAIVE or CE estimator as a discon-l
tinuous function of X , similar reasons as- given under consistency may
lead
Z! u .l l
~7T to have unknown limiting distribution and likewise for
_ ^OLS/T(6^ -<5^ ) . 11 The same argument applies for 3SLS and is particularly 
pertinent for the CE technique where even though both OLS or IV are 
consistent, only the IV estimator has known limiting distribution.
d) The Effect of Asymmetrical Adjustment
Suppose now that in the disequilibrium model (2.20) - (2.23):
Apt = Yt(Dc V
where Yt
+= Y if Apt > 0
= Y if Apt < 0 .
Then the reduced form equation for Pt is:
(2.51) ■ x/0 + v ot if Apt > 0
p t = ■
. + V0t if Apt < 0
where if X = (xlt>x2t>Pt_P then ^0 = (eiY+//(1+Y+(o^-o^));
-ß2Y+(a2-a1)/(l+Y+(a2-a1));l/(l+Y+(a2-a1))) and v* = (ult-u2t)Y+/(1+Y+(o^-o^)) 
and similarly for . Clearly (2.51) is a switching regression so that the
11 This point is made by Bowden (1978a), pp.68-69 for the CE estimator.
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arguments for inconsistency of least squares estimates outlined by Fair and 
Jaffee (1972) for their Directional Method 1 apply. If one proceeds by 
estimating the reduced form equations as if y+ = y then the NL technique 
would still remain consistent at stage two since linear combinations of the 
X's are still being used. The NAIVE technique will still be consistent if 
plim y  X'in = 0 for the subset of the sample where Ap^ _ > 0 (or Ap^ . < 0) .
However the CE technique will no longer be consistent since the estimates
/ \
7Tq which are used in E (g (Y^, X^ ) | , X) are no longer consistent estimates
of it . Thus a necessary condition for consistency at the second stage is 
not met, as Slutsky's theorem is violated,and not even the IV estimator will 
be consistent in the CE case.
All techniques will suffer a loss of efficiency if (2.51) is estimated 
as a non-switching regression. The question arises as to whether this affects 
the relative performances of the estimators and this is another subject of 
investigation in the simulation study in chapter 3.
e) L a g g e d  D e p e n d e n t  V a r i a b l e s
Consider the original model (2.13) - (2.16) but now with lagged 
dependent variables in (2.15) and (2.14). Consider, for example, the demand 
equation:
Dt = “lPt + xitßl + °lDt-X + Ult “ l < 0 •
Then using (2.15) and (2.16)
Qt = °t - 7 &Pt+
Dt-1 = Qt-1 + Y A|V l
and
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so that the equation to be estimated is:
01
(2.52) Qt = olPt ♦ X ßl ♦ e ^ . j  - -  AP; - —  A?;.! + »It
Similarly, from the supply curve: 
(2.53)
0 .
Qt = V t  + X2tß2 + 02Qt-l - b A?t + T  Apt-1 + u2t
Thus the introduction of lagged dependent variables merely requires the 
introduction of lagged Ap+ and Ap terms. However, this is provided the 
partial adjustment that is implied is made on the basis of the difference 
between last periods notional and this periods desired quantities. If 
instead adjustment is made on the basis of the difference between last 
periods actual and this periods desired quantities, which in section 1.2.2 
was shown to be often more logical, then, for example:
(t = V t  + xitßi + ei V i  + uit
and the equation to be estimated is:
(2.54) 1 * +Qt = V t  + xitß! + ei V i  - 7 ipt + uit
and similarly for supply. Therefore the difference is merely the exclusion 
of the terms Ap*  ^ and Ap^ _  ^ from demand and supply curves respectively.
Of more significance is the non-linear restriction between parameters on 
Q j , Ap^ and Ap*  ^ in (2.54) which in the least squares framework 
outlined so far cannot be imposed. In cases where one wishes to impose 
such restrictions the use of maximum likelihood methods is the best alternative, 
especially since these models are often not large. Single equation non-linear 
estimation will enable within equation restrictions as in (2.52) to be imposed, 
but not across equation restrictions such as 1/y = l/y+ = 1/y , while ML
estimation will enable a l l  restrictions to be imposed.
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f) Autocorrelation in the Disturbances
If in the model (2.20) - (2.25):
(2.55) Uit p • u . + e.l it-1 it
where e_.^~N(0,a.) , |p. | < 1 and cov(e^u. ^  )^ = 0 i = l,2 ; t=l(l)T ,it l '  ' " i
then focussing on equation (2.20):
and
Qt = V t  + Xltßl - - T aP^ + PlUlt-l + eY
P1 +
pi V i  - piVt-i - pixit-i6i - -  Apt-1
Y
It
so:
(2.56) Q t = a 1 (l-p1L)pt + X (l-p1L ) 3 1 - —  (l-P1L)Apt
Y
+ p iQ t -i + °it
where L is the lag operator. Higher orders of autocorrelation may be 
similarly introduced. However, once more there are non-linear within 
equation restrictions and recourse to maximum likelihood estimation is 
preferable in order to be able to impose all necessary restrictions.
2.3.3 The Stochastic Walrasian Specification: Least Squares Estimation
Two approaches to least squares estimation for the SMW specification? 
where sample separation is no longer available, have been suggested in the 
literature. The first is by Pair and Kclejian (1974). Recalling equation 
(2.4) the full model can be written:
(2.57) Qt - ktDt ♦ (l-kt)St ,
Dt = “ lpt + Xltßl + ult = + Ult ’(2.58)
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St = a2Pt + X2tß2 + u2t = Y  + U2t ’
Apt = + x5tß3 + U3t ’
kt = V Apt’V  + U4t = H4t + U4t
where = 1 if Apt < X + and zero otherwise, and X^. is a
vector of all exogenous variables in the model. In terms of observable Q 
and p^_ the model is reduced to:
(2.62) Qt = H4tDJ ♦ S*t - II4tS* + ^  ♦ eJt ,
(2.63) Apt = Y(ö‘-S*) ♦ X3tß3 + e2t
Y(ar a2)pt + + c2t *
The technique requires expressions for 11^ and $7^  . ^  is replaceable by 
H^^LCp ,X ) where L is linear in p^ and X^. and is approximated
by a Taylor series expansion. This enables equation (2.62) to be written:
(2.59)
(2.60) 
(2.61)
(2.64) ZltY l + Z2tY2 +
where Z consists of known polynomial functions of the predetermined
variables and consists of known polynomial functions of endogenous and
/\
predetermined variables. Thus given (2.64) one obtains Z2 , and also p^_ 
and minimizes:
T  ^ T
(2.65) S= I (Qt-zltY 1-z2tY2)2 - w I (Apt-y(a1-a2)pt-Y(Xlt31-X2t32))2 
t=l  ^ t=l
where w is a weight to be chosen either arbitrarily or by some iterative 
scheme as suggested by Fair and Kelejian (1974). While such a technique is 
consistent (given symmetrical adjustment) it requires polynomial functions 
of variables in the model causing a potentially serious loss in degrees of 
freedom; it also requires: some choice of the parameter w , a non-linear
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optimization technique, derivation of the underlying structural parameters, 
an explicit form for L and some tedious computation.
An alternative to this approach is Bowden's extension of his CE 
technique.12 Given the stochastic Walrasian equation, it is easy to show:
(2.65) pt = (Pt_i+Y(Xltq - X 2tl32) + X3te3 + Y(ult-u2t)ni3t)/(ln(a2-a1))
and using (2.65) it is possible to obtain:
(2.67) !t E(^Apt X3tß3 U3t') Apt X3tf33
(for this to be obtainable must not consist of any variables that occur
in X^ or X?t). Also
( 2 . 68) var(Apt-x3 Bj-u )
= var ^Cult~u2d _ Xfa2-al)u5t
l+y(a2'ai) l+y(a9-a1)
but this cannot be obtained unless var(u^) , cov(u^,u ) and cov (u^ ,u.^) 
are known. A search procedure for W is suggested by Bowden (1978a), but 
while this technique is intuitively very attractive the simulation experiments 
he performs give rather disappointing results.
The difficulties associated with these least squares approaches, 
especially the fact that some iterative procedure is necessary, suggests that 
it may be preferable to adopt the maximum likelihood approach for the SMW 
specification. Problems with this alternative are discussed in section
2.4.2.
12 Bowden (1978a), pp.190-194.
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2.4 MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION OF MODELS WITH A WALRASIAN EQUATION 
2.4.1 The Non-Stochastic Walrasian Equation
The use of ML estimation for this class of model is straightforward. 
Examination of (2.20) and (2.21) reveals that the log-likelihood may be 
obtained as:
(2.69) T log I (a2-a1) + 6 1 - T log 2tt + j  log |
- 7  I u'Z -1t=l t 1
Itwhere = "" and 6 = 1/y .
concentrated likelihood:
NC(2.70) £ = T log I(a2-a1) + 6|
where U = (u^....u„)
Often it is easier to work with the
- T[ log 2tt + 1] - y  log I UU ' /TI
Note that many authors write (2.69) as:
(2.71)
-1 . I „ ul ' h lul - 1 . E Kryb-
£N = T log I (a2~a1) + 61 - T log 2tt + j log | Z11
Apt>0 Apt<0
where ut
and
LI ^
it
* U 2t -
' - >
U lt —
‘ U 2t • \
Qt'alPt"X1t(3l+6Apt
^t“a2Pt~X2t^2
Qt~alPt XltPl
«. ^t a2pt. X2tP2 6Apt -
which, while numerically identical, may obscure the simplicity of the 
likelihood,although it makes the existence of sample separation clearer.
59
For example in relation to autocorrelation, Amemiya (1974) states that 
"... the maximum likelihood method becomes computationally intractable..."13 
and Laffont and Monfort (1977) appear to share that opinion. The latter 
authors derive a likelihood which accounts for first order autocorrelation 
in a very extended way, relying on a four way categorization of the state of 
the market according to current and lagged disequilibrium states, (see Laffont 
and Monfort (1977), Appendix 2). It is now shown that the derivation is 
really quite straightforward.
If, as in (2.55)
(2.72)
then:
it p. u. , +i it-1 it
(2.73) U = RU 1 + E
where U = ui , R = pi
0
, E = ei
■ u2 • .0 P2- ■ e2 -
Since the U ’s can be obtained the derivation of U  ^ causes no difficulty 
and so neither does that of E . The new concentrated likelihood is:
(2.74) £NC = T log I (a -a ) + 6| - Tllog(2TT) + 1] - y log |e E’/t |
where E = U - RU  ^ . Higher orders of autocorrelation can similarly be 
handled.
Lagged dependent variables provide no difficulties either, just as no
problem arose in the least squares case. If there is asymmetrical adjustment
then the Jacobian of the transformation of u, , u^ to Q. , p. will haveIt 2t <t ’ 11
13 Amemiya (1974), p.761.
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two values:
J+ = I (a2-ax) + (l/y+) I and J = | (o^-c^) + (1/y") |
and by observing Apt it can be ascertained for which observations J+ is 
operative and for which J is. If there are observations for which
Ap^ > 0 then:
(2.75) £NC = T^ log J+ + (T-ipiog J' - T[log(2iT) + 1] - j log | EE ’/T | .
A
If 6 is the ML estimate of all structural parameters and R the ML 
estimate of the autocorrelation parameters,obtained by maximization of (2.70) 
or (2.75),then the covariance matrix of the ML estimates is obtained as:
(2.76) covar(0,R) =
which is obtained using analytical or numerical second derivatives of the 
log-likelihood.
Finally, if 6 = 0 ,  it is easy, to show that the likelihood collapses 
to the equilibrium likelihood. In (2.71) the Apt term will disappear in 
u* and u^ leaving the equilibrium equations, while 6 disappears from 
the Jacobian leaving the equilibrium Jacobian. This disproves Quandt's (1978) 
argument about the failure of the equilibrium model to be nested within this 
type of disequilibrium model.14 This is of particular importance in the 
development of the Score test in chapter 4.
9(0,R)-9(0,R)'
1 4 As pointed out by Gourieroux, Laffont and Monfort (1980b).
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2. 4 . 2  T h e  M u l t i v a r i a t e  S t o c h a s t i c  W a l r a s i a n  E q u a t i o n
As a reminder, the model is:
(2.77)
(2.78)
(2.79) Apt = Y(Dt-St) + X3tß3 ♦ uJt
(2.80) Qt = min(Dt,St)
Dt = aipt + xu ei + un
St = a2pt + X2tß2 + u2t
and Quandt (1978) shows the likelihood to be of the form:
(2.81) If
ll+Y^-ap I 
(2tt) 21 Z | 2
-rT
T
l
t=l
" 4t/2 
“ £ (^(^t.)) + “
-t4t/2
x  (1
where if Z
i , j = Kl)3 :
r-H
t-H
D
Ö12 G13
°12 G22 G23
- G13 G23 G33 —
11a 0 13 22yo + y a
(aipt+Xlt6l)(o13Y
(YQt + Pf X3tß3)(al
and o J are the elements of Z
12 23-
3t = °1h a 1pt+xite 0 2 + o22(Qt-a2Pt-X2tB2)2
+ ö3'’(YQt+Pt-X3tß3)2 + 2al2(Qt-a2Pt-X2tß2)(-alp1.-Xlt.ßl)
+ 2°13(-a1pt-x1tf5i)frVpt- W  + 2a23«t-a2pt-x2tß2 a ^ t +pt-x3 t ^
4t = (lr3t""rlr2t)/lTl ; V  = 1,l(Qt + (1T2t/lIl))
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and = a 22 + 2yo2  ^ + y 2a 33
+ (Pt-YQt-X3t^3HY033+ö23)t 3t 3
and (p (x) = (2tt) 2e xp{-y2/2} • dy .
This likelihood is much more complicated than for the non-stochastic 
model and clearly the task of using analytical derivatives is a burdensome 
one. Therefore any non-linear algorithm to maximize the likelihood must rely 
on numerical first or second derivatives or not require them at all.
It is possible to provide a convenient reparameterization of the 
likelihood Quandt (1978) derives which is analytically simpler, easier to 
program on a computer and may sometimes have advantages for the numerical 
evaluation which is necessary. As usual the model is:
(2.82)
(2.8 3)
U3t = A Pt - - X3tS 3(2.84)
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If D and S
(2.85)
( 2 . 86)
(2.87)
are replaced by one obtains:
Wlt = Qt - V t  - Xlt3l
W2t = Qt " a2pt " X2tß2 
W3t = Apt ‘ X3t^3
so that:
( 2. 88)
(2.89)
(2.90)
'it= wu  + (Dt-Qt} =wn + en
U2t = W2t + (W  = W2t + e2t
U3t = W3t - Y(W  + Y(V V  = W3t ' Y(elt'e2t)
The terms e ^  and e ^  are similar to the terms used in Bowden (1979).15 
If > 0 then e^t = 0 and vice versa. Also as y -* °° , e ^  - q -> 0
so that elt = e2t = 0 and wlt = u = u\t > w2t = U2t = u2t (the super~ 
script e denoting that the disturbance is that of the equilibrium model).
Now
Il+y(a7-aJ| 
ß(Dt’St,Pt) (2tt) 3/2 | E | ^
exp{- j u^Z *u }
where u^ = (uj t ,U3t^  5 so
|l+Y(a -a )|
g(Dt.Qt,Pt) ° ,/2 U exp{- y w t+Vle1t),Z (V Vlelt)}(2tt) | E |
where w^ = (wit* w2t ’ w5t') aTld v ', = ( ] 0 ~Y) •
Also
I1+y(a 2 - a 1)I
(2tt) 3/2 I E I3/2 ’['! it’ eXp(‘ 7 (wt+V2e2t),rl(Wt+V2e2t)}
1 5 See section 1.1, equations (1.6) - (1.8).
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where = (0 1 y )  . The p . d . f .  f o r  t h e  d i s e q u i l i b r i u m  model i s :
0° 0°
(2 .91)  h(Qt , p t ) = g(Dt ,Qt ,p t )dDt  + g(Qt , St ,Pt ) dSt
J0 g (0 i t ’ Qt ’ pt )de i t  + 'o
g(Qt >c2 t ,Pt )d e 2t  .
Looking more c l o s e l y  a t  
equal  t o :
J0
g ( c l t * Q t »Pt ) * c^ e ] t  Can secn i t  i s
I l + y ( a 2-a 2) |  
(2tt) 3/2  \ Z \ ' 2
I l+yC o^ -ap  I 
(2tt) 3/2 I E I J o  
I 1 + y  (cx2 - o t 1 ) I ,° 
( 2 tt) ' ^ / 2  I Z I ^  i
exp { -  \  (w^ E 1w_t + 2w^E lvielt+viz 1 Vl ^clt^  2} dc
CXP{ -  I  ( , t3 t  + 2lT2 t Cl t +,Tl ( e 2 t ) 2 ) } de l t
I t
exp-(-ir4 t /2
Jn
3XP -  2
h ,  , ir2t r i 2i
y en % p  }J i don  ■
where tt^  = (tt^ t t _7T21 ^ 1 ’ S0 f i na- l l y  one o b t a i n s :
| l + y ( a 2- a 1) |  cxp{-Tr4 t / 2 }
S ( e 1 *. * Q-f. > 1Z 1 +- -7/n p  p
J0 I t  t  t  I t  (2 tt) 7 2 IZ I  2 7T2
where i t j  = V p ^ V  , » = w p ^ V  , ir = w p ' h , .  ,
TTt
p  rx 1 r 1 2)
tt^ / tt2 anc  ^ = ------- it expj  - y  y >dy . S i m i l a r l y :
Zoo ( 2 tt) 2 ( "  J
'°° | l + y ( a 9- a 1) |  cxp{  -ip41/ 2}
8('Qt , c 2 t  , p t ' )dc2tJ0 (2tt) 3/2  I Z I ^
where = V^E V? , ^  = w^E l V 2 , = w^E" l w1
and Zipt ^ 2 t ^ l  '
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It can be shown that if the terms are derived using integrals with 
respect to and S rather than e^ and then tt^  = V|E
= V^E as before but:
and
and
*2t ■
"st = (vW^K-VP
and similarly for the ip's . In Quandt's (1978) derivation all the tt ' s 
and Q's include second order powers of y , while in the revised version 
only tt  ^ and do. More importantly it is much easier to see how the
tt 1 s , ib's , Z and £, arc derived in the revised version and muchr TT \p
easier to program on a computer. Note that and V9 are simply vectors
of coefficients on and S in each equation and are easily obtained
from the known model at the same time as w is.
The log-likelihood is:
c | l + y ( a7- a t ) |  T
(2.92) Z = T log 1
h \ * \ kTr'^ |z|
j  loS 211
v f " V 2I logje (1-cH^)) + e ^4t/2 (l-(j)(^ t)) • (Q1/tt1)- k
It is easy to show that:
a)
I 1+Y (a2“ot1) I |6+(a -a )I
-----:---5--- — where 0. = (6 0 -1)'cejz-1e1)'s|s|'s
and 6 = 1/y . Putting 6 = 0  gives I (c^ 2 ^  ) I
(o33) ^ ^ I h
b) W4t = w3t
2t> K r l V 2w E w - ------ ----
1 1 0^E"1O1
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g 1 _ \ 0
P u t t i n g  6 = 0 g i v e s ,  a f t e r  some m a n ip u la t io n ,  it = u^ Z^ u^ _ . 
S i m i l a r l y  = uG Z ^ u ^  i f  6 = 0 .
O  V  = k t /,Ti -\ z ' 1e 1/ ( 0 ^ ' 1e 1) !5
3
= - \ w ^ a ^ / ( a 35) 2 i f  6 = 0
i= 1
and £ . . = - £  i f  6 = 0 .  ipt TTt
This  e n s u re s  t h a t  i f  6 (or  1/y)  = 0 , th e  s t o c h a s t i c  d i s e q u i l i b r i u m  
l o g - l i k e l i h o o d  e q u a l s  the  e q u i l i b r i u m  l i k e l i h o o d .
Next c o n s i d e r  B,, = 0 and O^
k k
°13  P 13Ö11Ö33 and °23  P23°22G33
0 , p = 0 , p?3 = 0 where
Then:
a)
| l+ Y ( a 2- a 1) |  | 6 + ( a 2- a 1) |  11+y (o^-ot^  |
k k
i k
%
i>i h i 5
,_.i
b) k t  ■ V  " t  - y p v
r  l
which a f t e r  some t e d i o u s  m a n ip u la t io n  r e d u c e s ,  when a! p 13 = p 23 = ° ’
t o :
(u l t " Sw3 t ;u 2 t )I:i 1
Also k t =
u - 6w 11 3t
2 t
c
uh
u 2 t  + <5w3t
( + , ' v “ 1 + (uU y  u
(ud ' k l u t
c) % . = -£TTt "ipt ,L/'it
V i 3 , r 33 J i  , 3 3 ,1i
I w. /(o ) -> -w^t(a ) ±
i= 1
as w3t
AV
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If w3t > 0, h(Qt,pt)
|6+(a2-a1)| (-upqV/2)
‘ e
I<S+ (a -a )| (-u ’s V / 2 )
while if w < 0, h(Q ,p ) = ----t---- r“  *e
1 - T log |6+(a2-aj)| - 1 log(2ir) + log |Z'!
W3t>0
-7 I ut'zilu+t-J.-1 -w <0 ot
Of interest is the case when 3-^=0 since clearly w = Ap^ and the 
likelihood is that for the non-stochastic disequilibrium model.
Of importance is the question of boundedness of the likelihood, it 
being similar in form to the mixtures likelihood originally discussed by 
Kiefer and Wolfowitz (1956). Bowden (1978a) has argued that the likelihood 
is unbounded but his proof is not sufficient to show this. In his notation 
(see pp.172-173) the p.d.f. is:
(2.93) prob(pt,Qt) = (2tt) _11 ^  r'2e x p j - ~ V a}
cP
; o , l
b . y _
l"'iexp{-Iyb(ßll)"lyb}N
P - V ybßbl ; 0 , l
K  j
He argues that if -* 0 and ya = 0 for t = 1 then prob(p^,Q^) -> 00
but prob(pt,Qt) /0 for t / 1 because the second part of the expression
ensures that it is precluded from being zero. The argument continues that 
3 - bif I and are in some way dependent this may overcome the
unboundedness, but this point is not pursued. It can be shown that if
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=n
r n 11a
’ ^b
__ r s 11b -
©-
cr
__
__
_1
a n d B and B,n n are thecl
(J) ’ —  Y a W 3 3 - - * b W 3 3 -
cl U
J a cobians for the two regimes, then B Q B' = B,fi, B.' and i a a b b b H a l  * H b l •
Also H a l = |Qa 1 11 • d a and = |ß | • d^ so that as H h l +  0 ■ so
does H a l T h e r e f o r e |]H J  B I a a a 1 = |b I I iü I IB I -> 0 and a 1 1 a 1 1 a 1 1 Bb 1 H b l H b l +
Given 1 B 1 a ■ K t 0 , this means •> 0 , so that either |Q -> 0
if d b f 0 or d, -* 0 b if H i d t 0 In the first case for t t 1 such
that y, / 0 , the second term of (2.9.3) is now zero as well since
'll 2 "0^1) prob(pt ,Qt.) = o for some t / 1
b
P - P 3 " V'ß, > 0 ; b b the second term
da  J
; o,i -> 0 for those t ,of (2.93) goes to zero since N
so prob(p^,Q^) = 0 for some t ± 1 . Thus the likelihood is no longer a
product of at least one Infinite and remaining finite terms. Being a product
of some infinite and some zero terms (as well as finite terms) it is no
longer clear that the likelihood is unbounded. Kiefer (1978), Quandt and
Ramsey (1978), Bowden (1978a) and Hartley (1977) show that for the scalar 
2 2case = ka^ ensures boundedness but such a proposition is not as clear in
this case where 0, B XB, a  Bl (B') 1 a b b b a
However, returning to the notation adopted in this chapter, consider 
the p.d.f.
11+Y(a 2_ot|) I
(2.94) h(Qt ,pt )
~\t/2
(2tt)
~\t/2
i in i in 2 o - * ( v »
2^ I " IFor t = 1 put tt^ = 0 . Then if tt'2 |E|'2 = 0 :
-it, i/2
O 4r p )  - »
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while for t / 1 and tt^ _^ / 0 :
-7I4t/2
e (l-<K\t)) * 0 .
U,But tt2|z | 2 = V^Z • IZI 2 , which cannot equal zero so long as  ^ 0
(true by definition) and Z  ^ is positive definite (true since it is the 
inverse of the variance-covariance). While these restrictions are logical the 
maximization algorithm may still choose VjZ • |Z| = 0 . If Z is 
symmetric and positive definite it can be decomposed to PP' where P is 
upper triangular, but if any diagonal clement in P becomes zero Z will 
still be singular. It may be sufficient to impose a penalty on the 
likelihood if |z| = 0 but this may not prevent |z| being arbitrarily 
close to zero. If Z is specified in terms of P the diagonal elements of 
P will give a clue as to whether Z is almost singular.
Quandt (1978) considers two cases that prevent or reduce the chances of 
unboundedness. These are where p ^  = P ^  = P23 = 0 or p ^  = p^ -^  = 0 .
In theory the likelihoods in these cases are bounded but in practice, if 
öj , G2 , Ö-, 0 is chosen by the maximization algorithm, problems will
still occur. Amemiya and Sen (1977), Kiefer (1978) and Hartley (1977) have 
indicated that even if the unboundedness occurs a consistent root may still 
exist and a search for a global maximum may be sufficient if it is 
restricted to some neighbourhood of the consistent root, however finding an 
initial estimate satisfying this condition is not easy. Amemiya and Sen 
(1977) have suggested that the local maximum may be assessed in terms of 
whether theoretically reasonable estimates arc obtained, liven this seems 
dubious if there are a variety of local maxima, all giving theoretically 
reasonable estimates, from which to choose.
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Given these problems the approach used in chapter 6 is to attempt to 
restrict the parameter Space to a region in which the likelihood is bounded 
and search for a global maximum, observing whether the algorithm seeks a 
solution on the boundary of the restricted parameter space.
Figure 2. 1
The diagram shows a likelihood which is unbounded if 0 = 0  but has a
Sconsistent root at 0* . 0 is the starting value to be tried. If the
restricted parameter space excludes the interval (0^,0^) an optimum will
still be obtained at 0' while if the interval (0",0") is excluded theL L U
consistent root 0* will be obtained. It is not clear how to choose the 
interval without setting it too finely or, as is also possible, without 
excluding 0* altogether. While Sealey (1979) maximizes this likelihood 
with no apparent difficulties, it is not clear how he restricts the 
parameter space to avoid the unboundedness problem. If it is not restricted,
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then it is surprising that the problem does not arise. In the application 
of the Official Short Term Money market an attempt at using the SMW 
specification is made. The results of this are to be found in section 6.7.
As in the BW specification various modifications are now considered.
Asymmetrical Adjustment
Now = (1 0 -y ) and V2 = (0 1 y ) , while J+ = |l+y+ (a9-a^)| 
and J = I 1+y (o^-apl . Everything else is unchanged and the final form 
of the log-likelihood is:
(2.95) S,S = -T log I z b  - I log 21T
T  f  J +  f / 2  T -  - i p .  / 2
+ J i l08| ^  e + -Tj e (l’< K ^ t))
Lagged Dependent Variables
If the lagged variable in a particular equation is the lagged notional 
value the problem is more severe than in the non-stochastic Walrasian case. 
For example in:
(2*96) Dt = a 1pt +
D^_ j is not observable so u^ 
transformation of (2.96):
xitBi + 6i Dt - i  + Uu
cannot be calculated. Even the
i = 0 elLixitßi l eVui=l It
is of no help since the lagged u's arc not available unless the lagged 
values of D are known. However, if the lagged actual quantity,  ^ ,
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is used then the problem disappears as Q  ^ is observed. Similar 
considerations apply to the supply curve.
Autocorrelation in the Disturbances
Recalling (2.55) :
uIt • «a . , + e .1 lt-1 It
then if, for example:
un = Dt - Vt ' hth
since any u ^  is only observable if Dt = Qt , it is clear that e^ 
cannot be obtained in the usual way. In the non-stochastic model the 
relationship
■ Dt - 7 aPt+
provides a means of treating autocorrelation but this avenue is closed in the 
stochastic version and there appears to be no alternative approach.
Two Step Procedures for Estimation of the Stochastic Model
Maddala and Nelson (1974) suggest that one way of estimating the 
disequilibrium model (2.77) - (2.80) is by a two step procedure:
Step 1. Using (2.77), (2.78) and (2.79) form:
(2.97) p. 1  ^ (Xltßl X2tß2^y t X3tß3 | (-U lt"U2t'>y+U3tl+y(a2-a1) pt-l + l+y(a2-a1) + 1+y + l+y(a2-a )
t 'and estimate (2.97) using OLS to obtain p
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Step 2. Using p obtained from the first step in (2.77) and (2.78) 
estimate the modified model (2.77), (2.78) and (2.80) using the likelihood
T
L = I h(Q ) 
t=l
where h(Q ) - dDt + s(Qt ,st)dst ,
and where
If as before:
g(Dt,St) =----exP’i-TulEi~lu,(2tt) |Z. 2 t 1 t
Ult Wlt + Clt
U = W + G2t 2t 2t
then g(Dt,Qt)
(2tt) |Z1
F expj-j (wt+V1elt) ,Z11(wt+V1elt) [■ where Vj = (1 0)
and g(Qt,St) = cxI,{ - I (wt+V2e2tV b 1("'t+V2e2t)} where V2 = (° U
so that
h(Qt) g(clt’V dcn  + „ s(V e2t)de2t'0
(2it)
W 2r -if4t/2
d - < K \ t )) * !L- t—  ( H I V ”  
*1 V
where tt  ^ = VJE = p'  , = a22 and the other it's , iJj's ,
Z  ^ and follow exactly the formulae at the start of this section. InTTt ipt J
this respect there seems to be not only no gain in using such a two step 
procedure, but a loss since Step 2 of this procedure is computationally 
identical to the complete full information ML procedure (apart from the 
dimensionality).
74
This procedure is, however, inconsistent as shown by Sen (1977). She 
has also demonstrated that a reversal of the order of the steps does yield 
consistent estimates. However the full information approach is superior to 
either technique and is adopted in the applied work in later chapters.
2.5 C O N C L U S I O N
In this chapter the least squares and maximum likelihood approaches to 
estimation of models of markets in disequilibrium have been considered for 
two categories of Walrasian price adjustment - a non-stochastic category and 
a multivariate stochastic category.
The conclusion is that for the non-stochastic category a choice of 
straight forward instrumental variables estimators is available, providing 
consistent estimates. Some consideration as to their efficiency and 
asymptotic distribution has also been given. Maximum likelihood may be 
readily applied to this type of model.
For the multivariate stochastic specification, least squares techniques 
are more complicated and given the necessity for search procedures may be 
only slightly less computationally burdensome than a maximum likelihood 
approach. Unfortunately the likelihood for these models is itself quite 
complicated and can be unbounded. A simplified notation for the likelihood 
has been developed and properties of the likelihood examined. Finally some 
attention has been paid to problems of finding the maximum of the likelihood.
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CHAPTER 3
A MONTE CARLO STUDY OF LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATION 
IN DISEQUILIBRIUM MODELS
3.1 INTRODUCTION
In section 2.3 the discussion of least squares estimation provides the 
motivation for a Monte Carlo study on the relative performance in small 
samples of the estimators considered. In that section three possible 
estimators are considered: the NL , NAIVE and CE estimators. Either
instrumental variables or ordinary least squares can be applied at stages 
two and three of a three stage simultaneous equation estimator, but the 
instrumental variables technique is preferred in general. Firstly, IV and 
OLS are equivalent for the NL technique; secondly, OLS is inconsistent for 
the NAIVE technique and thirdly, OLS is usually only considered in the 
context of its equivalence to IV in the simultaneous equation estimation 
literature. Therefore NL3SIV, NAIVE3SIV and CE3SIV are considered in 
the study, as well as a second order polynomial version of NL3SIV.
Since it is the relative performance of the estimators that is the area 
of concern, rather than an evaluation of the finite sample distribution of 
each, the experiment is designed to compare them under varying conditions of 
sample size, signal-noise ratio and model structure in terms of central 
tendency, dispersion about central values and dispersion about true values. 
Cragg (1964) has discussed various measures in each of these three 
categories. In order to make processing of results manageable the possible 
descriptive statistics within each category are limited. These are now
discussed:
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(i) The most common measure of central tendency is the bias and for each 
simulation of 50 replications the resultant mean bias for each parameter is 
calculated. The median is an additional measure that may be used but, given 
the normality of disturbances and the sample sizes used in the experiments, 
there is no reason to believe that any additional information would be 
conveyed.
(ii) For dispersion about central values the main measure is the standard 
deviation of the parameter estimate. Using the results of individual 
replications, it is possible to obtain information such as range, inter­
quartile range or the range in which x% of the values lie (x=80% say) but, 
for the same reasons as given in relation to the median, this is deemed 
unnecessary.
(iii) Finally, to measure dispersion about true values the root mean square 
error (RMSE) is used.
While it is informative to provide some of the results in terms of the 
above measures, it is not very convenient to provide all the results since 
the quantity of raw statistics would be overwhelming. More convenient is 
the use of ranking statistics which enable summarization in the presentation 
of results. One appropriate technique is based on Friedman (1937) and 
discussed in Cragg (1964) and Conover (1971) . This technique, very similar 
to that of Kendall's W (coefficient of concordance), (Kendall and 
Babington-Smith (1939)), is now outlined.
Let the data consist of b mutually independent k-variate random 
variables, (X^,...,X^) > i = 1 (1)b . In the experiments performed in this 
chapter b corresponds to the number of parameters and k to the number 
of estimation methods. The method to be outlined is repeated for case of
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bias, standard deviation, and root mean square error for a number of 
simulations which result from variations in the underlying model and consist 
of a certain number of replications to be decided upon. Consider row i 
and let R(X^) be the rank(€(l,k)) assigned to . Let R- be the sum
of the ranks in column j . That is:
b
(3.1) R = I R(X ) j = 1 (1)k .
J i= 1 J
Then the test statistic is
(3.2) 12bk (k + 1)
k
I R. -
j = l LJ
b(k+l)
and if the null hypothesis is that the estimation methods are identical
2then it is accepted if T < (k-1) at the a level of significance.
Thus for each simulation a test for significant difference in estimation 
is performed. As a second step one can obtain
(3.3) S = I r '
1 h=l J
where h denotes the simulation, h = 1(1)s where s is the number of 
simulations, and r I1 is obtained by ranking the values of Rj in simulation 
h . This is only used in particular cases which will be referred to 
subsequently. A shortcoming of the test is that should the null be rejected 
one may be able to identify the worst or best method but the exclusion of 
this method and the application of the friedman test to the remaining methods 
is not valid.1
One final point is that if estimates are considered to a sufficient 
number of significant digits one technique is bound to be ranked above
l See Conover (1971), pp.267-268.
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another even though the difference is not only trivial but just as likely to 
be affected by rounding errors during computation. Therefore in ranking 
techniques only three significant digits are considered. This leads to the 
possibility of ties in ranking in which case the average rank is assigned to 
each technique. 2
3.2 THE MODEL USED FOR SIMULATION
The model chosen for simulation is similar to that used by Quandt (1978). 
This consists of the equations:
(3.4) Dt = 64 - 8Pt + b t  + ().75X2t ♦ uIt
(ßj) (ß2) (ß3) (e4)
(3.5) S = -10 + 10p + 0.6X^t - 1•5X4t + u0 2
(ß5) (06) (ß?) (38^
(3.6) APt = Y ( V V  + U3t
1 0.5 0 '
with u = (uU  U 2t u„. )' ~ ctZ where E = ut 0.5 1 0
0 0 1
and Xu ~ U (10,20) , X2t ~ U (10,30) , X3t ~ U (20,40) and l4t
In all the experiments to be carried out sample sizes of 50 and 
used. In every case the number of rcplications is 50 .
U (5,15) . 
100 are
Since the least squares methods are not strictly valid if u^ £ 0 the 
main experiments are conducted without the inclusion of the disturbance term 
u^t . However the consequences of incorrectly using least squares methods 
to estimate the model with all three distrubances are investigated at a 
later stage. Thus at various stages the data is generated using u = 0
2 Conover (1971), p.266.
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and at other stages with u„^ _ ~ N(0,a0.1) .
In all experiments values of a of 1 , 5  and 10 are used.
2Translated into a measure of goodness of fit this gives values of R for
demand and supply equations of approximately 0.9 when ot = 1 , 0.75 when 
cl = 5 and 0.6 when a = 10 , indicating a reasonable coverage of possible 
signal to noise ratios. Also values of y of 0.02 , 0.1 and 0.2 are 
used to give a range of adjustment speeds to equilibrium. The speed of 
adjustment to equilibrium can be evaluated using the parameter y of 
Bowden's (1978a,1978b) PAMEQ specification. If Y = 0.2 , y = 0.78 , 
if Y = 0.1 , y = 0.64 , and if y = 0.02 , y = 0.26 . Thus the values of 
y ensure a reasonable range of possible adjustment speeds toward equilibrium.
The first 18 simulations are thus performed with u ^  = 0 , the three 
values of a , three values of y and two sample sizes. Having performed 
these replications a number of remaining experiments are performed with a 
view to answering the following questions:
(i) the effect of using the least squares techniques when u  ^ 0 ,
(ii) the effect of asymmetrical adjustment on the various techniques,
While the theory behind the advantages and disadvantages of each method 
has been outlined in section 2.3.2, as each experiment is analysed the 
connection between results obtained and what is suggested by the theory will 
be brought out.
3.3 S I M U L A T I O N  R E S U L T S
The first 18 simulations arc run in order to find out if there is a 
clear superiority of one technique over the others. The results of these
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simulations are summarized in Tables 3.1a, 3.1b, 3.2, 3.3a and 3.3b. Presented 
in tables 3.1a and 3.1b are detailed results for y = 0.1 , a = 1 and 
10 , and sample sizes of 50 and 100 . The bias is generally fairly small 
for all estimators, except for the constant in the supply equation which is 
about 10% when a = 1 and higher than 20% when a = 10 . For other 
parameters the bias is below 5% and average bias about 1% except for the 
polynomial NL estimator which gives very poor results for bias. Increasing 
the sample size does not lead to a reduction in bias for a l l  parameters - 
a rather paradoxical result - but because biases in most cases are already 
quite small in small samples, this result is not of major concern. The 
polynomial NL estimator, which has large biases, does show a marked overall 
improvement as sample size is increased but still compares unfavourably with 
the other methods, even the linear NL estimator. This may be, as argued in 
section 2.3.2, due to the large number of reduced form exogenous variables, 
making the method very similar to OLS on the structural equations which is 
known to be inconsistent. It may also lend some support to the notion also 
put forward in section 2.3.2 that high order polynomials are not suitable in 
the case of a ramp function which is linear but with a discontinuous point. 
Overall, the CE and NAIVE techniques do slightly better than the linear 
NL technique. Comparing the estimators in terms of standard deviation gives 
a different picture, with the polynomial NL estimator outperforming the 
linear version and the CE and NAIVE estimators. Again this superiority 
is not substantial and the results for RMSE, which in effect combines the 
measures of bias and standard deviation, while superior to the linear NL 
estimator are inferior to those of the CE and NAIVE estimators.
A number of regressions are performed to assess how the RMSE's for 
particular parameters, under each estimation method, vary as N , 1/y and
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TABLE 3 . 1 a
SIMULATION RESULTS FOR MODEL WITH y  = 0 , l  , a = l  AND N = 50 AND 100
N = 50 N = 100
NL POLY-NL NAIVE CE NL POLY-NL NAIVE CE
................... B IAS ...................
t ( 6 4 ) 0 . 1 4 9
( 0 . 2 )
0 . 1 9 0
( 0 . 3 )
0 . 0 5 4
( 0 . 1 )
0 . 0 5 4
( 0 . 1 )
0 . 2 0 5
( 0 . 3 )
0 . 2 2 4
( 0 . 4 )
0 . 1 5 1
( 0 . 2 )
0 . 1 5 2
( 0 . 2 )
, ( - 8 ) - 0 . 0 3 5
( 0 . 4 )
- 0 . 0 3 2
( 0 . 4 )
- 0 . 0 3 1
( 0 . 4 )
- 0 . 0 3 1
( 0 . 4 )
- 0 . 0 0 3
( 0 . 0 4 )
- 0 . 0 0 2
( 0 . 0 3 )
0 . 0 0 0
( 0 . 0 )
0 . 0 0 0
( 0 . 0 )
, ( 1 ) 0 . 0 0 3
( 0 . 3 )
0 . 0 0 1
( 0 . 1 )
0 . 0 0 7
( 0 . 7 )
0 . 0 0 7
( 0 . 7 )
- 0 . 0 0 6
( 0 . 6 )
- 0 . 0 0 7
( 0 . 7 )
- 0 . 0 0 4
( 0 . 4 )
- 0 . 0 0 4
( 0 . 4 )
!_ ( 0 . 7 5 ) 0 . 0 0 0
( 0 . 0 )
- 0 . 0 0 2
( 0 . 3 )
0 . 0 0 2
( 0 . 3 )
0 . 0 0 2
( 0 . 3 )
- 0 . 0 0 5
( 0 . 7 )
- 0 . 0 0 6
( 0 . 8 )
- 0 . 0 0 4
( 0 . 6 )
- 0 . 0 0 4
( 0 . 6 )
. ( - 1 0 ) 1 . 0 2 1
( 1 0 . 2 )
1 . 0 1 3
( 1 0 . 1 )
0 . 9 8 1
( 9 . 8 )
0 . 9 8 2
( 9 . 8 )
0 . 5 0 4
( 5 . 0 )
0 . 5 1 0
( 5 . 1 )
0 . 4 8 9
( 4 . 9 )
0 . 4 8 9
( 4 . 9 )
. ( 1 0 ) - 0 . 1 9 9
( 2 . 0 )
- 0 . 1 9 9
( 2 . 0 )
- 0 . 1 9 2
( 1 . 9 )
- 0 . 1 9 2
( 1 . 9 )
- 0 . 0 8 4
( 0 . 8 )
- 0 . 0 8 5
( 0 . 9 )
- 0 . 0 8 1
( 0 . 8 )
- 0 . 0 8 1
( 0 . 8 )
7 ( 0 . 6 ) - 0 . 0 0 6
( 1 . 0 )
- 0 . 0 0 7
( 0 . 9 )
- 0 . 0 0 4
( 0 . 7 )
- 0 . 0 0 4
( 0 . 7 )
- 0 . 0 0 4
( 0 . 7 )
- 0 . 0 0 5
( 0 . 8 )
- 0 . 0 0 3
( 0 . 5 )
- 0 . 0 0 3
( 0 . 5 )
} ( - 1 . 5 ) 0 . 0 2 8
( 1 . 9 )
0 . 0 3 2
( 2 . 1 )
0 . 0 2 4
( 1 . 6 )
0 . 0 2 4
( 1 . 6 )
0 . 0 1 1
( 0 . 7 )
0 . 0 1 2
( 0 . 8 )
0 . 0 0 8
( 0 . 5 )
0 . 0 0 8
( 0 . 5 )
' Y ( I O ) 0 . 0 4 5
( 0 . 5 )
0 . 1 3 2
( 1 . 3 )
- 0 . 0 5 1
( 0 . 5 )
- 0 . 0 5 2
( 0 . 5 )
0 . 0 5 2
( 0 . 5 )
0 . 0 9 0
( 0 . 9 )
- 0 . 0 0 2
( 0 . 0 )
- 0 . 0 0 2
( 0 . 0 )
................... STANDARD DEVIATION ...................
»1
2 . 9 7 3 3 . 0 1 5 3 . 0 2 7 3 . 0 2 6 1 . 9 1 4 1 . 9 0 2 1 . 9 0 0 1 . 9 0 1
ß 2 0 . 6 4 5 0 . 6 4 7 0 . 6 5 0 0 . 6 5 0 0 . 4 1 6 0 . 4 1 5 0 . 4 1 4 0 . 4 1 4
ß3 0 . 0 5 8 0 . 0 5 7 0 . 0 5 7 0 . 0 5 7 0 . 0 3 7 0 . 0 3 6 0 . 0 3 6 0 . 0 3 6
^4 0 . 0 3 4 0 . 0 3 4 0 . 0 3 4 0 . 0 3 4 0 . 0 2 2 0 . 0 2 2 0 . 0 2 2 0 . 0 2 2
*5 3 . 7 8 2 3 . 7 7 8 3 . 7 9 2 3 . 7 9 2 2 . 8 8 1 2 . 8 6 8 2 . 8 8 0 2 . 8 8 0
ß6
0 . 6 3 0 0 . 6 2 8 0 . 6 3 3 0 . 6 3 3 0 . 4 8 6 0 . 4 8 3 0 . 4 8 6 0 . 4 8 6
^7 0 . 0 2 8 0 . 0 2 8 0 . 0 2 8 0 . 0 2 8 0 . 0 2 2 0 . 0 2 2 0 . 0 2 1 0 . 0 2 1
ß8
0 . 0 5 8 0 . 0 5 8 0 . 0 6 0 0 . 0 6 0 0 . 0 4 2 0 . 0 4 1 0 . 0 4 1 0 . 0 4 1
1 / Y 0 . 5 7 7 0 . 5 4 9 0 . 5 3 2 0 . 5 3 2 0 . 4 3 2 0 . 4 0 1 0 . 3 7 0 0 . 3 6 9
................... R . M . S . E .........................
3 1 2 . 9 4 8 2 . 9 9 1 2 . 9 9 7 2 . 9 9 5 1 . 9 0 6 1 . 8 9 6 1 . 8 8 7 1 . 8 8 7
3 2 0 . 6 4 0 0 . 6 4 1 0 . 6 4 4 0 . 6 4 4 0 . 4 1 2 0 . 4 1 1 0 . 4 1 0 0 . 4 1 0
ß3
0 . 0 5 7 0 . 0 5 6 0 . 0 5 7 0 . 0 5 7 0 . 0 3 7 0 . 0 3 7 0 . 0 3 6 0 . 0 3 6
ß4
0 . 0 3 4 0 . 0 3 3 0 . 0 3 3 0 . 0 3 3 0 . 0 2 3 0 . 0 2 3 0 . 0 2 2 0 . 0 2 2
ß5
3 . 8 8 0 3 . 8 7 5 3 . 8 8 0 3 . 8 8 0 2 . 8 9 6 2 . 8 8 4 2 . 8 9 2 2 . 8 9 3
ß6 0 . 6 5 4 0 . 6 5 3 0 . 6 5 6 0 . 6 5 5 0 . 4 8 8 0 . 4 8 6 0 . 4 8 8 0 . 4 8 8
B7 0 . 0 2 8 0 . 0 2 9 0 . 0 2 8 0 . 0 2 8 0 . 0 2 2 0 . 0 2 2 0 . 0 2 1 0 . 0 2 1
^8 0 . 0 6 4 0 . 0 6 6 0 . 0 6 5 0 . 0 6 4 0 . 0 4 3 0 . 0 4 3 0 . 0 4 2 0 . 0 4 2
1 / Y 0 . 5 7 3 0 . 5 5 9 0 . 5 3 0 0 . 5 2 9 0 . 4 3 1 0 . 4 1 1 0 . 3 6 6 0 . 3 6 5
Figures in parentheses below biases are percentage absolute biases.
Standard deviation used in this and subsequent tables is the 
unbiased estimate i.e. obtained using the number of replications 
minus unity in the denominator.
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TABLE 3 .1 b
SIM ULATION RESULTS FOR MODEL WITH Y = 0 ,1  , a  = 10 AND N = 50 AND 100
N = 50 N = 100
NL POLY-NL NAIVE CE NL POLY-NL NAIVE CE
................  BIAS .................
(64) 1.135 1.198 0.946 0.959 0.155 1.032 -0 .014 -0 .0 0 8
(1 .8 ) (1 .9 ) (1 .5 ) (1 .5 ) (0 .2 ) (1 .6 ) (0 .0 ) (0 .0 )
( -8 ) -0 .2 0 0 -0 .08 0 -0 .19 2 -0 .195 0.029 0.001 0.028 0.028
(2 .5 ) (1 .0 ) (2 .4 ) (2 .4 ) (0 .4 ) (0 .0 ) (0 .4 ) (0 .4 )
(1) -0 .0 0 8 -0 .026 -0 .001 -0 .001 -0 .014 -0 .038 -0 .007 -0 .0 0 7
(0 .8 ) (2 .6 ) (0 .1 ) (0 .1 ) (1 .4 ) (3 .8 ) (0 .7 ) (0 .7 )
(0 .75 ) -0 .00 2 -0 .0 2 9 0.002 0.002 -0 .009 -0 .02 9 -0 .004 -0 .004
( 0 .3 ) (3 .9 ) (0 .3 ) (0 .3 ) (1 .2 ) (3 .9 ) (0 .6 ) (0 .6 )
( -10 ) -2 .3 4 0 3.390 -2 .356 -2 .36 6 -2 .834 1.561 -2 .887 -2 .89 1
(2 3 .4 ) (33 .9 ) (23 .6 ) (2 3 .7 ) (28 .3 ) (15 .6 ) (2 8 .9 ) (2 8 .9 )
(10) 0.386 -0 .660 0.394 0.396 0.497 -0 .265 0.512 0.513
(3 .9 ) (6 .6 ) (3 .9 ) (4 .0 ) (5 .0 ) (2 .7 ) (5 .1 ) (5 .1 )
. ( 0 .6 ) -0 .004 -0 .040 -0 .00 1 -0 .001 -0 .005 -0 .023 0.009 0.009
7  K
( 0 .7 ) (6 .7 ) (0 .2 ) (0 .2 ) (0 .8 ) (3 .8 ) (1 .5 ) (1 .5 )
A - 1.5 ) 0.019 0.138 0.010 0.010 -0 .011 0.060 -0 .022 -0 .0 2 2
(1 .3 ) (9 .2 ) (0 .7 ) (0 .7 ) (0 .7 ) (4 .0 ) (1 .4 ) (1 .4 )
'Y (10) 0.446 1.361 0.241 0.250 0.369 0.790 0.133 0.143
(4 .5 ) (13 .6 ) (2 .4 ) (2 .5 ) (3 .7 ) (7 .9 ) (1 .3 ) (1 .4 )
................  STANDARD DEVIATION .................
3 1
11.254 9.378 11.347 11.334 7.578 6.035 7.624 7.625
B
2.334 2.043 2.339 2.340 1.570 1.326 1.561 1.562
B 23 0.179 0.178 0.178 0.179 0.106 0.115 0.110 0.110
ß4 0.131
0.110 0.129 0.130 0.078 0.071 0.075 0.075
H
12.010 11.638 11.967 11.977 8.011 8.668 7.928 7.928
ß6 2.166
1.939 2.168 2.168 1.432 1.463 1.423 1.423
ß7 0.088
0.089 0.085 0.085 0.062 0.063 0.059 0.060
B s
0.224 0.184 0.222 0.222 0.156 0.130 0.156 0.156
1/Y 2.224 1.732 1.944 1.954 1.315 1.268 1.155 1.160
................  R .M .S .E .....................
h
11.199 9.361 11.273 11.261 7.503 6.063 7.548 7.548
ß2 2.319
2.024 2.324 2.324 1.555 1.313 1.546 1.546
ß3
0.178 0.178 0.176 0.177 0.106 0.120 0.109 0.109
ß4
0.130 0.113 0.127 0.128 0.078 0.077 0.075 0.075
B s
12.118 12.009 12.079 12.090 8.421 8.722 8.362 8.364
ß6
2.178 2.030 2.182 2.183 1.502 1.472 1.499 1.499
ß7
0.087 0.097 0.084 0.085 0.061 0.072 0.060 0.060
ßS 0.223
0.228 0.220 0.220 0.154 0.142 0.156 0.156
: 1/Y 2.247 2.024 1.939 1.950 1.353 1.483
1 .1 5 2 1 . 1 5 7
F ig u re s  i n  pa ren theses  below b ia s e s  a re  pe rcen tage  a b s o lu te  b ia s e s .
a are changed. The parameters chosen are the adjustment parameter, 1/y , 
the demand curve slope, > and the supply curve slope, 0^ . The
results are set out in Table 3.2. 3 It can be seen that for and 3^
the results are extremely similar for all estimators, while for 1/y there 
are more noticeable differences. This is made clear by the following 
additional regressions with the RMSE's for 1/y using the RMSE for the NL 
technique as the independent variable:
RMSE
RMSE
POLY-NL
NAIVE
RMSECE
-0.109 +
(-1.81)
0.053 +
(2.78**)
0.052 +
1.173 RMSE 
(28.32**)
0.825 RMSE 
(113.98**)
0.826 RMSE
NL
NL
NL
R = 0.980
R = 0.999
R = 0.999
(2.85**) (120.492**)
The superiority of the NAIVE and CE techniques is apparent, with their 
RMSE's being greater than that for the NL case for values of about 0.3 
and less, which is less than that obtained in any of the simulations so far 
performed. However for the polynomial NL as RMSE increases it is 
dominated by the NL technique - largely a result of the small sample bias 
Below an RMSE of about 1.15 the polynomial NL is superior but above this 
value the ordinary NL technique gives better RMSE’s. Because it has been
The reason for the difference in choice of explanatory variables when 
the RMSE’s for 1/y arc the dependent variables is that the equation:
RMSEr = 0n + Q.a + 0O6 + 07N o U l 2 5
where 6= 1/y, gave higher variances than:
RMSEg/6 = (OQ+01a+026+03N)/6
suggesting the existence of heteroscedasticity in the first case, 
resulting from the RMSE not being scaled by the size of the parameter. 
For 02 and 0^  this does not matter since they are held fixed during 
all experiments.
TABLE 3.2
REGRESSION OF RMSE's ON EXPERIMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS 
FOR VARIOUS PARAMETERS
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DEPENDENT
VARIABLE
ESTIMATION
METHOD CONSTANT ay Y Ny R2
RMSE./6 NL 0.071 0.101 0.284 -0.005 0.8680 (7.27*) (8.71*) (1.77**) (-3.08*)
(6=l/y) POLY-NL 0.075 0. 116 0.326 -0.007 0.863
(6.63*) (8.66*) (1.75**) (-3.32*)
NAIVE 0.058 0.091 0.4 09 -0.006 0.898
(7.23*) (9.57*) (3.10*) (-4.53*)
CE 0.058 0.091 0.398 -0.006 0.897
(7.25*) (9.58*) (3.01*) (-4.45*)
CONSTANT a l/y N R2
RMSE0 NL 0.991 0.157 0.013 -0.011 0.932
32 (5.48*) (11.61*) (5.46*) (-5.35*)
POLY-NL 0.985 0.144 0.013 -0.010 0.932
(5.82*) (11.40*) (5.65*) (-5.44*)
NAIVE 1.007 0.156 0.013 -0.011 0.931
(5.53*) (11.51*) (5.35*) (-5.40*)
CE 1.004 0.156 0.013 -0.011 0.932
(5.53*) (11.55*) (5.37*) (-5.40*)
RMSE a NL 0.764 0.149 0.015 -0.006 0.938
b6 (4.70*) (12.29*) (6.82*) (-3.91*)
POLY-NL 0.767 0.146 0.015 -0.007 0.936
(4.71*) (12.00*) (6.86*) (-3.92*)
NAIVE 0.794 0.149 0.015 -0.007 0.937
(4.78*) (12.07*) (6.67*) (-4.05**)
CE 0.793 0.149 0.015 -0.007 0.936
(4.78*) (12.07*) (6.67*) (-4.05*)
t-ratios are in parentheses.
* *
Significant at the 1% level. 
Significant at the 10% level.
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assumed that linear regressions are adequate in capturing these responses it 
is important to qualify these results; it may be that, outside the range of 
experimental conditions imposed in these experiments, the regressions do not 
predict very accurately, in which case some non-linear functional form may be 
preferable. This problem is not pursued any further here - the regression 
presented having successfully indicated the similarities between the NAIVE 
and CE techniques and the differences that occur in all other comparisons.
Table 3.3a gives the results of the Friedman test in ranking the 
estimators. Having summed the ranks assigned for individual parameter 
estimates in each simulation, the test is then applied. The table gives the 
sum of the ranks and the value of T for each simulation. Also by summing 
over all 18 simulations and obtaining an average ranking, the value of T 
over all the simulations is available. At the 5% level of significance, in 
about eleven of the simulations the hypothesis of no difference in descriptive 
statistic is accepted. It should be noted that the Friedman test is 
conservative. Because of this results are also presented using a 50% level 
of significance. On this basis in five of the simulations the hypothesis of 
no difference in bias is accepted, in five that of no difference in standard 
deviation is accepted and in seven that of no difference in mean square error 
is accepted. The aggregate test rejects the null hypothesis of no difference 
in all three cases and in particular emphasises the fact that the NAIVE and 
CE methods are generally superior.
Table 3.3b sets out the values of T when the estimators arc ranked by 
common characteristic e.g. sample size. These results are presented in order 
to isolate where major differences in estimators occur. It is clear that the 
polynomial version of the NL estimator is consistently inferior in terms of 
bias in all sub-categories. The linear NL case ranks third and the NAIVE
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method is slightly superior to the CE method. For standard deviation the 
null hypothesis of no difference is accepted more often than for bias. The 
most interesting feature is the relative deterioration of the NAIVE 
technique for smaller sample size. This is even more marked in the case of 
RMSE. The hypothesis of no difference is accepted for N = 50 but easily 
rejected for N = 100. For smaller sample size the NAIVE and CE 
techniques are superior in terms of bias but the polynomial NL technique 
is superior in terms of standard deviation. In terms of RMSE there appears 
to be no significant difference between estimators. However, in the larger 
sample size the performance of the NAIVE and CE techniques is generally 
superior. These results are in accordance with Bowden and Turkington (1979) 
and Bowden (1978a), except for the results for bias of the polynomial NL 
technique that are obtained here. Later in this chapter some replications 
with the model used by those authors are performed to ascertain whether this 
result is model specific. In the model based on that in Quandt (1978) the 
four exogenous variables plus lagged price lead to twenty one variables in 
the polynomial reduced form (plus the constant) while in the model based on 
that in Bowden (1978a) there are two exogenous variables plus lagged price 
and thus only nine variables in the polynomial reduced form (plus the 
constant). Thus if the argument put forward that a large number of 
instruments causes the polynomial NL estimator to mimic OLS estimation of 
the structure is valid, it might be expected that the performance of the NL 
estimator be more favourable using Bowden's model than has been found so far. 
A small number of experiments with that model arc performed in section 5.4.
Returning to the model under consideration the next step is to examine 
the effect of u„^ f 0 on the model. These results are very poor with large 
biases and a dramatic decline in efficiency compared with results for the
39
non-stochastic model. Only 1/y = 10 and N = 50 are used as it is 
apparent from these results that least squares estimation of the stochastic 
model is very unsatisfactory. Table 3.4 shows results for 1/y = 10 , a = 1 
and 10 , and N = 50 which can be compared to Tables 3.1a and 3.1b. The 
importance of the result of this experiment is that least squares estimation 
cannot be relied upon to generate reasonable starting values for maximum 
likelihood estimation of a stochastic model. It is also clear that, given 
the large biases and standard deviations of the parameter, 1/y , the Jeast 
squares estimator will provide no information on whether one should estimate 
a stochastic disequilibrium model using maximum likelihood techniques when 
such a specification is called for.
The next experiment is designed to examine the consequences of 
specifying an asymmetrical Walrasian equation. The values used are l/y+ = 20 
if Apt > 0 and 1/y = 5  if Apt < 0 . The results are presented for 
a = 1 and 10 and N = 50 in Table 3.5a. Whereas a restriction is imposed 
in the previous disequilibrium estimation, in this case no restriction is 
imposed, so two values of 1/y are obtained. The most noticeable difference 
to the symmetrical case is that the simple NL estimator is clearly the best 
performer in terms of bias, although it still does not do well in terms of 
the other two measures. In section 2.3.2 it was shown that in the 
asymmetrical adjustment case the reduced form for price is a switching 
regression so that the advantages of the NAIVE technique and CE technique, 
which both used p to form the non-linear terms, is lost. It is now clear 
that the major effect of this is on small sample bias. Comparison of Table 
3.1a, 3.1b and 3.5a shows that all measures have generally deteriorated but 
for the NL technique bias has been affected less that the NAIVE or CE 
technique. This then leads to a relative improvement in the NL technique.
TABLE 3.4
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SIMULATION RESULTS FOR MODELS WITH l/y= 10 , a =1 AND 10 , N =50 AND u f 0
a  = 1
OIIÖ
NL POLY-NL NAIVE CE NL POLY-NL NAIVE CE
...................  BIAS ...................
( 6 4 ) - 3 . 3 0 6
( 5 . 1 )
- 2 . 4 9 0
( 3 . 9 )
- 3 . 2 4 6
( 5 . 1 )
- 3 . 3 2 3
( 5 . 2 )
- 2 7 . 4 0 9
( 4 2 . 8 )
- 3 1 . 1 8 2
( 4 8 . 7 )
- 3 4 . 2 9 8
( 5 3 . 6 )
- 2 8 . 9 2 2
( 4 5 . 2 )
( - 8 ) 0 . 6 1 8
( 7 . 7 )
0 . 6 6 0
( 8 . 3 )
0 . 6 2 2
( 7 . 8 )
0 . 6 3 9
( 8 . 0 )
5 . 8 2 9
( 7 3 . 0 )
7 . 4 5 3
( 9 3 . 2 )
7 . 3 9 4
( 9 2 . 4 )
6 . 3 2 4
( 7 9 . 0 )
( 1 ) - 0 . 0 3 1
( 3 . 1 )
- 0 . 1 0 1
( 1 0 . 1 )
- 0 . 0 4 3
( 4 . 3 )
- 0 . 0 4 2
( 4 . 2 )
- 0 . 3 7 5
( 3 7 . 5 )
- 0 . 6 2 0
( 6 2 . 0 )
- 0 . 4 9 0
( 4 9 . 0 )
- 0 . 4 4 6
( 4 4 . 6 )
( 0 . 7 5 ) - 0 . 0 5 3
( 7 . 1 )
- 0 . 1 0 2
( 1 3 . 6 )
- 0 . 0 5 8
( 7 . 7 )
- 0 . 0 5 7
( 7 . 6 )
- 0 . 2 9 1
( 3 8 . 8 )
- 0 . 4 7 3
( 6 3 . 1 )
- 0 . 3 7 6
( 5 0 . 1 )
- 0 . 3 2 3
( 4 3 . 1 )
( - 1 0 ) - 1 . 5 7 0
( 1 5 . 7 )
- 0 . 1 4 0  
( 1 . 4 )
- 0 . 8 4 4
( 8 . 4 )
- 0 . 8 9 7
( 9 . 0 )
2 3 . 4 4 8
( 2 3 4 . 5 )
3 4 . 7 0 2
( 3 4 7 . 0 )
3 8 . 2 2 2
( 3 8 2 . 2 )
2 4 . 7 3 3
( 2 4 7 . 3 )
( 1 0 ) - 0 . 0 5 4
( 0 . 5 )
- 0 . 3 9 7
( 4 . 0 )
- 0 . 2 1 6
( 2 . 2 )
- 0 . 2 1 2
( 2 . 2 )
- 5 . 1 4 8
( 5 1 . 5 )
- 7 . 1 9 6
( 7 2 . 0 )
- 7 . 6 1 6
( 7 6 . 2 )
- 5 . 5 4 4
( 5 5 . 4 )
( 0 . 6 ) - 0 . 0 2 2
( 3 . 7 )
- 0 . 0 8 0
( 1 3 . 3 )
- 0 . 0 3 2
( 5 . 3 )
- 0 . 0 3 0
( 5 . 0 )
- 0 . 2 5 9
( 4 3 . 2 )
- 0 . 4 3 0
( 7 1 . 7 )
- 0 . 4 1 9
( 6 9 . 8 )
- 0 . 2 3 5
( 3 9 . 2 )
( - 1 . 5 ) 0 . 1 1 1
( 7 . 4 )
0 . 2 3 4
( 1 5 . 6 )
0 . 1 3 4
( 8 . 9 )
0 . 1 3 1
( 8 . 7 )
0 . 6 4 7
( 4 3 . 1 )
1 . 0 2 6
( 6 8 . 4 )
0 . 8 4 3
( 5 6 . 2 )
0 . 6 7 1
( 4 4 . 7 )
Y ( 1 0 ) 2 . 1 4 2
( 2 1 . 4 )
6 . 6 8 6
( 6 6 . 9 )
3 . 2 2 2
( 3 2 . 2 )
2 . 9 4 0
( 2 9 . 4 )
6 . 0 8 1
( 6 0 . 8 )
9 . 2 6 1
( 9 2 . 6 )
9 . 1 7 0
( 9 1 . 7 )
7 . 1 8 7
( 7 1 . 9 )
...................  STANDARD DEVIATION ....................
1 5 . 6 9 6 1 4 . 8 2 9 1 5 . 4 8 8 1 5 . 5 4 3 3 9 . 0 6 1 1 9 . 5 9 0 5 0 . 8 7 1 3 2 . 5 0 5
*2 3 . 0 3 3 3 . 0 8 2 3 . 1 0 2 3 . 0 7 8 8 . 3 7 6 4 . 1 0 8 1 1 . 8 7 1 8 . 4 1 7
*3 0 . 3 0 8 0 . 2 8 7 0 . 3 1 2 0 . 3 1 2 0 . 7 3 1 0 . 4 2 6 1 . 0 1 5 0 . 8 8 5
ß4 0 . 1 4 1 0 . 1 3 9 0 . 1 3 2 0 . 1 3 4 0 . 5 1 2 0 . 3 1 5 0 . 9 5 8 0 . 5 7 0
6 5 1 9 . 8 3 7 1 9 . 3 2 2 1 8 . 1 8 6 1 8 . 1 9 8 2 9 . 6 8 6 2 2 . 0 3 6 8 7 . 5 2 1 2 6 . 6 7 8
S6 3 . 3 6 0 3 . 3 2 5 3 . 0 2 7 3 . 0 4 5 5 . 2 4 8 3 . 6 8 3 1 4 . 0 8 8 4 . 3 1 1ca 0 . 1 5 7 0 . 1 3 8 0 . 1 4 4 0 . 1 4 5 0 . 3 1 9 0 . 2 1 0 1 . 1 4 3 0 . 3 1 0
"C
D
00
0 . 3 4 5 0 . 3 3 4 0 . 3 1 1 0 . 3 1 4 0 . 8 9 6 0 . 4 9 1 1 . 3 7 5 0 . 7 6 5
1/Y 3 . 6 6 1 1 . 8 7 2 3 . 1 0 2 3 . 0 7 8 5 . 4 2 7 0 . 8 5 0 1 8 . 7 6 1 3 . 1 9 4
...................  R . M . S . E  ...................
h 1 5 . 8 8 6 1 4 . 8 9 0 1 5 . 6 7 3 1 5 . 7 4 1 4 7 . 3 9 7 3 6 . 7 2 1 6 0 . 9 0 1 4 3 . 2 6 6
3 . 0 6 6 3 . 1 2 1 3 . 1 3 3 3 . 1 1 4 1 0 . 1 3 5 8 . 4 9 0 1 3 . 8 8 4 1 0 . 4 6 0
ß 3 0 . 3 0 6 0 . 3 0 2 0 . 3 1 2 0 . 3 1 1 0 . 8 1 6 0 . 7 5 0 1 . 1 1 8 0 . 9 8 3
^4 0 . 1 4 9 0 . 1 7 1 0 . 1 4 3 0 . 1 4 4 0 . 5 8 5 0 . 5 6 6 1 . 0 1 9 0 . 6 4 9
ß 5 1 9 . 7 0 0 1 9 . 1 2 8 1 8 . 0 2 3 1 8 . 0 3 7 3 7 . 5 9 6 4 0 . 9 8 9 9 4 . 6 9 8 3 6 . 1 8 3
ß 6
3 . 3 2 7 3 . 3 1 5 3 . 0 0 4 3 . 0 2 2 7 . 3 1 4 8 . 0 6 6 1 5 . 8 9 0 6 . 9 9 7
8 7 0 . 1 5 7 0 . 1 5 8 0 . 1 4 6 0 . 1 4 7 0 . 4 0 9 0 . 4 7 8 1 . 2 0 7 0 . 3 8 7
^ 8
0 . 3 5 9 0 . 3 3 8 0 . 4 0 5 0 . 3 3 5 1 . 0 9 8 1 . 1 3 5 1 . 6 0 1 1 . 0 1 2
1/Y 4 . 2 1 0 6 . 9 3 8 4 . 4 4 5 4 . 3 1 8 8 . 1 1 5 9 . 2 9 9 2 0 . 7 1 3 7 . 1 8 7
Figures in parentheses below biases are percentage absolute biases.
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S I M U L A T I O N  R E S U L T S  FOR MODEL WITH A S YM ME TR I CA L AD J U S T ME N T  
1/Y+ = 20 , 1 / y '  = 5 , a  = 1 AND 10 , N = 50
a  = 1 a  = 10
NL POLY-NL NAIVE CE NL POLY-NL NAIVE CE
.................  BIAS .................
(64) 0 .127 0 .327 0 .189 0 .196 1.270 2.105 1.168 1.242
(0 .2 ) (0 .5 ) (0 . 3 ) (0 .3 ) (2 .0 ) (3 .3 ) (1 . 8 ) (1 .9 )
( -8 ) -0 .0 3 3 - 0 .0 5 9 -0 .0 5 8 -0 .05 9 -0 .2 68 -0 .245 -0 .28 8 -0 .30 1
(0 .4 ) (0 .7 ) (0 .7 ) (0 . 7 ) (3 .4 ) (3 . 1 ) (3 .6 ) (3 .8 )
(1) 0 .003 0.001 0.006 0.006 0.007 -0 .03 2 0.016 0.016
(0 .3 ) (0 .1 ) (0 .6 ) (0 .6 ) (0 . 7 ) (3 .2 ) (1 .6 ) (1 .6)
(0 .75 ) 0.000 - 0 . 0 0 2 0 .002 0.002 0.001 -0 .031 0.006 0.005
(0 .0) (0 .3 ) (0 .3 ) (0 .3 ) (0 .1 ) (4 . 1 ) (0 .8 ) (0 .7 )
( -10) 0 .994 1.247 1.176 1.182 2.775 4 .158 3.173 3 .191
(9 .9 ) (1 2 . 5 ) (11 . 8 ) (11 . 8 ) (27 .8 ) (41 .6 ) (31 .7 ) (31 .9 )
(10) -0 .20 2 - 0 .2 4 7 -0 .231 -0 .232 -0 .564 -0 .814 -0 .625 -0 .62 8
(2 .0 ) (2 .5 ) (2 . 3 ) (2 .3 ) (5 .6 ) (8 .1 ) (6 . 3 ) (6 . 3 )
(0 .6 ) -0 .00 5 -0 .006 -0 .00 2 -0 .002 -0 .019 -0 .036 -0 .009 -0 .0 10
(0 .8 ) (1 .0 ) (0 .3 ) (0 .3 ) (3 .2 ) (6 .0 ) (1 .5 ) (1 .6 )
( - 1 . 5 ) 0 .029 0 .030 0 .021 0.021 0 .089 0.133 0.067 0.068
(1 .9 ) (2 .0 ) (1 .4 ) (1 .4 ) (5 .9 ) (8 .7 ) (4 .3 ) (4 .5 )
Y+ (20) -0 .024 0.241 0 .027 0 .031 0 .289 2.244 0.339 0.371
(0 .1 ) (1 .2 ) (0 .1 ) (0 .2 ) (1 .4 ) (11 .2) (1 .7 ) (1 .9 )
Y~(5) 0 .110 0 .018 -0 .191 -0 .192 0 .419 0.864 -0 .440 -0 .4 10
(2 .2 ) (0 .4 ) (3 .8 ) (3 .8 ) (8 .4 ) (17 .2 ) (8 .8 ) (8 .2 )
................... STANDARD DEVIATION ..................
*1 3.287 3.086 3.012 3 .017
10.471 10.007 9.602 9.686
e2 0 .700 0 .652 0 .648 0 .649 2.281 2.153 2.131 2.147
0 .059 0 .058 0 .058 0 .058 0.194 0 .186 0.187 0 .187
0.036 0.035 0.035 0 .035 0 .120 0.115 0.116 0.115
4 .076 4 .221 4 .151 4 .142 12.401 13.106 12.520 12.506
*6 0 .700 0 .717 0 .707 0.706 2.120 2 .223
2.143 2.138
ß7 0.029 0 .027 0 .028 0 .028 0 .091
0 .090 0 .090 0 .090
0 .063 0 .059 0.062 0 .062 0.196 0.187 0.197 0.196
1/Y+ 1.531 1 .187 1.079 1.081 4 .556 3.502 3.272 3.262
1/Y" 1.263 0 .956 0.814 0 .807 4 .096 3.343 2.733 2.757
.................  R .M.S .E ......................
3 .257 3 .073 2.988 2 .993 10.444 10.127 9.577 9 .668
b2 0.694 0 .648 0.644 0 .645 2 .274 2.145 2.130 2.147
^3 0 .059
0.057 0 .058 0.058 0.192 0.186 0 .186 0 .186
0.036 0 .035 0 .035 0 .035 0 .119 0.118 0.115 0.114
b5 4 .156 4 .361 4 .274 4 .2 68 12.586 13.624 12.794 12.785
^6 0 .722 0 .751 0.737 0.736 2 .173 2.346
2.211 2 .208
g7 0 .029 0 .028 0.028 0.028
0.092 0.096 0.090 0 .089
^8 0 .069 0 .065 0 .065 0.065
0.214 0.228 0 .206 0.205
1/Y+ 1.516 1.200 1.069 1.070 4 . 52 0 4 .130 3.257 3.251
i / y " 1.255 0.946 0 .828 0 .822 4 .076 3.421 2.741 2 .760
Figures in parentheses below biases are percentage absolute biases.
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However for standard deviation and RMSE the NAIVE and CE techniques are still 
slightly superior. Table 3.5b gives the results of the Friedman test for the 
experiments used.
The final subject of investigation is the parameter 1/y . Since, 
estimates of 1/y and its variance determine whether one accepts or rejects 
the hypothesis of equilibrium it should be given special attention. To do 
this a selection of experiments already performed is made. To keep the 
number manageable the selection is restricted to N = 50 and then values of 
a = 1 , 5 or 10 and 1/y = 10 or l/y+ = 20 and 1/y = 5 chosen.
Firstly, a Kolmogorov goodness of fit test of 1/y (or l/y+ and 1/y ) 
shows that in all these experiments the hypothesis that the parameter (or 
parameters) follows a normal distribution is accepted. This supports the 
idea of a simple t-test on 1/y when least squares estimation of the non­
stochastic disequilibrium model is performed. Next, a Friedman test is 
performed on the results for the three descriptive statistics and these 
results are presented in Table 3.6. Because there are two values of the 
parameter in the asymmetric case instead of one, the symmetric case is 
treated as if there are two values by giving the rankings twice their normal 
weight. Again the evidence suggests that the CE and NAIVE techniques 
are superior, but as with the more general results the linear NL method 
performs quite well in terms of bias - especially for the asymmetrical 
adjustment case. However in terms of RMSE, the CE and NAIVE techniques 
are superior. The polynomial NL estimator still performs relatively 
poorly as regards bias but it outperforms the NL estimator for the other 
measures, while still being inferior to the other two techniques.
FR
IE
DM
AN
 T
ES
T:
 
RE
SU
LT
S 
FO
R 
RE
PL
IC
AT
IO
NS
 
W
IT
H 
AS
YM
M
ET
RI
CA
L 
AD
JU
ST
M
EN
T
93
cd CD 00 00
CO \D X I CD
H • • •o XI rH to
rH t-H r H to
UJ JFCO CD X JFH -
r H r H r H LO
• UJ
in > JF JF
1---1 o o X CD
j5Tf < rH rH r H LO
—1
l JF JF
cd r H X I X
X I to to CD
o
X
VS JF
X x f X I X I coto to to CD
X I CD to rH
X - CO r H o
E - • • • •
CD X LO X
X
x .
O
HH UJ cd o
_^VN JF
CD
E - rH X ) X I LO
<
>
UJ > \<S JF
a 1—1 CD CD X I o
< r H rH X I lO
Q X
< X
Q X.
7 ' 1
< > co X LO o
E - X X I X I X I CO
in o
X
JF JF
X to X I o
X to to to o
t-H
X X r H X
LO o CO X
E- • • •
CD X XI X
r H r H to
JF JF
CD \£> H CD
X I X I X I X
CD UJ JF JF r_VS VS
1—1 X I X I O LO
CO < X I X I X I vOsC
X
X
1 JF VS
>< X I X x X
X to to to o
o r H
X
X vO 00 00
2 t-H r H r H
H
X UJ
Ö r H LO o H
r H <
1—1 u
DC ii II ii UJ
UJ DC
IX Ö Ö Ö ID
X ID
UJ <
94
TABLE 3.6
FRIEDMAN TEST: RESULTS FOR PARAMETER 1/y IN SELECTED EXPERIMENTS
(N = 50)
ESTIMATION
METHOD NL POLY-NL NAIVE CE
EXPERIMENTAL R T  A C
CHARACTERISTIC • ••••• D  1 / VO ••••••
a = 1 1/y = 10 2 8 4 6
a = 5 1/y = 10 6 8 4 2
p it t—^ o -< ii o 6 8 2 4
a = 1 1/y = 20 1 4 2 3
i /y ; = 5 2 1 3 4
a = 5 1/y = 20 1 4 2 3
i/y” = 5 1 4 3 2
a = 10 1/y = 20 1 4 2 3
1/y" = 5 2 4 3 1
SUM OF RANKS 22 45 25 28
T = 15.9
......  STANDARD DEVIATION ......
a = 1 1/Y = 10 8 6 3 3
a = 5 1/y = 10 8 6 4 2
a = 10 1/y = 10 8 2 4 6
a = 1 1/Y+ = 20 4 3 1 2
1/Y = 5 4 3 2 1
a = 5 1/Y+ = 20 4 3 2 1
1/Y" = 5 4 3 1 2
a = 10 1/Y = 20 4 3 2 1
1/Y" = 5 4 3 1 2
SUM OF RANKS 48 32 20 20
T = 26.4
......  RMSE ......
a = 1 1/Y = 10 8 6 4 2
a = 5 1/y  = 10 6 8 4 2
a = 10 1/y  = 10 8 6 2 4
a = 1 1/y + = 20 4 3 1 2
i/y ; = 5 4 3 2 1
a = 5 1/Y = 20 4 3 1 2
1/Y“ = 5 4 3 1 2
a = 10 1/Y = 20 4 3 2 1
1/Y" = 5 4 3 1 2
SUM OF RANKS 46 38 18 18
T = 30.4
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3.4 SIMULATION OF AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL
The decision to simulate an alternative model arises from a number of 
considerations. Firstly, it is conceivable that simulation results are model 
specific and the apparent superiority of one estimation technique likewise. 
Secondly, by choosing a model with a smaller set of exogenous variables, 
additional light might be cast on the performance of the polynomial NL 
estimator as obtained in section 3.3. This leads to a choice of the model 
used by Bowden (1978a) and Bowden and Turkington (1979) which is an 
adaptation of Tintner's meat market model (1963). The model is:
t 1 t It It
(3X) (ß2) (33)
= 14.60 + 0.62p - 0.42 X0+. + u^t t 2t 2t
(ß4 ) (ß5) (ß6 )
APt = (1/4.76) (Dt-St) + u3t
C1/Y)
where y = 1/4.76 corresponds to Bowden's y of 0.7 .
The data is generated using X^ ~ N(4.956,0.3973) , X^t ~ N(8.840,1.207) .
0.517 0 0
0 0.937 0
0 0 0.090
with a = 1 or 2 , pQ = 9.23 and u
sometimes set to zero. The number of observations chosen was 50 and the 
number of replications 50. The single value of y indicates a third 
motivation for repeating experiments with this model. As argued in section 
2.3.2 there is an across equation restriction, which makes the validity of 
unrestricted two stage least squares estimation doubtful and certainly makes
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such a method inefficient relative to the restricted three stage least 
squares estimator. Thus the experiments performed here have accounted for 
these considerations.
Setting u„t E 0 and a = 1 and 2 , the experiments are performed 
and the results for the two values of a given in table 3.7. It is found 
that the NAIVE technique is the best overall performer and that the CE 
method is still fairly similar to the NAIVE method. It is also found that 
the polynomial NL estimator has less bias than its linear counterpart for 
cl = 1 (for most parameters) but not for a = 2 . Thus the reduction in 
number of exogenous terms used in the reduced form does appear to have led 
to a decrease in small sample bias. The polynomial form however is always 
superior as regards standard deviation and RMSE. Thus the conclusions that 
Bowden (1978a) and Bowden and Turkington (1979) have arrived at using two 
stage instrumental variables are substantiated for the restricted three stage 
instrumental variables methods used here. The only qualification to be made 
is that the performance of the linear NL estimator is not dramatically 
inferior to the other methods. The Friedman test accepts the hypothesis of 
no difference in estimators, except for standard deviation and RMSE with 
a = 1 , in which case it appears that the NAIVE technique is the best 
while the linear NL technique is the worst.
3.5 C O N C L U S I O N
In tliis chapter an investigation of the relative performance of the 
least squares estimators of disequilibrium models has been carried out.
Much of the motivation for these experiments is found in section 2.3.2.
The general conclusion is that the NAIVE and CE techniques are 
superior to the two NL techniques tried especially on the basis of RMSE.
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TABLE 3.7
SIMULATION RESULTS FOR BOWDEN'S MODEL WITH a = 1 AND 2 , N = 50 AND u 3t = 0
a  = 1 a  = 2
NL POLY-NL NAIVE CE NL POLY-NL NAIVE CE
................  BIAS ................
20.52) 0.005 0.098 0.555 0.528 0.185 -0.241 0.810 0.833
(0.0) (0.5) (2.7) (2.6) (0.9) (1.2) (3.9) (4.1)
-1 .42) 0.048 0.028 -0.057 -0 .050 0.039 0.094 -0.079 -0.077
(3.4) (2.0) (4.0) (3.5) (2.7) (6.6) (5.6) (5.4)
1.90) -0.107 -0 .088 -0 .013 -0.021 -0.136 -0.158 -0.026 -0.036
(5.6) (4.6) (0.7) (1.1) (7.2) (8.3) (1.3) (1.9)
14.6) -3.432 -3.405 -3.020 -3.061 -4.163 -4.252 -3 .970 -4.006
(23.5) (23.3) (20.7) (20.9) (28.5) (29.1) (27.2) (27.4)
0.62) 0.365 0.350 0.323 0.328 0.444 0.423 0.424 0.431
(58.9) (56.5) (52.1) (52.9) (71.6) (68.2) (68.4) (69.5)
-0 .42) -0.004 0.009 -0.001 -0.002 -0.008 0.022 -0.001 -0.005
(1.0) (2.1) (0.3) (0.5) (1.9) (5.2) (0.3) (1.2)
(4.76) 0.696 0.663 0.283 0.328 0.862 1.015 0.383 0.451
(14.6) (13.9) (5.9) (6.9) (18.1) (21.3) (8.0) (9.5)
................  STANDARD DEVIATION ................
4.363 3.864 3.592 3.707 5.448 5.086 4.713 5.114
e2 0.607 0.538 0.479 0.496 0.752 0.711 0.630 0.675
e3 0.353 0.323 0.281 0.285 0.456 0.438 0.388 0.387
e4 6.143 6.133 5.965 5.991 7.349 7.316 7.173 7.234
h 0.655 0.636 0.622 0.624 0.771 0.750 0.756 0.761
e6 0.161 0.154 0.159 0.160 0.221 0.217 0.225 0.223
l/Y 1.061 1.024 0.986 0.966 1.360 1.355 1.432 1.377
................  R.M.S.E.....................
*1 4.320 3.827 3.599 3.708 5.396 5.041 4.735
5.130
e2 0.603 0.533 0.477 0.493 0.745 0.710 0.628 0.673
0.366 0.331 0.278 0.283 0.471 0.462 0.385 0.385
e4 6.983 6.961 6.633 6.674 8.382 8.399 8.135 8.206
H 0.727 0.721 0.696 0.699 0.883 0.854 0.860 0.867
0.159 0.153 0.158 0.159 0.219 0.216 0.222 0.221
l/Y 1.260 1.211 1.016 1.011 1.598 1.682 1.468 1.436
IKING
h a s
>.D.
1.S.E.
22
27
27%
POLY-NL
19
20 
19
NAIVE
13
9
9
16
14
14%
3.86
15.56
15.75
18
24
24
POLY-NL
23
14
18
NAIVE
12
15
12%
17
17
15%
5.23
5.23 
5.98
Figures  in  p a r e n t h es e s  below b i a s e s  a re  pe rc en ta g e  ab s o lu te  b i a s e s .
98
The linear NL technique compares favourably in terms of small sample bias 
but is less efficient than the alternatives. The polynomial NL technique 
(the order of polynomial chosen is 2) is superior to the linear NL 
technique in terms of efficiency but has much larger small sample bias when 
there are a large number of exogenous variables.
The comparisons of the estimators has been made using two models in 
order to reduce the chance of the results being model specific. In chapter 6 
an opportunity to compare the estimators with real data is available and it 
is of interest to assess the differences between them in that case. It may 
be that with such data, often having a strong trend component and 
exhibiting substantial collinearity, the differences between estimators 
become less evident. It is certainly the case that in many of the 
experiments means, standard deviations and RMSE’s differed between 
estimators by very small amounts and the cost of using a linear NL 
estimator (which fits exactly into the traditional 3SLS framework) may be 
insubstantial, especially if it is consistent starting values for maximum 
likelihood estimation of the non-stochastic disequilibrium model that are
required.
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CHAPTER 4
THE SCORE TEST FOR MARKETS IN DISEQUILIBRIUM 
4.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter a method of testing the hypothesis of equilibrium 
against the alternative of disequilibrium is considered. The model to be 
dealt with is the same as in chapter 2 and is:
(4.1) Dt = olPt ♦ XltB1 ♦ ult
U-2) st = V t  + X2tß2 + u2t
(4.3) Qt = min(Dt,St)
0.4) lt - Y(Dt-St) ♦ u3t
where 1^  is some indicator of excess demand and is frequently but not 
necessarily replaced by Ap .
Estimation techniques for (4.1) - (4.4) have been outlined in a number 
of articles, with Maddala and Nelson (1974) providing a comprehensive summary 
of maximum likelihood (here after referred to as ML) techniques. More 
recently Quandt (1978) has considered the formulation of tests for the 
disequilibrium hypothesis. To the extent that the model comprises only
(4.1) - (4.3), this would seem to be impossible as it involves an assumption 
that the market is in disequilibrium, but the addition of (4.4) enables one 
to discriminate between equilibrium and disequilibrium markets. Fair and 
Jaffee (1972) realizing this, propose that the hypothesis 1/y = 0 be 
tested and if accepted one would accept the hypothesis of equilibrium.
Quandt (1978) has also suggested this method of attack. On a more heuristic
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note Portes and Winter (1978) suggest examining the residuals from equations 
(4.1) and (4.2) estimated under the null hypothesis of equilibrium to see how 
they correspond to 1^ (which are indicator functions of demand pressure).
So far no assumption about disturbance terms has been made. It is usual 
to assume the demand and supply equations ((4.1) and (4.2)) include normally 
distributed disturbances u^ and u? with mean zero and variance
covariance matrix As far as (4.4) is concerned the
disturbance term has been treated as optional. If u ^  is included then 
the full variance covariance matrix for the model (4.1) - (4.4) is
Z
13
'23
23 23
and it is sometimes assumed = 0 .
Quandt has shown that in the case where u ^  / 0 , that as 1/y -> 0 the 
disequilibrium likelihood collapses to the equilibrium one, but has stated 
this is not so if there is no disturbance term in (4.4). This latter 
argument is not correct, arising as it does from incorrectly specifying the 
likelihood for the model.1 Once this is accepted, it is clear that the 
idea of taking the closeness of the ML estimate of 1/Y to zero as an 
indicator of equilibrium is a reasonable one.
In practice, use of the estimates under the alternative hypothesis 
using Wald or Likelihood Ratio Tests may cause severe computational 
difficulties (see Quandt's Table 5 for the failures) and utilization of
l This has been shown by Gourieroux, Laffont and Monfort (1980) and in 
section 2.4.1.
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information available under the null hypothesis only, may avoid such 
practical difficulties. This provides a motivation for application of the 
Score or Lagrangian Multiplier test statistic for the hypothesis H : 1/y = 0 , 
as it is known to possess asymptotic power equivalent to the W and LR 
statistics (against a sequence of local alternatives), and is, hopefully, 
easier to compute. In fact one might go further and argue that the principal 
use of a test for disequilibrium based on equilibrium residuals is to avoid 
estimating a disequilibrium model wherever possible, just as the Durbin- 
Watson statistic is designed to allow investigators to not worry about 
autocorrelation.
Before considering the Score test a number of alternative procedures 
for hypothesis testing suggested by Quandt (1978) are worth evaluating. Also 
a method outlined by Hwang (1980) is considered.
Tests based on y : Firstly, it should be realized that as y -*• °o (0r if
6=l/y=0) the disequilibrium model will always collapse to the equilibrium 
model. To see this write (4.4) more generally, to allow lagged adjustment 
of price:
Apt = Y(Dt-St) - u3t
and rearranging:
Dt - St = 6(Apt+u^t) = 0  if 6 = 0 .
Therefore testing whether 6 = 0  will be appropriate in a wide class of 
models. Unfortunately, 6 = 0  is on the boundary of admissible values for 
6 , since 6 < 0 will imply an unstable model, so /T(6-6q) , when 6q = 0 , 
cannot possibly be asymptotically normal, even if the null hypothesis 
6 = 0  is correct. This is a serious problem where maximum likelihood
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estimation is being used, as the parameter estimates should be restricted to 
lie inside the parameter space. Thus a simple t-test,that 6 = 0 ,  may be 
acceptable where least squares is performed but not in the maximum likelihood 
case.
Tests based on Pr(Dt<S^ _): Apart from the criticisms Quandt makes of this
test, it is found to be unworkable in the simulation results lie obtains.
Tests based on Embedding Procedures: These procedures rely on estimating a
compound density based on the two hypotheses where a new parameter A in 
the interval [0,1] is estimated. A A close to zero confirms one 
hypothesis and a A close to unity the other (see Cox (1961,1962), Quandt 
(1974)). There is the possibility of both models being rejected if A is 
significantly different than zero or unity. Another problem is testing A , 
since the values of interest lie on the boundary of allowable values, meaning 
that the same problem as for 6 can arise.
Tests based on Posterior Odds: This method is not very appealing due to the
complexity of evaluation if the number of parameters is large. The 
probability Type I error for this test is also found by Quandt to be quite 
high and in some cases the test breaks down because of numerical problems.
The Likelihood Ratio Test: Apart from the problems that can occur in
estimating the alternative model when u £ 0 and the fact that in this 
case under some conditions the likelihood is unbounded, which may cause 
optimization problems, this test seems to work reasonably well in Quandt's 
simulation experiment. However, there is still the problem that when 
testing the null hypothesis, 6 lies on the boundary of the parameter space. 
In this case it is the upper 2a percentage point of the y distribution 
which is required for the test to have significance level a in large
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samples (see Chernoff (1954) and Cox and Hinkley (1974,pp.320-321)) .
The W a l d  Test: Similar considerations arise from the boundary problem as for
the Likelihood Ratio test. The Wald Test like the Likelihood Ratio test 
requires estimation under the alternative (disequilibrium) hypothesis but, 
unlike the latter, does not require estimation under the null (equilibrium) 
hypothesis.
T e s t s  b a s e d  on S t a b i l i t y :  Hwang (1980) suggests a method involving a test of 
stability of parameters where stability supports the equilibrium hypothesis 
and instability the disequilibrium hypothesis. The test involves obtaining 
a reduced form equation for quantity and estimating and testing the stability 
of the parameters in this equation, making use of the cusum and cusum of 
squares tests of Brown, Durbin and Evans (1975). The problems with this type 
of test are that, firstly, the alternative hypothesis is instability of 
parameters, which can arise for reasons other than the model being a 
disequilibrium model, and secondly, an equilibrium model is likely to be 
accepted when there is a frequent change in the operative regimes (from 
excess supply to excess demand and back again) as the type of stability test 
can only detect more systematic or permanent changes in parameter values.
The Score test avoids most of these problems, even the boundary problem 
which has no effect on the test (see Moran (1971)). This and some desirable 
aspects already mentioned make this test potentially very attractive and it 
is to its derivation that attention is now turned.
In the following section the Score test is considered for the case
2where (4.4) includes no stochastic term (or o^= 0). It is shown that the
resulting test follows very closely the lines suggested by Fortes and Winter
2(1978). In section 4.3 a Score test based on II : 1/y = 0 ,  ^ 0 (i.e.
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oZ is no longer assumed to be zero) is considered. It is discovered that 
the Score test statistic is identical to that when the disturbance term u ^  
is excluded i.e. the test statistic is invariant to the inclusion or 
exclusion of u_t (a similar situation occurs in testing for 
heteroscedasticity, see Breusch and Pagan (1980)). This is an advantage in 
that a range of alternatives is encompassed, but a disadvantage in that, if 
the equilibrium hypothesis is rejected, little guidance is available on the 
exact alternative that should be followed. Since the case where u is 
included is far more complicated in terms of estimation than when it is 
excluded, this is even more unfortunate. However, if the null hypothesis is 
accepted a potentially awkward estimation technique can be avoided. In any 
case, unless there are additional variables one feels should be in equation 
(4.4) one may be prepared a priori to exclude the possibility of u ^  ? 0 . 
In section 4.4 a small Monte Carlo experiment is carried out to assess the 
performance of the test. Finally in section 4.5 some additional 
considerations are investigated.
2
4.2 A DISEQUILIBRIUM MODEL WITH NON-STOCHASTIC ADJUSTMENT
Consider the model (4.1) - (4.4) with u = 0 . Then the likelihood
is:2
(4.5) £N = T log I (c^-ap + 6| - T log 2 tt - I log^l
T
1 V tv"1 -  J l ut
t= 1
where:
2 See section 2.4.1.
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It
u2t
Qt'aii,t'xitf3i+6&p
6 = 1/y , and Ap
+ [ APt if APt > 0
and Ap
-Ap^ if Ap^ < 0 
0 otherwise.0 otherwise
It is easy to see that if 6 = 0  the likelihood becomes the equilibrium 
likelihood. Quandt (1978) reaches a different conclusion because he sets up 
the likelihood without reference to the known sample separation - that is in 
the same way as when u t 0 .
ior a log-likelihood £(0) with 0 = (0^,0^) and a null hypothesis 
Ho : 0^  = 0° the Score test is based upon obtaining:
(4.6) 3 - dh h r h 2 b 2 b i r l A  = df lldi
where d
3ä (01,02)
30.
' h i 712
, i =
6r ei T21 J 22
is the information matrix
with 0J - 0 and 09 = 09 , and ©2 is the maximum likelihood estimate of
©2 under 11^  : h  = e i • If 0 j is pxl and 0 2 is qxl then d^ is
pxl , In  is pxp , I12 is pxq , 1 27 is qxq and I 2 y is C1XP , so
that under 110 , S will be a x2(p ) v a r i a t e . For the model in this paper
(4.7) S = dl
0
where 11 : 6 =0 0 ; 6 is a scalar, 02 = («,3, I) the ML estimates under
the n u l 1, d r =
0
3£N (6,02 )
and S is tested
2
"(1) variate. For36 6=0
as a x
the purposes of obtaining a value for S it is common to replace I by
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11= -(82£N (6,0 )/3030')
T
or H = - I [(9^(6,0 )/39)(9^(6,0 )/30)’]
6=0 t=l 6=0
so that the statistic becomes:
(4.8) S = d^ll11d6
This term is now evaluated. First consider d^ .
(4.9)
3£(6,0 )
36 = |(tt -a ),6| - Jj (ult<J1hp;+U2ta12Ap;+Uitc12Ap%u2V 2Ap;)
and putting 6 = 0  gives
(4.10) d I ♦ (utta12A p % u ^ ta - A p t-)]e 22
6 " (a2-ad t-1
0 0  i
where u and u are residuals from an equilibrium model and a J is
-1 0
row i column j of Z, If u^J 1 t
It
e
l2t
and Ap^ _
Apt 
AP; j
then
(4.11) 1 r e 'v - 1 A o
6 ~ (ot2"a P  " t = l Ut 1 Pt
0
which can be evaluated once the ML estimates of , a 9 , Z^ and u^ _ are
known.
Thus d^ essentially involves correlation of residuals from the
equilibrium equations with Ap° (or in general with an indicator of excess
demand, I ) and this is the sort of strategy implied by Fortes and Winter
(1978). Note however that there is a correction T/lcu-ct-jJ as well as a
weighting matrix which is iust Z.^ • The closer d„ to zero, the more1 o
likely estimation under the equilibrium hypothesis is all that is required.
The matrix II can be partitioned as:
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(4.12)
where 1L^
and H22 =
1 ik e l ih o o d  
h y p o th e s i s
From
so th a t :
(4 .13)
To d e r i v e
32!lN( 6 , 0 2)
362
325-N( 0 ,6 2)
362302
6 =  0
H11 H12
"21 "22
H12 = H21 = :
But £N(0
(6 , 02)
36 5=0 30.
-J 0 2=02 0 2 = 0 2
- 92=°2
so 11^ 2 i s  a v a i l a b l e  from FIML e s t i m a t i o n  under th e  n u l l  
However 11^ and II^2 must be s p e c i f i c a l l y  d e r iv e d .
"4.9):  
)2£N( 6 , 0 2) 
362
2 - I (0n ( i p p 2 ♦ o 22(Apt- ) 2)
I (“ 2 ' “ 1) +5I'" t  = 1
T Tv , 11 .. +. 2 22 , ,  - . 2 .
) , (ö (Apt ) + o (Apt ) )
(CL2~a i >)2 t=1
or
T
(<*2 - 0 4 ) F - 1
1 ( A p ° ) ' y S °
I I 0 use  (4 .1 1 ) :
3dS T I  . 11, + 12. -
377 = 7 — 72 l .  Pt (a a!’t  + a AP t51 (a^-ap t = l
3d6 T l  , 12. + 22. -377 = - 7 -----72 + I Pt(a APt + a A>V2 lo^-a^)  t = 1
3d c
33
v v r l i *  + 2 i .I  X (a Apt + a Ap )
t= l  Ji j
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where 3.. is the coefficient of X , the j'th exogenous variable in
1Jt ij
equation i . Finally, using the result that * (see Theil9a,
(1971), p.33) where is the element in row i column j of gives
8d6 r r 11, 11 e 12 e . + 12, 11 e 12 e A -n^ — = I [a (a u lt+a u2t)APt + a (a u ^ + o  u0J A p J
11 t=l 2t J t
3d
I [o12(a12u^ +o"2u^ )Ap" + (ai"utT +o“zu'l ) Ap ]22, 12 c 22 c
22 t = l
3d I [öU (a12u^t+a22u2t)Ap^  + azz (o^u^+a^u^) Apt ]22, 11 e 12 e
12 t=l
where may be replaced by j / ia22-a 12^
Note that if the indicator variable, 1^ , is not equal to Ap^ and 
pt is exogenous (e.g. 1^ = Ap^+ )^ the Jacobian becomes unity and
vanishes from the log-likelihood and all its derivatives. In such a case the 
similarity to the Portes and Winter (1978) approach becomes even more 
pronounced.
4.3 THE CASE OF STOCHASTIC ADJUSTMENT
Now consider the case where u„^ / 0 . If 6 = 0 ,  it can be shown that 
the disequilibrium likelihood collapses to the equilibrium one (see Quandt 
(1978)). However there arc some circumstances which enable the likelihood 
to become unbounded in this stochastic case. This is because of the 
similarity of the likelihood to that obtained in the case of mixtures of two 
normals as dealt with by Kiefer and Wolfowitz (19S6). Fortunately this 
unboundedness occurs at the boundary of admissable values for the variance 
covariance matrix so that while problems of estimation of the disequilibrium
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model a r i s e ,  i t  t r a n s p i r e s  t h a t  th e  Score t e s t  i s  th e  same as in  t h e  p r e v io u s  
s e c t i o n .
The s t o c h a s t i c  l o g - l i k e l i h o o d  can be shown to be:. 3
(4.14) T log
l+y(a2- a 1)
15 - T log 2tt + y  log I£ I
T r
l  log V 
t  = 0 1
- i|k  / 2  r 4t
- ^ 4 t /2
e ( l - 4 ) ( ^ t ))
2^
where TT. =  V T  V lb = v E ' V1 1 1 U 2 2
TT„ = w 1 E  ” 1 V \ p _ -  w ' r X2t t  1 r 2t t  2
TT_ , v - 1=  W 1 L W ib_ = w'£ Xw3t t  t r 3t t  t
TT .4t =  ( tt , tt - tt„  1 / t t ,  v 1 3t 2 t ; /  1
ili
M t
0 1 
1
Y
f >
W l t ’ V al v xltßl '
it+-> w2t = Q t - a 2 P t - X 2 t e 2
- W 3 t  • ■ A p t  - X 3 t B 3  -
ii•M
h
TT / TT 2 
2 t  1 • V  = *2X 2
When 6 = 0 ,  JT = £ (G^) , so t h e  f i r s t  d e r i v a t i v e s
S 2o f  £l w ith  r e s p e c t  to  a , G?  ^ o r  when 6 = 0 ,  a re  z e ro .
T he re fo re  t h e s e  can be excluded  from t h e  Score v e c t o r  and on ly  d^ need be
c o n s id e re d .  Also i t  can be shown £S ( 6 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 02) = £N(0? ) . S ince :
3 See s e c t i o n  2 . 4 . 2 .
no
it is clear that:
(x,y)
3x y=a
(x,a)
3x
arS(6'ai3’a23’O3'02)
36
°13=0
a23=0
3* ( M 2)
36
so the first derivative is the same as for the non-stochastic case. By the 
same reasoning:
and
32*R (6,0 a a*,0 }
3630,
2 N81 (6,02)
3 6 30 2
32£S (6,a13,o23,a£,02)
362
2 N3Z£1N(6,02)
36'
and so the Score test is the same as for the non-stochastic model.
4.4 MONTE CARLO EXPERIMENTATION
In order to assess the performance of the Score test a small Monte Carlo 
experiment is devised. As a starting point the model used by Quandt (1978) 
is chosen. This model is:
Ill
(4.15)
(4.16)
(4.17) APt = 0.1(Dt-St) + u3t
(4.18) Qt = min(Dt,St)
where u is optional. The variance-covariance matrix chosen by Quandt is
. 1 .05 0
.05 . 1 0
0 0 .1
but is possible to test with 10Z . Also y is varied with values of 1.5 
and 3.0 being chosen.
Finally , x0  ^ , x ^  and x ^  are generated as uniformly
distributed variables with ranges (10,20), (10,30), (20,40) and (5,15)
respectively. Also, as in Quandt’s study, these variables are tried with a
range 1.5 times those specified above. The exogenous variables and
disturbance terms are generated using subroutine RANDU. which generates
uniform variates in the range (0,1). For the disturbance terms the normal
variates are then generated using uniform variates. To generate the
equilibrium model (4.17) and (4.18) are dropped and replaced by Q =D = S .t t t
Maximum likelihood estimation is performed using optimization algorithm 
PRAXIS (see Brent (1973)) which does not require first or second derivatives. 
The first derivatives at the maximum values are derived analytically at each 
observation and the information matrix computed as:
T
II = - I [(3)1/30 ) (3£ /36 )'] .
t=l 6=0 6=0
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Part itioning,as well as using 3£/36|^_^ , enables derivation of the Score 
statistic as set out in section 4.2.
The major concern is to ascertain the ability of the Score test to:
(i) accept the equilibrium hypothesis when it is correct (or in 
other words its Type I error)
(ii) reject the equilibrium hypothesis when it is false (or its 
Type II error).
The experiments Quandt performed are chosen and are summarized in Table 4.1, 
but the number of replications is increased in order to obtain a reasonable 
guide to the Type I probabilities. With this in mind 500 replications is 
the number chosen.
T A B L E  4.1
D E S I G N  OF M O N T E  C A R L O  E X P E R I M E N T S
Experiment
Number Value of y
Size of 
Variance 
Covariance 
Matrix
Range of 
Exogenous 
Variables
Sample Size
1 0.1 E lxStandard
range
60
2 0.1 10E lxStandard 
range
60
3 1.5 E ^Standard
range
60
4 3.0 E lxStandard
range
60
5 0.1 E lxStandard
range
120
6 0.1 E 1.5xStandard 
range
60
The incidence of failures of maximum likelihood does not occur here 
because only the equilibrium model need be estimated. In particular
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optimization of the complicated likelihood for the stochastic model is 
avoided.
Table 4.2 summarizes the four experiments carried out when the data is
generated by an equilibrium model. It can be seen that the number of
rejections of the null hypothesis is very small, that is the actual level
of Type I error compared to the nominal 5% level is very small. The standard
error attached to an estimate of this Type I error obtained from the binomial
distribution is [p(l-p)/M]2 where N is the sample size. If p is 0.05
then the standard error for N = 500 is 0.0097 and using the normal
approximation to the binomial gives a 95% confidence interval of (0.031,
0.069). Thus in all cases one accepts the hypothesis that the estimated Type I
error is less than the nominal level. While Breusch (1978) and Buse (1980)
have obtained low Type I errors, a possible explanation is the inadequacy of 
4RANDU. , and repetition of the simulations with a more reliable generator 
may be advisable.
TABLE 4.2
DATA GENERATED FROM EQUILIBRIUM MODEL
Experiment
Number
No. of
Rejections of 
Null Hypothesis
Implied 
Type I 
Error (%)
Value of x2 
Giving 5% 
Type I Error
1 3 0.6 2.3
2 6 1.2 2.5
5 3 0.6 2.0
6 3 0.6 2.0
To obtain a Type I error of 5% it is necessary to use a critical value of 
approximately 2.3 as compared to 3.841. In performing the subsequent tests 
of power, when the alternative hypothesis is true, two figures are given:
one based on the nominal 5% level (i.e. Xq 95C1) = 3.841), and the other 
based on an actual Type I error of 5% (i.e. a critical level of -2.3).
4 See Kennedy and Gentle (1980).
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Given the complexity of the stochastic disequilibrium specification the model
builder may in fact choose a low Type I error and this will be ensured using
?a critical value Xq  ^ (1) . By tabulating two figures the trade off between 
power and Type I error may be assessed.
TABLE 4.3
DATA GENERATED FROM A NON-STOCHASTIC DISEQUILIBRIUM MODEL
Experiment
Number
Rejections of Null 
2
using XQ>g5(l)
Rejections of Null 
2using Value of X giving 
5% Type I Error
Number Power Number Power
1 500 1 500 1
2 500 1 500 1
3 394 0.79 432 0.86
4 225 0.45 302 0.60
5 500 1 500 1
6 500 1 500 1
TABLE 4.4
DATA GENERATED FROM A STOCHASTIC DISEQUILIBRIUM MODEL
Experiment
Number
Rejections of Null 
using Xo.95(U
Rejections of Null 
2using Value of y giving 
5% Type I Error
Number Power Number Power
1 487 0.97 492 0.98
2 302 0.60 357 0.71
3 360 0.72 397 0.79
4 202 0.40 285 0.57
5 500 1 500 1
6 500 1 500 1
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These results are given in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 for the non-stochastic and 
stochastic specifications respectively. As one might expect the power of the 
test declines as the null hypothesis and alternative become very similar.
This is indicated by comparison of experiments 1, 3 and 4. Power is unity 
(or very close) when y equals 0.10 which corresponds to a value of y in 
Bowden's (1978a) PAMEQ specification of 0.36 (or alternatively 64% of 
adjustment to equilibrium taking place in one period), but drops to about 
0.60 when y = 3.0 which corresponds to a value of y of 0.02. Since this 
latter value implies very little difference between the two models, and so 
little cost in using the equilibrium specification rather than the 
disequilibrium one, the model builder may not be unduly concerned at such 
low power. The intermediate value of y of 1.5 corresponds to y equal 
to 0.04, still very fast adjustment to equilibrium, but the power of the 
test can be seen to have risen quite substantially. Comparison of experiments 
1 and 2 show the response of the power of the test to a lower signal to noise 
ratio. In the non-stochastic model power remains unity but in the stochastic 
model is as low as 0.6. In experiment 6 the signal to noise ratio is 
increased and in the stochastic specification power increases accordingly. 
Finally, when the sample size is increased to 120 the power of the test for 
the stochastic specification becomes unity reflecting the consistency of 
the Score test.
Comparison between Tables 4.3 and 4.4 shows lower power when the true 
model includes a stochastic disturbance term in the Walrasian equation. This 
is to be expected due to the irregularity of the likelihood. The discrepancy 
is not substantial except when the variance covariance matrix is larger 
(experiment 2). This is not surprising as the difference between the 
stochastic and non-stochastic model will be greater as the variance 
covariance matrix is scaled up.
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In comparison t o  Q uand t ' s  r e s u l t s  f o r  a l i k e l i h o o d  r a t i o  t e s t ,  in  
Table  4 .5  i t  can be seen t h a t  th e  Score t e s t  lias much lower p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  
Type I e r r o r  us ing  t h e  nominal 5% le v e l  o f  s i g n i f i c a n c e ,  but  much lower 
power.  Even i f  th e  c o r r e c t i o n  i s  made to  o b t a in  a t r u e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  Type I 
e r r o r  the  power o f  the  Score t e s t  would s t i l l  be c o n s i d e r a b ly  lower.  However 
t h e r e  a re  a number o f  f a c t o r s  t h a t  must be taken  in t o  account  in  e v a l u a t i n g  
Q uand t ' s  r e s u l t s .  F i r s t l y ,  t h e  number o f  r e p l i c a t i o n s  performed i s  very  low 
(50 in  most c a s e s ,  25 in  some, whereas in  th e  exper iments  performed he re  th e  
number i s  500) th u s  e s t i m a t e s  o f  Type I e r r o r  a r e  l i k e l y  to  be l e s s  r e l i a b l e .  
Secondly,  32 p e r  cen t  o f  Q uand t ' s  r e p l i c a t i o n s  a r e  d i s c a rd e d  due t o  f a i l u r e  
in  o p t i m i z a t i o n  o r  problems with  the  r e s u l t i n g  H ess ian .  I t  may be t h a t  th o s e  
r e p l i c a t i o n s  which a re  d i s c a rd e d  c o n ta in  a h ig h e r  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  i n c o r r e c t  
r e j e c t i o n s  o f  the  t r u e  model and in p a r t i c u l a r  mean t h a t  th e  power o f  th e  
t e s t s  i s  o v e re s t i m a t e d  in  Q uand t ' s  s tudy .
T A B L E  4 . 5
C O M P A R I S O N  OF S C O R E  T E S T  A N D  L I K E L I H O O D  R A T I O  T E S T
Experiment
Number
Type I E r r o r  (%) Power
Score t e s t LR t e s t Score t e s t LR t e s t
1 0.6 8 .0 0.97 1
2 1.2 8.0 0.60 1
3 - - 0.72 1
4 - - 0 .40 0.96
r 0.6 10.0 1 1
6 0.6 4 . 0 1 1
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4 . 5  E X T E N S I O N S  OF THE SCORE T E S T
An im por tan t  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  in deve lop ing  a t e s t  o f  th e  e q u i l i b r i u m  
h y p o th e s i s  us ing  th e  Score t e s t  i s  t h e  cho ice  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e  h y p o th e s i s .  One 
l i k e l y  a l t e r n a t i v e  i s  t h a t  o f  d i s e q u i l i b r i u m  wi th  asymmetr ical  ad jus tm en t  
i . e .  i n s t e a d  o f  ( 4 .4 ) :
I f  th e  a l t e r n a t i v e  i s  s p e c i f i e d  as symmetrica l  ad jus tm en t  t h e r e  i s  a 
p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  t h e  e q u i l i b r i u m  h y p o th e s i s  w i l l  be accep ted  when a 
d i s e q u i l i b r i u m  h y p o th e s i s  with asymmetr ica l  ad jus tm en t  i s  c o r r e c t .  So f a r ,  
f o r  ease o f  e x p o s i t i o n ,  on ly  th e  symmetrica l  case  has  been co n s id e re d .  
However i t  i s  easy  to  show how th e  Score t e s t  i s  v a r i e d  f o r  t h e  b ro ad e r  type  
o f  d i s e q u i l i b r i u m  a l t e r n a t i v e .
F i r s t ,  i n s t e a d  o f  ( 4 . 5 ) ,  t h e  l o g - l i k e l i h o o d  w i l l  be in  t h e  non­
s t o c h a s t i c  case :
(4.19) I i f  Dt  > s tt Y (Dt -St ) i f
(4 .20)  £N = Tj log] ( a 2 - a j ) + 6 + | + ( T - T p l o g |  (ct2- a p  +6
T
-T log 2tt - I log I Ej I - u p "  u t
t  = l
where T r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  number o f  o b s e r v a t i o n s  f o r  which Ap^ > 0 and u^ 
i s  now:
The Score s t a t i s t i c  i s :
(4 .21)
118
where d s = A (d + ,d ) 6 6"
= 3£N(6+, 6 ' , 6  ) / 3 6 +  ^ ,
1 6 =0
9£N(6+ , 6 " , 0 2) / 8 6 '
6+=0
6~=0 6"=0
and d =
6+
Ti Tv , e 1 1 +  e 12 +.
j ( u l t a A'’t +U2 t a APP| ( a 2~a1) | Zt=
cl
T-T T
v , e 1 2 -  e 22. --V
J (u l t °  AV U2t °  APt }
6" 1 ( v a P 1
z
t=
and £ ’d. = A d . where 0 £
i s  the  u n i t  v e c t o r ,  d^ th e  Score v e c t o r f o r  th e
symmetrica l case  and A i s  d e f in e d  below.
For second d e r i v a t i v e s
T 1 Tv
►-
**:
> 
t-1
ii
2
( a 9 - a 1 ) “
L
t = l
0
and I I U  = £ 'H ^  £  . A l s o ha12
" l 2 = l ' < 2 • The m a t r i x A
11, .  +^2
T-T
1 v 22 , - . 2~ 2  ~  I  O  (Apt )
( a ? - a 1) t = l
A A _ 1  A
H j - and i s  2x2 . I f  the
Score s t a t i s t i c  f o r  th e  symmetrica l  case  i s
S6 = :,6l , n 'd6
i t  i s  easy  t o  show t h a t  = d^£(£ 'A£) ^ £ ’d^ and as expec ted
s in ce  (d^A ^d^)(£ 'A£)  ^ (^'d^)"" (see Rao (1973),  i . e .  1. ( i i i ) . (b) , p .54) .
These c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  app ly  e q u a l l y  well  t o  th e  s t o c h a s t i c  d i s e q u i l i b r i u m  
model s in c e  i t  i s  s t i l l  t r u e  t h a t
* V , 6 > 13, o 23 , a 33 , 02) = «‘R e p  and £S( 6 + ' « ‘ . ° 13. ° 2 3 ’a 33’e 2)
Ö =0 
6 ”=0
° 1 3 ' °
°23~°
°33=0
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= £^(6+,ö 09) . Thus using the asymmetrical adjustment model as the 
alternative hypothesis, a Score statistic which has a Chi-square distribution 
with two degrees of freedom under the null li : 6 = 6  = 0  is computed and
used for testing. The test for symmetrical adjustment can easily be derived 
from values obtained when obtaining the test for the asymmetrical case.
4.6 C O N C L U S I O N
It has been shown that a Score test for models of markets in 
disequilibrium can be developed which has the advantage over other tests of 
only requiring estimation under the null hypothesis of an equilibrium model. 
The test is demonstrated to be analytically identical for two forms of 
alternative hypothesis, one form having an extremely complicated likelihood 
function. Therefore if the null hypothesis of equilibrium is accepted the 
model builder avoids a potentially troublesome method of estimation - the 
stochastic specification. A Monte Carlo experiment demonstrates that although 
the Score test has lower power in the stochastic case than for the non­
stochastic case, in most instances it compares reasonably well.
In summary, although the Wald or Likelihood Ratio tests might be 
expected to have greater power, the Score test provides a convenient method 
of testing for a disequilibrium specification without having to estimate a 
disequilibrium model. The low probability of Type I error (using the 
nominal 5% value from the Chi-square distribution) ensures that rejection of 
the equilibrium model will rarely occur when it is correct which is argued
to be a desirable feature of the test.
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CHAPTER 5
A DISEQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF THE OFFICIAL SHORT TERM
MONEY MARKET
5.1 THE OPERATIONS OF THE OFFICIAL SHORT TERM MONEY M A R K E T 1
The Official Short Term Money Market (hereafter referred to as the 
OSTMM) was established primarily to promote a market in short term 
government securities and to enable risk free investment of substantial 
short term funds. The dealers receive funds from groups such as trading 
banks, savings banks, public authorities, the Australian, state and local 
governments and private lenders; they place these funds in Treasury notes 
(3 month), government securities (maturing within 5 years), certificates of 
deposit and commerical bills.
Lenders to the OSTMM deposit funds either at call or for a fixed period 
and generally the most liquid and volatile source of funds for dealers is 
that provided by the trading banks. The reason for this will be outlined in 
the section on supply of funds to dealers.
Dealers are required to hold the bulk of their assets in the form of 
Treasury notes and government securities and in return for this restriction 
the government provides last resort facilities for the dealers when they are 
faced with a shortage of funds.
i A comprehensive description of the operations of the market is given in 
Allan (1977).
"Jobson's" Year Book gives a general description of the operations of 
the market. The 1962 and 1976-77 editions are useful in this regard.
121
The day to day operations of the dealers are now described. Dealings 
are usually initiated by telephone. The client informs the dealer of the 
amount they wish to lend and the desired term. The dealer then states the 
rate of interest they will pay for the loan and if the client accepts, they 
make out a bank cheque for the amount of the loan in return for safe custody 
certificates. The dealer is told of withdrawals, usually the afternoon 
before or before 11.00 a.m. on the day when the withdrawal is to be made. 
When this occurs the reverse of the previous transaction takes place.
During the day a dealer may require overdraft accommodation (possibly more 
than once), for example, if withdrawals are made early in the day before new 
deposits are fully transacted. The Reserve Bank allows the dealer a 
"daylight overdraft" but the dealers account must be in credit by the end 
of the day, otherwise the dealer must use the last resort borrowing 
facilities that the Reserve Bank provides. The rate of these borrowings is 
a penalty one so the dealer avoids using the facility when there are 
unexpected shortages of funds,except in the short run under special 
circumstances (see section 5.3.c).
If the dealer suspects that they may not be in credit at the end of the 
day they have the following options:
(i) try to attract more deposits by offering a higher interest rate 
to lenders,
(ii) use last resort borrowing facilities, 
or (iii) sell some securities to balance the portfolio.
These options will be examined more closely in section 5.3.C. However 
in the next section they are discussed in so far as they are relevant to 
motivation of a disequilibrium approach to the OSTMM.
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5.2 THE M O T I V A T I O N  OF THE D I S E Q U I L I B R I U M  A P P R O A C H  TO THE M O D E L L I N G  
OF T H E  M A R K E T
In many markets there may be evidence of a mismatching of demand and 
supply, the most usual being unintended inventory accumulation or decumulation. 
For such markets this evidence is more than just some notion of which way 
inventories are changing - one has data on the level of inventories and any 
change can be regarded as being due to differences between demand and supply.
In chapter 1 section 2.2 it has been explained how this can enable some 
models of commodity markets to be reformulated slightly to become amenable 
to traditional estimation approaches. It was also pointed out how such an 
approach can be used in labour markets. The argument for a disequilibrium 
approach using a Walrasian equation for the price dynamics and the minimum 
condition as in 1.2.3 rests with the idea that in some cases inventory 
changes or unemployed resources are not observed at all.
Now consider the OSTMM. All those variables which are observed can be 
set out in a simplified balance sheet format as below.
BALANCE SHEET FOR THE OSTMM 
LIABILITIES ASSETS
DEPOSITS BY TRADING BANKS TREASURY NOTES
DEPOSITS BY OTHER LENDERS GOVERNMENT SECURITIES
LAST RESORT BORROWING CERTIFICATES OF DEPOSIT
SHAREHOLDERS FUNDS COMMERCIAL BILLS
OTHER
It is accepted that the dealers' liabilities are more liquid than their assets 
since a substantial portion of liabilities are at call. Therefore, given the 
dealers' asset portfolio and equity much of their day to day operations 
involve ensuring deposits are at an adequate level. The proposition put
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forward for the ensuing analysis is that in the face of an imbalance in their 
portfolios dealers can choose one or more of the options (i) - (iii) 
mentioned in section 5.1. Each has potential advantages and disadvantages.
It is important in analysing these options to recall that the dealer must 
remove the imbalance by the end of the day. Before proceeding with this 
analysis, it is necessary to introduce some plausible assumptions about the 
transactors and their behaviour in the OSTMM.
In the long-run it is assumed that the market is competitive in that the 
interest rate cannot be freely set by either the dealer or depositors. This 
is a reasonable assumption,given the OSTMM exists within a wider financial 
market which includes sections competing with OSTMM dealers for funds from a 
disparate group of potential depositors. This assumption enables one to 
derive long-run demand for deposits and supply of deposits as functions of 
interest rates - the own rate and rates of other assets or liabilities in 
the particular decision makers choice set. A popular approach has been to 
use the theory of portfolio choice as exemplified by writers such as 
Parkin (1970), Sharpe (1973) and Johnston and Perrin (1976). If A is a 
kxl vector of assets and liabilities (negative assets) and r is a kxl 
vector of returns on each asset where r ~ N(pR,ZR) then the problem is to 
maximize expected utility which is usually made equivalent to maximizing:
(5.1) U = A'yR - (bA'ErA/2) .
A constraint that assets sum to E , where E is the initial endowment 
(usually wealth) is also imposed.
(5.2) £'A = E .
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Then forming the Lagrangian
(5.3) £ = A'pR - (bA'I A/2) - X(£’A-E) 
and obtaining the first order conditions for a maximum gives:
(5.4)
and solving for A in particular gives the long-run solution:
(5.5) A* = Ü \i + b2e 
where B^  is kxk and B? is kxl .
Frequently generalized adjustment is introduced into the model so that:
(5.6) At - At.j = D(AJ-At_p
where the time subscript, t , is now introduced and D is a kxk matrix 
of adjustment coefficients. This aspect of portfolio models has been 
discussed by writers such as Brainard and Tobin (1968), Christofides (1976) 
and Hunt and Upcher (1979).
In the model of the OSTMM the dealers liability, deposits, is of prime 
concern and from (5.5) and (5.6) a demand for deposits equation is obtained. 
By a parallel approach for Trading Banks and for other lenders the supply of 
deposits (which to them is demand for an asset) can also be obtained. Each 
of these equations will include differing sets of interest rates depending 
on assets or liabilities in each decision makers choice set.
While the analysis so far is reasonable in explaining the notional 
quantities demanded and supplied, it is argued that in the short term
b£n & A = tuR R
1 o 1 X E
125
imbalances between the notional demands and supplies may occur as a result 
of interest rates not moving immediately to clear the market. To develop 
this argument it is assumed that the dealers have the ability to set rates in 
the short run. This is exactly the type of assumption, suggested by Arrow 
(1959), Leijonhufvud (1968) and Alchian (1970), that suppliers become 
transitorily monopolists, which lias already been discussed in chapter 1. When 
dealers face a shortage of funds, rather than raise the rates offered to 
call forth a l l  the additionally required funds, they will only gradually 
raise these rates while acquiring information about supply conditions. 
However, since they must be in balance by the end of the day, the remaining 
shortfall must be made up by last resort borrowing and/or sale of some 
assets (Treasury notes, government securities etc.). When the dealers face 
an excess supply of deposits from Trading Banks and other lenders, rather 
than lower their rates to cut out all the excess supply immediately, they 
will only gradually lower their offers and refuse to accept deposits from 
some potential depositors.
It is on this basis that the Walrasian equation is included in the 
model, representing the adjustment of interest rates in response to excess 
or deficient demand. Also added to the model is the condition that the 
minimum of demand and supply is the quantity traded. This means one side of 
the market may be constrained. If it is the suppliers of deposits, then 
they will be forced to hold excess cash or excess of the asset they wanted 
to replace by OSTMM deposits. However if it is the dealers, then they must 
take action to balance their portfolios immediately in order to remain in 
balance each day. This can be done by using the last resort borrowing 
facility or by reducing asset holdings, these actions not having been 
originally planned by the OSTMM dealer. If the latter action is taken the
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cost will vary depending on whether the reduction can be effected by sale of 
Treasury notes or bonds. Except where the reduction in bonds may enable 
dealers to avoid (further) capital losses, it is to be expected that the 
option of varying holdings of Treasury notes will be preferred. If the 
last resort borrowing option is used, penalty rates will be paid, but 
offsetting this is the breathing space the dealer gains during which search 
can take place.
The model hypothesises a planned demand for deposits equation which is 
determined by dealers' planned asset holdings and the need to balance their 
portfolios. It also hypothesises planned supply of deposits equations. Any 
shortfall of supply of deposits in relation to demand is then met by the 
adjustment processes (i) - (iii) of section 1. It is possible to observe 
interest rate changes and last resort lending which provides easily used 
information for the model.
If there was no unplanned reduction in the asset portfolio and no 
rationing of suppliers the model would be:
planned demand for funds by 
dealers
planned supply by trading banks
planned supply by other lenders
planned last resort borrowing
(5.U) l" = 0 t (Dt-STt-SOt-L[>) 
(5.12) Lt = + L“
+ u ^  unplanned last resort borrowing
observed last resort borrowing
(5.13) Ar^ = (D^-ST^-SO^-L^) + + u change in interest rate
(5.14) Qt Lt = STt + S0t observed quantity
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where Q is the sum of deposits by trading banks and other lenders, r^_ is 
the endogenous rate of interest and , X , X ^  and X ^  vectors
of exogenous variables. However there is no means by which it is possible 
to distinguish between a planned reduction in asset portfolio and an unplanned 
reduction, which occurs when the option of selling securities to balance the 
portfolio is built into the model. It could be argued that the first two 
options, variation of interest rates and last resort borrowing will be 
adequate, thereby overcoming this problem, but the experience of 1973-75 in 
the OSTMM suggests a period when this third option was being used quite 
substantially. In the face of rising interest rates and tight liquidity in 
the economy generally, the OSTMM deposits fell from a peak of $1083.7 m. to 
a trough of $387.4 m. in June 1974, before rising to $892.8 m. by the end of 
1975. It was not until the end of 1977 that the 1973 peak was once more 
reached. While it is not denied much of this reduction was planned, it is 
also reasonable to assume that sometimes dealers may have been forced into 
additional unplanned reductions as well. If there is an excess supply of 
funds to the dealer one would expect to see a low level of last resort lending 
and a general reduction in interest rates paid to lenders. In this situation 
it is likely to be lenders who remain unsatisfied, but again there is no 
exact measure of the amount of unsatisfied supply.
As a result, in the OSTMM the imposition of a minimum condition seems 
necessary to adequately model the dealers' behaviour. Muellbauer (1978) has 
argued that aggregation of such minimum conditions for each dealer results 
in the condition:
(5.15) Qt < min(Dt,St)
(where S is the sum of all individual notional supplies),
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since aggregation occurs over some sub-markets which experience excess demand 
and others which experience excess supply. In the labour market this is 
certainly a reasonable argument since there is a wide range of factor 
differentiation between each sub-market causing a degree of isolation between 
them. This is less likely to be the case in the OSTMM which, while regulated 
in a number of areas must be competitive, both within the market between 
dealers and with other financial markets. That they have lost ground 
relative -to the unofficial market (USTMM) is due in no small part to the 
general decline in attractiveness of government securities. If the 
competitiveness, especially that between dealers, is accepted, one would not 
expect a great variation in the position individual dealers find themselves 
in. Therefore if the market as a whole is in a situation of excess demand 
(supply) then individual dealers are likely to be in the same position. Thus 
the minimum condition will be restricted to:
(5.16) Qt = min(Dt,St)
which is just that suggested by Fair and Jaffee (1972)
Specifically, for the OSTMM (5.14) is replaced by
(5.17) Qt = min(Dt-Lt,STt+SOt)
or Q + L = min(D +L' ,ST +S0 +Lt)
The disaggregation of the supply equation requires one further assumption to 
be made when (5.17) replaces (5.14). If it is supply that is being observed, 
then observed trading bank deposits equals supply of trading bank deposits 
and observed deposits by other lenders also equals supply by other lenders, 
i.e. if Qt = STt + SO then QTt = STt and Q0t = S0t^ O^ .
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where QT^ and QOt are the observed levels of trading bank and other
lenders' deposits respectively. This is only a guide to the general form of
the model with a number of variations introduced in later sections. The
identity (5.17) requires some further elaboration. Observations are
available on Qt and only. If there is excess demand for deposits one
observes supply as well as last resort borrowing (i.e. 0 = S^ .); if there is
excess supply one observes demand made up of deposits (which are now demand
determined) and planned last resort borrowing (i.e. D = Qt + L^ ) . Roth
(5.11) and (5.13) reflect the two options (i) and (ii) of the adjustment
process, while option (iii) will be reflected by any inequality between D
and . If > S + this implies an unplanned change in
portfolio size while if < S + this implies that Trading Banks or
other lenders are being rationed. One final point to be made is that as
written the model consists of seven equations, two of which are identities.
There arc four observed endogenous variables QT^ _ , QO^ , and r^  and five
p  u.unobserved endogenous variables , ST^ _ , SO^ , L^_ and L . A question that 
arises is: if the model is reduced to an estimatable form whether all the
structural parameters are recoverable. This aspect will be dealt with in 
section 5 of this chapter.
5.3 THE DEMAND AND SUPPLY RELATIONSHIPS OF THE OSTMM MODEL 
5.3.a. Demand for Deposits by Dealers
The dealer expects to earn profit from two sources
(i) the margin between interest received on assets and interest paid 
on deposits (liabilities); and
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(ii) any gains made through capital appreciation of securities (or 
losses through capital depreciation).
Let A be the level of dealers assets, D the level of deposits with the
dealer and E the dealers equity. Let r^ and r^ be respective interest
0rates received from assets and paid for deposits and g^ be the expected 
percentage capital gain on assets. Then following the portfolio approach 
already outlined in section 5.2 (see equation (5.1)).
(5.18) V 4 +rAt> - DtrDt - l°AtAt - f °DtDt
2 2where g a and cj represent the risk associated with the assets and At Dt r
deposits in the portfolio. Then U is maximized subject to the constraint
(5.i9) \  - q  + Et
when Et is given (at least in the short run).
In the case of the STMM it is reasonable to assume that most interest 
rates are exogenous. Certainly the assets that a dealer will typically hold, 
such as Treasury notes and government securities, are traded in much wider 
and larger financial markets. Although the dealers might have some 
discretion in the rates offered to lenders in the short run, as argued in 
section 2, not only is each dealer competing with other dealers to obtain 
finance but also with other financial institutions. Moreover potential 
lenders will compare rates on short term assets (similar to those held by 
dealers) with those rates offered by dealers, so should the differential 
between them widen significantly the amount of lending to dealers will be 
severely affected. Should interest rates be rising in the financial market 
as a whole the dealers will be therefore compelled to offer competitive rates. 
However this may not be possible unless the assets they hold provide an
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adequate return. This can be ensured by rearrangement of their assets when 
interest rates are rising, but it is precisely in these circumstances that 
the possibility of capital losses become significant. With bond prices 
falling the dealer could become locked in to holding bonds - a result of 
weighing the losses from a reduced margin on the portfolio and the losses 
from selling bonds at below the price originally paid. To avoid this the 
dealers must try to anticipate changes in bond prices. On the other hand if 
dealers can anticipate capital gains the opportunity to make additional 
profits exists. Thus a capital gains term is considered important in 
determination of OSTMM portfolios.
By allowing the terms reflecting the risk associated with assets and 
deposits to have time subscripts it is possible to account for other factors 
that might have an effect on the dealers decision by making risk a function 
of other variables. The variables hypothesised are:
(i) the level of equity: the higher the level of equity, all other 
things being equal, the lower the risk, as the gearing ratio, D^/E » 
will be lower.
(ii) liability composition: the higher the level of deposits by
Trading Banks, all other tilings being equal, the higher the risk as these 
deposits are more volatile and more likely to be at call. Thus a liability 
composition variable, QT^ ^/Q  ^ is introduced where QT^  ^ is the level
of Trading Bank deposits and  ^ is total deposits.
(iii) proportional change in money supply: this will affect risk in
that a large increase in the money supply will influence the dealers 
assessment of availability of funds, likelihood of withdrawal of call
deposits and general liquidity conditions in the economy at large.
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(iv) certificate of deposits: the introduction of these assets as an
allowable part of a dealer's portfolio in March 1969 will influence risk by 
allowing a more diversified portfolio. This factor is introduced via a dummy 
variable, , which is suggested by Johnston and Perrin (1976). They also
suggest a dummy, D? , which accounts for the effect of the interest rate 
ceiling on certificates of deposit which was no longer effective after 1971.
Given these factors which influence risk, substitute (5.19) into (5.18)
2 o- -2 2 d- -
_°A<Wlt>_ •W -2yv(5-20) Ut - CgAtT At)(Dt+Et) - rDtDt -f
where is a vector of the variables just discussed and = a^(W^)
and = a^(W^) . Note that is included in . Then maximizing
with respect to D :
9U 2
(5 .2 !) - gAt + rAt rDt _ V " i d ( V V  - d o-D (Wu )_ Dt = 0 >
so:
(5.22) Dt
SAt"rAt-rDt-a[0A(Wlt)]2 ' E
aCaA(Wlt)]2 + d[aD(V ]2
t
where D* is planned long run demand for deposits.
For practical purposes a linear version of (5.22) is preferred, so:
(5.23) D{ ■ ai(rAt-rDt) ♦ bu Et ♦ b^QT/Q)^
+ bi3(AM3/H3)t + b14Dlt ♦ b15D2t ♦ .
The next step is to formulate the capital gains term in order to be able to 
estimate (5.23). In doing so the following points are relevant:
(i) dealers will typically hold securities which will mature within
five years (i.e. short term securities).
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(ii) the rates quoted for such securities are the yield rates to 
maturity and as such include a capital gains component.
Let F be the face value of the security, p^ its price at period t , 
p^ its expected price, r^_ the yield to maturity and rp the quoted rate 
on the face value of the security. Then in any period the payment on the 
security is rp x F and the rate of return TpxF/p • If m is the 
period to maturity of the security then over m periods the price will 
change from p^ to F since the security will be redeemed at its face 
value. Therefore an investor buying this security in period t will expect 
to receive a return of (F-p^j/p over m periods as a result of the 
movement in the price of the security. Thus in period t the proportion of 
the total final capital gain is approximately ((F-p )/p^_xm) • Then the
yield to maturity in period t is given by:
(5.24) V F + I 
PAt + m
F-pAt
At
Note that and rp are in proportions not percentages. Then:
(5-25) PAt = FtrF + i)/(rAt+i° '
0It is now hypothesised that the expected capital gain, g , takes theA L
fo rm:
(5.26) gAt = gAt + VSAt^At-d + 02(gAt'gAt-d
where g^t is the actual capital gain. This is a mixture of the 
extrapolative and adaptive expectations assumptions, as in Turnovsky (1970) 
and Valentine (1977). Also note that:
3At ^At ^At -p^^At-p (r + — ) At m J
(5.27) 1
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so that g is the capital gain achieved in period t over the previous 
p periods. Although 1/m is not known, values of 1 , 2  or 3 are most 
likely for the OSTMM and so each is tried when the regression is performed. 
Next assume that there is a partial adjustment scheme toward the long run 
planned demand based on the previous periods actual level of deposits.
Then:
(5.28) Dt - V l  = 6d Dt*-Vd
and so:
(5.29) l (rAt-rDt} + BlW lt + V A t  + (1‘6l)Qt-l + Ut
where u^. is the disturbance term. Because the demand for deposits is 
derived to a large extent from the dealer's portfolio of assets it is possible 
to specify an alternative to (5.29) which uses the lagged asset variable 
rather than lagged deposits and moreover disaggregates between government 
securities and non-government assets. The response is expected to differ 
between these two categories because for government securities there is a 
minimum requirement on the amount held in the portfolio, as well as the 
possibility of capital gains or losses. From (5.26)
(5.30) ’At 02gAt-l ’At 6l(gAt-gAt- d + 62gAt
and from (5.29) and (5.30):
(5.31) Dt = a l(rAt-rD d  + a l62(rA t - r rDt-l)
+ V ßl + Wlt-lßie2
+ V 1+0l + 02)gAt - Vl^At-l
+ O  + °2 ^  l5l-)(i-2 02Dt-l + ut + 02ut-l
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which is an equation which must be estimated with imposition of non-linear 
restrictions. There are also implications for the structure of the 
disturbances which are discussed in section 6.4. Note that if 0^  = 0 
expectations are adaptive, while if = 0 expectations are extrapolative 
(if 0^  > 0) or regressive (if 0^<O). If 0^ = 0^ = 0 then a crude 
expectations scheme g = g^. results.
Also important in the construction of the demand equation is choice of 
interest rates to be used. The best indicator of the margin between asset 
returns and the amount paid on deposits is probably the difference between 
the rate on government securities (which make up the major part of the 
dealer's portfolio) and marginal rate on deposits in the current period.
Since no marginal rate is available the best choice would appear to be the 
average of the minimum and maximum call rates which proxies for the marginal 
rate (see section 5.3.d). In generating the capital gains term the rate on 
government securities is used. The published government security rate chosen 
is the two year non-rebatable bond rate.
The other variable requiring some choice is the level of equity since 
no monthly data are available. The choice is either paid-up capital, which 
does not adequately reflect the financial position of the dealers, or 
shareholders' funds which, while a better indicator, is more difficult to 
obtain as it is only available in individual dealer's Annual Reports. Both 
series suffer in being only available annually and must be interpolated to 
obtain monthly figures.
5.3.b. Supply of Funds to the Dealers
There are two main categories of lender - Trading Banks, whose deposits 
tend to be at call and all other groups whose deposits tend to have a higher
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proportion placed for fixed periods. This lias led to consideration being 
given by Dewald (1968) and Allan and Valentine (1978) to disaggregation in 
modelling the supply of funds. The latter have shown some empirical 
justification for disaggregation. If this is accepted there are some 
significant implications for both formulation, estimation and testing of the 
disequilibrium hypothesis. These will be discussed in 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6.
The two types of supply are now discussed.
Supply of Funds by Trading Banks
First it is recognized that banks have certain requirements to meet in 
determining their portfolios. The two of prime importance are the Statutory 
Reserve Deposit (SRD) requirement and the minimum liquid and government 
securities (LGS) convention. Once these requirements are met the banks are 
free to choose the remainder of the portfolio. Advances make up the vast 
majority of this remainder. At any time the Trading Banks have a certain 
amount of unused overdraft limits which may be called upon by the banks' 
borrowers. Allan and Valentine (1978) suggest that trading banks will wish 
to hold an amount of liquid funds as a precaution against these unused over­
draft limits being used and that the OSTMM is one avenue for placement of 
these short term funds. The call deposit facility of the OSTMM is very 
attractive in that the deposits are very liquid compared to government 
securities and earn interest, unlike cash. To this extent they may often be 
preferred to the holding of free LGS assets (i.e. LGS assets over and above 
the convention).
It is worth noting that in the submission by the Council of Authorized 
Money Market Dealers ((1979), section 12) to the Committee of Inquiry into 
the Financial System of Australia, it is stated that loans to authorized 
dealers are made from the Trading Banks exchange settlement accounts (the
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accounts they maintain to clear cheques from day to day). The banks also 
place money with each other on the inter-bank market (as well as with 
unofficial dealers and merchant banks). This could be seen to contradict the 
hypothesis that funds come from the free section of the banks' portfolios, 
but it should be noted that the exchange settlement accounts will be part of 
LGS assets. To the extent that these accounts accumulate, LGS assets rise, 
and given that the LGS convention is being met, excess LGS assets will appear. 
These are conditions when banks are likely to deposit with dealers and 
therefore there is no contradiction between the notions that banks supply 
dealers from exchange settlement accounts and that they supply dealers out 
of excess LGS assets.
The willingness of the banks to provide funds to the OSTMM will be 
tempered by the change in advances occurring during the period. Movement in 
the SRD ratio is likely to affect supply to the dealers and the severity of 
this effect will vary depending on the amount of free (or excess) LGS assets. 
If these are very small the banks will vary liquidity via OSTMM deposits 
much more than if they are large.
The higher the interest rates for Treasury notes and government 
securities the greater the incentive Trading Banks have to hold excess LGS 
assets rather than OSTMM call deposits. Rose ((1969), p.116) argues this - 
particularly in relation to treasury notes. At the same time the higher the 
rate on call deposits the greater the incentive to hold such deposits.
However, given the reasons related to unused overdraft limits, excess LGS 
assets and SRD's, these interest rate incentives may be of secondary 
importance. One other rate is worth considering, that on certificates of 
deposit (CD). These are a recent development only (see 5.3.a) but are of 
relevance in that while most rates offered by banks are fairly stable the
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CD rate has fluctuated much more. For example in June 1974 the CD rate was 
17.2% compared to the overdraft rate of 11.5%, while in December 1977 the CD 
rate was 9.7% compared to the overdraft rate of 10.5%. When the CD rate is 
much higher than the overdraft rate two factors may lead to banks holding 
call deposits with the STMM. The first is their desire to earn interest on 
the most liquid funds to offset this high CD rate. The second is a preference 
for liquid funds so that when old CD's are redeemed, the banks can recall 
these deposits in order to reduce the need to issue new CD's. Because of 
their more recent introduction the use of dummy variables, such as those 
mentioned for the demand equation may be useful, especially in generating 
shifts in parameters associated with the other variables.
The introduction of Australian Savings Bonds in January 1976 provided 
an extremely attractive form of investment, evidenced by the strong demand 
for them. The high interest rates and the case with which they could be 
converted to liquid funds may have influenced Trading Banks in favour of 
holding LGS assets above minimum requirements rather than placing funds in 
the OSTMM. Thus a dummy variable for their introduction is tried.
Retail sales can also be included as an indicator of economic activity 
(see Allan and Valentine (1978)). A high level of economic activity will 
reduce banks' expectations about the level of free reserves (drawing on 
overdraft accounts) and influence their decision to deposit with dealers).
It is not clear what sign this variable should have: a positive sign
indicates that a high level of economic activity leads to high expected 
drawings on overdraft accounts due to higher intended expenditures and so a 
preference for liquid assets, such as STMM call deposits, by Trading Banks, 
while a negative sign indicates that banks expect a higher repayment rate 
(e.g. from the rural sector) with a consequent preference for less liquid
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2assets by the banks.
Finally, during the 1970's, the growth of unofficial short term money 
market has been substantial. Their share of the short term money market was 
29.7% in June 1969, while in June 1974 it was 32.2%.2 3 This latter percentage 
was rather exceptional and by June 1978 the situation had stabilized with the 
USTMM share at 72.2%. Much of this variation has been due to the fact that 
because the OSTMM is required to hold a large amount of government securities, 
when interest rates rise, instead of being able to seek out more attractive 
forms of investment, dealers are forced to reduce the size of their portfolio. 
The Council of Authorized Money Market Dealers (an organization consisting 
of dealers in the OSTMM) have argued that government securities should be 
made more responsive to market conditions for this very reason (see Council 
of Authorized Money Market Dealers (1979), p.4 and sections 8 and 11). The 
essential point is that the growth of the USTMM, the dealers of which are 
often affiliated with the Trading Banks, has probably directed funds away 
from the official market. To account for this a market shares variable 
(USTMM deposits/total STMM deposits) is introduced.
The Trading Bank planned supply function is:
(5.32) ST* = ST(UOD,XLGS,SRD,ATAD,rT,rG,rM,rCD,DCD,Du,DA,RETAIL)
where UOD is unused overdraft limits, XLGS is excess LGS assets, SRD the 
Statutory Reserve Deposit ratio, ATAD the change in trading bank advances, 
r,p , r^ , r^ and r ^  the Treasury note rate, the two year bond rate, marginal 
rate paid for call deposits and certificates of deposits rate respectively,
2 This underlines the fact that retail sales is probably not a particularly 
good indicator of economic activity but little else is available on a 
monthly basis.
3 These percentages are obtained from figures in the Reserve Bank of 
Australia, Statistical Bulletin, Flow of Funds Supplements, various 
dates.
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RFTAIL is the level of monthly retail sales, D a dummy for the introduction 
of CD's, a dummy for the introduction of Australian Savings Bonds and
Dy the market shares dummy accounting for the growth of the unofficial 
market. It is assumed that the OSTMM has little effect on all but the 
marginal rate offered (chosen to be the average of maximum and minimum call 
rates) which is therefore the endogenous interest rate in the equation. 
Different lags are possible for the variables and are tried during estimation. 
Again it is possible to incorporate a partial adjustment process into the 
equation to relate long run planned supply to current planned supply. That 
is:
(5.33) ST. - STt_1 = 62(ST*-STt_p
which when combined with (5.32) yields the Trading Banks' current planned 
supply equation.
Supply of Funds by Other Lenders
It is postulated that unlike the Trading Banks many of the other lenders 
to authorized dealers have a regular pattern of high and low liquidity, and 
are more certain as to when they need to draw on deposits. Therefore other 
lenders are more likely to use fixed deposit facilities than are the Trading 
Banks.
The first example of this is the case of companies and their tax payments. 
While the timing of tax payments lias varied over the sample period it is 
reasonable to assume that as the date for tax payments draws near the 
companies set aside enough funds, period by period, to enable them to meet 
this commitment when it is due. Fixed deposits, as well as call deposits, 
with the STMM may be one attractive interest bearing repository for these
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funds. Given that companies know exactly when they need to draw on these 
funds such deposits are more likely to be fixed, unless it is very close to 
the tax date or the company generally experiences wide swings in liquidity. 
Therefore a tax variable is introduced - based on company tax payable. As a 
result of the tax instalment system introduced in 1973-79 (and subsequent 
modifications to the year by year method of payment) such a variable might 
be expected to capture any effect on OSTMM deposits of the changed timing of 
tax payments. Its construction is discussed in more detail in section 6.2.
Another source of supply by other lenders, perhaps more relevant in the 
1970's, is the expectation of exchange rate fluctuations which will lead to 
speculative capital flows in or out of the country. In the case of inflows, 
some proportion is likely to be lodged with the OSTMM. In the case of 
outflows, local speculators will withdraw available liquid funds, some of 
these being in the OSTMM. Moreover, any funds earmarked for tax payments 
may be placed outside the country rather than witli domestic financial 
institutions. Thus a variable to account for the effect of exchange rate 
speculation is introduced. Such a variable has been used by Porter (1974, 
1977). He uses the lagged value of foreign reserves which is triggered in 
1971-72 during a period of expected exchange rate appreciation. His 
variable is inadequate in this model as it cannot be used to capture the 
1976 speculation when a currency devaluation was expected. Therefore the 
change in reserves triggered during the two periods is used, so that zero 
values reflect no speculation, positive values speculation based on expected 
revaluation and negative values speculation based on expected devaluation. 
The effect of price changes is also removed from the figures for reserves 
before calculating the change. Further discussion of this variable is to be
found in section 6.2.
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Other variables used in this equation are interest rates (with a 
preference for choice of longer term rates than in the Trading Bank equation), 
a capital gains term, the proportional change in money supply and the 
unofficial STMM variable. Also because of the suspected longer term nature 
of these deposits and their associated seasonality, in many cases seasonal 
dummies may be of more importance in this equation. So:
(5.34) SO* = SO(rT,rG,rM,rw,TAX,SPEC,AM3/M3,DU,D1,...,D11)
where r^ is the weighted average interest rate on deposits (although r^, , 
the maximum fixed deposit rate may be an alternative), TAX the tax variable 
and SPEC the variable reflecting exchange rate speculation, AM3/M3 is the 
proportional change in the money supply and D^,...D arc seasonal dummies.
Again a partial adjustment scheme may be superimposed.
(5.35) S0t - S0t_1 = 63(SO*-SOt_1)
5.3.c. Last Resort Borrowing
Evidence suggests that while there is a minimum 7 day period for which 
last resort loans are held, this minimum is also usually the maximum (sec 
Allan (1977), p.36). Thus over the week the dealer must reallocate assets 
and liabilities in order to be in balance when repayment is due. Because 
the rate on last resort borrowing is a penalty rate, exceeding the bond 
rate and the dealers' weighted average rate paid on deposits, it is clear 
that the dealers only regard this facility as a short term source of funds. 
Moreover there is likely to be some disapproval from the Reserve Bank if a 
dealer's use of the facility becomes excessive (except in special 
circumstances, such as a short term liquidity crisis in the market).
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Therefore it is unlikely that last resort borrowing forms part of a dealer's 
long run desired portfolio. In the short run such borrowing can be rational 
under a number of circumstances. Firstly, over a period of one week the 
dealer is much more likely to be able to find funds at a favourable interest 
rate through market search. Secondly, as liquidity begins to tighten the 
dealers may resist running down their portfolio until it is clear such 
conditions are likely to persist. The same resistance would occur during 
short term liquidity crises such as those mentioned by Allan and Valentine 
(1978). These authors give a third reason: where dealers do not want to 
telegraph a shortage of funds, which might bid up rates payable on deposits 
in following periods, into the market. These are reasons why in the short 
run dealers might choose to use the last resort facility.
Thus variables explaining this component of last resort borrowing are 
introduced into a "planned" equation which, when the equilibrium hypothesis 
is accepted, will close the model. These variables are the marginal rate a 
dealer must pay for funds, the last resort borrowing rate and proportional 
change in the money supply as an indicator of general liquidity conditions. 
Also variables such as unused overdraft limits or the tax variable might be 
significant as indicators of the dealers' likelihood of success in obtaining 
deposits from bank and non-bank sources respectively. The higher last 
periods holdings of government securities the greater is the ability of a 
dealer to run down these (without violating reserve bank requirements) as an 
alternative to last resort borrowing. Also the lagged level of total 
deposits is included as the greater the dealers' deposits, the greater the 
amount of last resort lending likely to take place. An alternative to this 
variable is the level of shareholders funds and a choice is made on empirical 
grounds. Finally the lagged value of last resort borrowing is included. There 
will be a reluctance by dealers to use the facility in this period if they
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have used it in the previous period. However the variable may pick up a 
trend to increased usage of the facility, as well as liquidity conditions 
specific to the OSTMM, so a priori the sign of the coefficient of this 
variable is unknown.
As it stands a planned last resort borrowing equation cannot be 
separately estimated and the planned and unplanned components must be 
combined during estimation (using (5.10) - (5.12)). However there will be 
situations, to be shown later, where the two components can be separated out 
after the model is estimated.
5 .3 .d .  The Endogenous In terest  Rate Variable
The preferred rate chosen is the average of the maximum and minimum call 
rates (hereafter referred to as the average call rate) as chosen by writers 
such as Parkin (1970). The reasons for this choice are now outlined. While 
Allan and Valentine (1978) argue for the choice of the maximum call rate as 
a reasonable approximation to the rate paid on additional deposits, 
preliminary investigation reveals this to be a potentially inferior choice. 
In their paper the accuracy of approximation is indicated by whether:
(5.36) AD D-lr = t  • --  + r • ----W C D IV-1 D
is an acceptable relationship. To determine this they estimate:
(5.37) nf a d  D-l -r = a + R (r,-, —  + r „ •---) + u .W D W-l D ;
An a value close to zero, 3 close to unity and high R would support
the contention. The result for the sample period in this study is:
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(5.38) r = 0.7857 + 0.8552 ( r ^ -  + r ) ; R2 = 0.7802
(3.9336) (23.3820) DW = 2.0663
Fl,154 = 546*7157
(Allan and Valentine:
0.695 0.854
(4.10) (24.70)
R2 = 0.801 
DW = 2.41 )
This result can be seen to be very similar to that of Allan and Valentine, 
but if the coefficients on r^ and r^  ^ are estimated separately 
the result is:
(5.39) 0.3994 + 0.4505 
(2.0334) (8.6310)
ADr —— + 0.9431 D-lrL c D_ W-l D
(30.6579)
= 0.8600 
= 2.4734
12,153 = 469.9551
which suggests p  cannot truly be the marginal rate. Alternatively it may 
be hypothesised that the marginal rate is a proportion of the maximum call 
rate - in the case of (5.39) this proportion being 0.4505.
However, even if one accepts this hypothesis there is reason to believe 
(5.36) is inadequate. Ilendershott (1979) acknowledges the fact that the 
difference between new additions to funds and net additions to funds will be 
of importance in determining the weighted average rate. A simpler version of 
his hypothesis, where D denotes old deposits, is:
D-D
r = r W M
OLD + r OLDW-l
and assuming that a fraction b of any periods deposits are retained in
the next period (i.e. DOLD b*D_1):
, D-l . D-lr - b * r ---+ b • r •----M M D W-l D(5.40)
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Therefore (5.40) is estimated without a constant term as none is indicated 
by the theory, with the two competing rates: r = a • r^ and r^ = a • r^ 
(where r^ is the mean of the maximum and minimum rates). The results, with 
the constraints implied by (5.40) imposed, arc:4
(5.41) rw = 0.5669 rc - 0.4425 rc • p p  + 0.7806 r^  ^• p p ; R2 = 0.8743
(31.4925) (14.6227) (17.0035) DW = 2.3570
F. 1r = 1070.74341,154
(5.42) rw = 0.9946 r - 0.5257 rc * p p  + 0.5285 rw 1 • p p ; R2 = 0.9106
(76.0026) (21.3385) (11.0355) DW = 2.0336
F x = 1567.9962
The regression equation (5.42) is clearly superior to that of (5.41) and both 
(5.41) and (5.42) are superior to the previously estimated versions (5.38) and 
(5.39).5 In preferring (5.42) it should be noted that not only does the 
retention rate, b , seem more plausible but that r is in fact a very good 
proxy for the marginal rate as the coefficient of p  is very close to 
unity.
Having chosen p, in preference to r , it is worth considering the 
alternatives to these rates that could have been used. In general these 
are considered unsuitable.
i) the maximum rate paid on fixed deposits.
This is the best alternative and replacing r , by r in (3.40) gives a
i
slightly superior equation to (5.41):
4 The standard error for the term r^ * — ~  or r^. is calculated
using the method of Goldberger, Nagar and Odeh (1961).
?5 It is recognized that and DW in a regression that does not include
the constant term may be misleading however since both (5.41) and (5.42) 
exclude the constant they are comparable.
147
; R 2
F1 = 1256.3963
DW = 2.3891
(51.3845) (12.6460) (13.6567)
However because in extreme market conditions there will be some "stickiness” 
in the fixed rate (since dealers would prefer to avoid paying high rates for 
too long) as compared to the call rate (dealers will expect funds earning 
this rate to be withdrawn more quickly) it is felt that the call rate is more 
responsive to market conditions and so is preferred.
ii) minimum call rate.
This is unsatisfactory in that it is very low, sometimes even zero, and by 
itself would not be a very good proxy for the marginal rate.
iii) the weighted average rate on deposits.
While this rate reflects the average cost of funds to the dealer, it contains 
too much past history to be suitable. The rate will reflect to a small 
degree current conditions, but to a larger degree depends on rates paid on 
deposits carried over from previous periods. It could be argued that this 
rate should be used in the demand equation because the difference between 
the rate received on securities and the average rate paid on deposits reflects 
the interest return on the portfolio. However the dealers major activity is 
in obtaining new deposits and the difference between the current rate 
received on securities and the current marginal rate is a more appropriate 
indicator of the dealers margin on these deposits.
5.4  DISEQUILIBRIUM IN THE OFFICIAL SHORT TERM MONEY MARKET
In section 5.2 motivation for a disequilibrium approach to the model of
the OSTMM is provided. The argument is that should the dealers be forced
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to make unplanned sales of securities in the face of a shortage of deposits 
or if suppliers are rationed when there is excess supply of deposits then 
there is a "residual" arising from the difference between notional demand 
and notional supply. Whereas this residual can sometimes be deduced (e.g. 
via inventory changes in commodity markets), this is not possible in this 
case. The use of a minimum condition - slightly more complex than that 
originally suggested by Fair and Jaffee (1972) - is a potential means to 
overcoming this difficulty.
Also in section 5.1 alternative means of adjustment have been posited. 
In the face of a shortage of funds the dealer can:
(i) offer a higher interest rate to lenders
CS.13) irt = Yt(Dt-STt-SOt-LtP) + + ,
(ii) carry out last resort borrowing (unplanned)
(5.11) LtU = 0t (Dt-STt-SOt-LP) + u5t ’
or (iii) carry out unplanned security sales
(5.44) unplanned security sales = D - ST - SO^ - .
It is worth noting that Gordon and Hynes (1970) argue that the 
Walrasian equation is often poorly embedded into the market framework because, 
firstly, it is never deduced as the maximizing response of economic units to 
changing data and, secondly, the economic actors are not defined. However 
in this model the dealers are the economic actors in that it is argued they 
quote the interest rates they are prepared to pay, and vary them according 
to adequacy or inadequacy of the forthcoming supply. Since information is
149
only forthcoming through market search the dealer is unlikely to vary interest 
rates to clear the market immediately. This is particularly true if the 
opportunity cost of last resort borrowing is low, as use of this facility 
will give the dealer time to carry out search in the market.
It is now possible to elaborate further on this disequilibrium behaviour. 
Firstly, much of the estimation is performed with non-stochastic versions of 
(5.13).
N o n - S t o c h a s t i c  W a l r a s i a n  E q u a t i o n
In this case 3. = 0 and u r . = 0  so Ar < 0  will indicate whether o ot t
D^_ - ST^ _ - SO^ - < 0 . In this type of model (5.11) becomes:
0 — Ar + urt y t 5t
While 0 <_ 0^_ 1 when Ar^ _ > 0 , the model specification is such that
when Ar^ < 0 , 0 ^  should be zero, otherwise the ration would be counted 
twice, once as the ration of suppliers and once as a deviation by the 
dealer from his planned asset and last resort borrowing levels. Note 
that no exogenous variables are included in the equation for L1^1 since 
it is expected that = 0 when - ST^ - SO^ - = 0 (or at least
the expected value of should).
Thus:
(5.11a) Art + 51 if Art > 0
5t if Ar < 0 .
In section 5.5 this model is manipulated to obtain estimatable equations.
150
S t o c h a s t i c  W a l r a s i a n  E q u a t i o n
If the Walrasian equation for Ar^ . is stochastic then Ar < 0 cannot
pbe used as an indicator that D - ST - SCf - L. < 0 . Therefore the firstt t t t ^
modification is that in (5.11), —  Ar. cannot be substituted in for
Yt
D. - ST - SCT - LP . Instead: t t t t
(s.llb) I ,I - et(Dt-STt-sot-d) ♦ ust .
Turning to the Walrasian equation itself it may now be specified as:
(S.Ub) Art - V Dt-SV SOt-LtP) ♦ * V
although there must be definite reasons for introducing X . Since 
administered pricing is clearly not applicable, the argument must be that 
the economic actor (or actors) that set the price do not do so with a sole 
purpose of clearing the market. While this may be possible in oligopolistic 
markets (e.g. unions keeping wages high, leading to excess supply of labour 
at the prevailing price) it seems unlikely for the OSTMM, which is reasonably 
competitive. Moreover when the supplies of and demands for funds are matched, 
it seems unlikely that the dealer will choose to vary interest rates offered 
to depositors. This would imply that the dealer requires more funds (if 
they raise the rate) or is trying to deter suppliers (if they lower the rate) 
and both these actions should be manifested in the original demand and supply 
specifications. Thus in this model, from now on, 3^ = 0 is assumed.
5 . 5  E S T I M A T I O N  O F  THE M O D E L
First the non-stochastic model is manipulated to obtain estimatable
equations.
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5.5.a. Non-Stochastic Walrasian Equation
The f u l l  model i s :
(5 .45 )
( 5 .4 6 )
(5 .47 )
(5 .4 8 )  
( 5 .49
(5 .50 )
(5 .51 )
D = a ,  r + x, 3, + u,t I t i t  l I t
ST a  r + + u„t 2 t 2 t  2 2 t
SO = a  r + X, 3 ,  + u„t 3 t 3 t  3 3t
LP a  r + X, 3 + u „t 4 t 4 t  t 4 t
LU 0. (D -ST.-SO^ - LP)t t t  t t J
Ar t = V Dt -ST -SO -
Q« min(Dt -Lt ,STt +SOt ) = QTt  + Q0t
where 0 and y  have a s u b s c r i p t  t  t o  a l l o w  f o r  a s y m m e t r i c a l  a d ju s t m e n t  
s p e e d s .
S i n c e  Ar^ < 0  as  < ST^ _ - S0^ _ , d e f i n i n g
Ar.
Ar _^ i f  Ar^ > 0 
0 o t h e r w i s e
and Ar = <
Ar i f  Ar < 0 t  t
0 o t h e r w i s e
, w i l l  e n a b le
th e  model t o  be m a n i p u l a t e d  a s  f o l l o w s .
i f  Ar > 0 t
St  , QT = STt  and QO = SO
Art Art = Y ( D . - L ^ )
Q = D - iT - —  Ar+
<t  t  t  + t  Y
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while
If Ar < 0
so
and
while
+ 1 +0 —  Ar + u+ t 5t Y
Art = Ar~ = T’ ( Q ^ - S O p  
QT = ST - ( —  -e)Ar"
y "
QOt - eAr t
Note that a new parameter £ is introduced to account for sharing of excess
supply disequilibrium between Trading Banks and other lenders. If £ is
close to zero the Trading Banks bear most of this burden while if £ is
close to 1/y the other lenders do. Next, the term must be excluded
from the demand equation before estimation can proceed and the separate 
P uequations for and must be aggregated in order that a last resort
borrowing equation be obtained. In the case of the demand equation subtracting 
the planned last resort borrowing equation to get:
Qt = («r a4)r + - * 4 ^ 4 ' 4 Alt + (ult-u4t}
Y
is one option. Alternatively adding unplanned last resort borrowing gives:
Qt + Lt = “ lrt + Xltb ' -T Art+ + 0+ ^
Y Y
+ Ult + U5t
as an alternative. It is the latter version that is preferred, as + L 
represents the total funds from all sources and, apart from the term
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—  Ar+ , r e p r e s e n t s  the  d e a l e r s  t o ta l  demand f o r  funds .  Adding p lanned  
Y+
and unplanned  l a s t  r e s o r t  bor rowing g iv e s :
Lt  = a 4r t  + X4 t 64 + 9+ t K
Y
+ U4t + U5t *
so th e  complete s e t  o f  e q u a t io n s  t o  be e s t i m a t e d  i s :
(5.52) % + Lt  = V t  + x i t ß i - \  K  + 0+
+ u.  + ul t
(5.53) QTt  = V t + x2 t e 2 - (-r-e)Ari
Y
(5.54) Q° t  = a 3r t  + X3 t e 3 - £Ari + u
(5 .55) Lt  “ V t  + X4 t 64 + 0+ 4  Ar
2t '
3t
U4 t  + U5t *
T h e re fo re  th e  model t o  be e s t i m a t e d  u s in g  l e a s t  s qua res  t e c h n iq u e s  i s ,  in
te rm s  o f  composi te  p a r a m e te r s :
(5 .56) %  + h  = a i r t + x n ß i
(5 .57) QTt  - a 2r t + X2 t ß2
(5.58)
Q°t = a 3r t + X3 t ß3
(5.59) h  ■ a 4r t + X4 t ß4
S ince  g* ii /—
\ 
C
D
+
1 1—
* + and *+•g4 = 0
t h e  model. Also s i n c e  g2 = - ( i / y
+ gX
+
Ul t  + U5t
+
g2&rt  + +j
C
M
P
- £ Ar^ + U3t
+ + 
+ g.Ar S4U t
+
(u4 t +u5 t 5
, + + 
/ y , e and y+ can be deduced from
) + e , Y can be deduced.  Thus a l l
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underlying structural parameters can be obtained from the composite 
parameters.
Maximum likelihood, at a cost of increased computation time, enables all 
underlying parameters to be obtained directly, all restrictions to be imposed 
whether linear or non-linear and enables correction for autocorrelation. 
Maximum likelihood estimation requires evaluation of the Jacobian. This has 
two parts:
1 1 1 -al+ i--0+J-4- 4-Y Y
J+ =
1 0 0 -a2
0 1 0 -a3
0 0 1 -a4
H V+CD1
= ai - a2 - a3 - “4 -0/Y+)
1 1 1 ‘“I
and J =
1 0 0 -a2 - (—  -e)Y
0 1 0 '“j - e
0 0 1 ~a4
if Ar > 0
if Ar < 0
“l " a2 " °S " a4
5.5.b. S t o c h a s t i c  W a l r a s i a n  E q u a t i o n
If (5.13b) is used rather than (5.13) then sample separation is no 
longer available. The technique that is followed in this type of model has
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been outlined in chapter 2. The extension to the model here is now outlined. 
It is known that
Qt = min (D^ _-L , ST t* t+S0t) - QTt ♦ QOt
and if PD - L > ST t t t + SO then QT = ST and QO^ = S0^ _
while if PD - L < ST t t t + so then QTt + Q0t = Dt - Lt •
The system, slightly rearranged, is
In this case 
for deposits
Uu - Dt airt - Xltßl
U2t = STt " a2rt - X2tß2
u3t = SOt a3rt - X3tß3
U4t = LP -t a4rt - X4tß4
U5t = LUt
U6t = Art
W Lt-sV sV
Y ID -L -ST - SO ) 'tv t t t t
it is convenient to define DD^ = D - L and DD^ is demand 
excluding planned last resort borrowing. Then:
(5.60) v n  = uit " U4t “ DDt - (“r “4)rt ' Xltßl + X4tß4
(5.61) V2t U2t = STt a2rt X2tß2
(5.62) V  =3t U5t ■ sot ' a3rt X3tß3
(5.63) V4t = U4t U5t = Lt " a4rt - X4tß4 - V DV SV SOt
(5.64) V5t U6t ■ Art - ^t(DDt-STt-SOt
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The joint density
OO
h« Tt’QOt>Lt’rd  =
OO OO
+
ni't Q0t
where f(DD^_,ST^,SO, , r ), is obtained from f(vt) where = (v^
The double integral leads to an extremely complicated likelihood. To avoid 
this it is possible to assume that in the event of excess supply of funds it 
is a specific group of lenders who are rationed while all other lenders can 
place all their funds. For example, it may be a subset of the other lenders 
category, in which case:
OO
h(QTt,QOt,Lv rt) =
QV QOt
OO
+
which fits into the framework of 2.4.2.
Following that framework:
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with
and
4t - “4rt - X4tß4
St
It
2t
V3t
4t
5t
It
Art
w. + eIt It
2t
w„ + e3t 3t
W4t - 6t(eit"e3t}
W5t - V en
Then
h(QTt,QOt,Lt,rt) = f(elt,QT QOt,Lt,rt) -delt
+
oo
f(QTt+QOt,QTt,e3t>Lt>rt)
0
de3t '
The Jacobian of the transformation from disturbances to endogenous variables 
is:
1 0 0 0 Ccx'j -ot4)
0 1 0 0 ~a 2
0 0 1 0 'a3
-0t et 6t 1 -a4
"Yt Yt Yt 0 1
1 +Yt(a9+a^+a^ -aj)
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f(DD ST ,SOt,Lt,rt) = Jf(vt)
J r 1 tv-l ,
57277?! exp { - 2 v;z vt}(2ti)D/"|£|
I£ elt > 0
Vt = Wt + Sl°lt
where S1 = (1 0 0 -9t - V
and if e ^  > 0
v = \< + s ^e „t t 3 3t
where s = (0 0 1 6^ Y ) .
Then following the technique in section 2.4.2
T  ■ slr S  ’ *21 = WtE"lsi ’ *3t = WtZ"lwt
*1 = S3Z''53 ’ *2t = ’ *3t =
and the likelihood can be evaluated accordingly.
5.6 HYPOTHESIS TESTING IN THE OSTMM MODEL
Having developed the broad specification of the OSTMM model it is 
possible to show how various hypotheses about dealers’ behaviour may be 
tested during estimation. The broadest possible model includes aspects 
such as unplanned changes in security holdings, unplanned last resort 
borrowing, rationing of potential depositors (non-price) and, of course, 
interest rate variation in response to disequilibrium. The dealers' 
behaviour may be asymmetrical - a different type of adjustment, as well as
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a different magnitude, may occur depending on whether there is excess demand 
or supply. Finally the Walrasian equation may be stochastic or non-stochastic. 
An important question is whether a sequence of tests can be developed in the 
manner suggested by Mizon (1977). He discusses the procedure for hypothesis 
testing where hypotheses are naturally ordered, within a specified maintained 
hypothesis, in terms of restrictiveness. In the OSTMM model however this 
natural ordering is not feasible. The most unrestricted model is one with 
0 , 1/y , 1/y and e not equal to zero while the most restricted is
the equilibrium model with 0 = l/y+ = 1/y = e = 0 . However, between
these extremes are a number of groups of models such that within each group 
there is a naturally ordered sequence of nested models, but it is not 
necessary for a model in one group to be nested by, or itself nest, a model 
in another group.
The answer to this problem is either to impose more structure on the 
hypotheses (on a priori grounds) or perform an exhaustive testing 
procedure. To minimize the proliferation of possible models to be tested 
the former would seem to be more preferable. It is possible before testing 
the various behavioural hypotheses to examine the least restricted model in 
order to assess if certain a priori restrictions are violated. This may 
be sufficient to provide a clearer direction to the ordering of hypotheses 
but is by no means guaranteed to be successful. Another possibility is to 
start with the most unrestricted model, set up a number of branches with 
nested hypotheses of increasing restrictiveness and test along each branch 
until a restriction is rejected. It is then sometimes possible to obtain a 
nesting of the accepted models on each branch and use for example the Wald(W) 
or Likelihood ratio (LR) test. If they are not nested a model selection 
criteria such as Akaike's AIC criterion (1974) or the Cox test (see Cox 
(1961),(1962)) might be the best alternative. An unfortunate aspect that
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arises is that there is no simple or clearcut alternative hypothesis to the 
null of equilibrium so that construction of the Score test is not as simple 
as in chapter 4. If the most general alternative is specified and the Score 
test accepts the null hypothesis of equilibrium the existence of an 
acceptable intermediate model is not ruled out. As Mizon (1977) has pointed 
out, it is not feasible to test along branches with nested hypothesis of 
decreasing restrictiveness as it is difficult to say anything about the power 
of the test, whereas the reverse procedure does have desirable properties.
At this stage insufficient is known about the nature of the model and 
it transpires that early in the estimation of the OSTMM model a clearer idea 
of the ordering of hypotheses becomes available. Thus further details of 
the testing procedures are left to chapter 6. However, in the remaining part 
of this section the hypotheses to be considered are more closely analysed.
Consider the model in terms of the underlying parameters 
0+ , 1/y , 1/y and e • All should be non-negative and so, during
maximum likelihood estimation, it may be desirable to restrict the parameter 
space so that negative values cannot be obtained. This can be done in three 
ways: by imposing a penalty on the value of the likelihood if negative
values occur, by placing lower bounds on parameters, or by formulating the 
structural parameters as squares of underlying parameters so that only 
positive values can be obtained.6
There arc five possible restrictions that can be imposed on the 
parameters under consideration, each involving a loss of one degree of 
freedom. These are:
6 For further discussion of this point see chapter 6, section 3.
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Rl : CD + II O no unplanned last resort borrowing
R2 : 0 +  =  1 no unplanned security sales
R3 : 1/y = no rationing of Trading Banks
R4 : e = 0 no rationing of other lenders
R5 :
i?*-r-HII
+
r-H symmetrical adjustment in the Walrasian 
equation.
Note that while l/y+ = 0 appears to be only one restriction, it is in
effect two since when it is imposed 0+ cannot be deduced;
D - ST - SC) - will always be zero and so 0+ must be excluded t t t t
from the model by setting it to zero. Also, if 1/y = 0  it is
reasonable to assume e = 0 . Therefore there are two joint restrictions 
that can be imposed:
J1 : 1/y = 0 = 0  no unplanned security sales or unplanned
last resort borrowing
J2 : 1/y = e = 0 no rationing of depositors.
The first involves a loss of two degrees of freedom, as does the second. 
If all possible combinations of restrictions are considered there are 
about fifty models, thus the need to obtain additional information in 
the early stages of estimation that might reduce the number of 
possibilities.
If least squares estimation is used the restrictions Rl - R5, J1 
and J2 are only obtained as effects on the composite parameters in 
(5.56) - (5.59).
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RI : g4 = 0 
R2 : g* = 0 
R3 : g2 = 0 
R4 : e = 0 
R5 : ---
no unplanned last resort borrowing
no unplanned security sales
no rationing of Trading Banks
no rationing of other lenders
symmetrical adjustment in the Walrasian 
equation,
where R5 has no discernable effect on the parameters of the model unless 
other restrictions are also imposed. There are also the joint restric­
tions which are:
4- 4-J1 : g^  = g = 0 no unplanned security sales or last resort
borrowing
J2 : g^  = £ = 0 no rationing of depositors.
While there are a number of overall tests when ML estimation is used, 
in the least squares (LS) case this is not so. The model can be 
estimated with restrictions imposed, using Lagrangian multipliers, which 
are then tested individually using a t-test on the multipliers or jointly 
using a Chi-square test (see Byron (1970)). However there is no obvious 
way of choosing between different models and so any testing of the model 
is performed only in order to provide guidance during ML estimation 
and subsequent hypothesis tests.
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5.7 C O N C L U S I O N
In this chapter the specification of the OSTMM model has been developed. 
Special attention is paid to formulating the model so that a number of 
testable hypotheses arc available and these have been outlined in section 
5.6. Both the non-stochastic and stochastic Walrasian equations have 
been considered as simulation studies in chapter 3 indicate that if the true 
model is the stochastic version then estimation under the non-stochastic 
assumption can be expected to give extremely poor results.
The next chapter gives the results of estimation and hypothesis tests 
for the different models and from the results obtained attempts to draw
conclusions about the behaviour of dealers in the OSTMM.
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CHAPTER 6
THE ESTIMATION OF THE MODEL OF THE OFFICIAL SHORT TERM
MONEY MARKET
6.1 INTRODUCTION
In chapter 5 a model of the OSTMM has been developed for the purposes 
of estimation. The specification of the model has been designed to enable 
propositions about the dealers' behaviour to be tested during estimation.
The major aspects of the model to be analysed are the possible existence of 
unplanned security sales, rationing of potential depositors and unplanned 
last resort borrowing. In chapter 2 the techniques of estimation of 
disequilibrium models have been surveyed and some of the difficulties that 
arise discussed. For the basic Walrasian (BW) specification three stage 
instrumental variables estimators will be consistent but inefficient. A 
comparison of different least squares estimators has been made in chapter 3. 
From initial consistent estimates, maximum likelihood (ML) estimation may be 
applied to obtain consistent and asymptotically efficient estimates (at the 
cost of additional computation). Obtaining initial consistent estimates 
where there is a stochastic multivariate Walrasian (SMW) specification is 
possible, but it may be easier to try alternative sets of feasible starting 
values and see if convergence of the algorithm is to the same point for each. 
In the case of the SMW specification, the likelihood is complex and can be 
unbounded which may cause difficulties during ML estimation.
Before proceeding with estimation of the model, a discussion of the 
data used is given in the next section. Then in section 6.3 the 
optimization procedure for ML estimation and some associated problems are
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discussed. In section 6.4 the results of preliminary estimation under 
equilibrium assumptions are given. In section 6.5 the results of least 
squares estimation of the disequilibrium model and associated hypothesis 
tests are presented as a preliminary to ML estimation - in section 6.6 with 
the BW specification and in section 6.7 with the SMW specification. The ML 
results are used for extensive testing of the various hypotheses discussed 
in section 5.6.
6.2 THE DATA USED IN THE MODEL
The data used is monthly data for the period January 1964 to December 
1977. The estimation period covers the period July 1964 to June 1977. This 
reduced estimation period allows for lags on variables. Although for most 
series more recent observations are available, the use of confidential 
series released after some delay prevents the use of such observations.
Thus the sample is a period of 14 years which provides 156 observations.
Most of the series used are available from the Reserve Bank Bulletins1 
and require little discussion. The Reserve Bank also provided two 
confidential series: Monthly Averages of Last Resort Loans to the OSTMM
and Monthly Averages of Last Resort Loan Rates to the OSTMM.2 These series 
are listed in the Appendix. However there are two series that have been 
specifically constructed for use in the model, one to represent the pattern o,f 
tax payments and one to represent the effect of exchange rate speculation. 
The reasons for requiring these scries have been given in chapter 5 and a 
very brief outline of their construction given. A more detailed description
1 Reserve Bank of Australia, Statistical Bulletin, various.
2 The author is indebted to the Reserve Bank for provision of these 
confidential series.
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now follows.
The Tax Variable
This variable is constructed on the following basis. First it is 
assumed that most companies determine the amount of tax they are liable to 
pay in August each year. The basis for such an assumption is that financial 
statements are prepared for the financial year in July and usually annual 
reports are presented some time in August. The tax paid in a given year is 
based on the previous year's income or profit.
Up until 1973 tax payments were made in one amount and were due by 
April 1st. Thus it is assumed that up until then, companies accumulated 
sufficient funds over the August to April period to make the tax payment.
This is assumed to be adequately represented by a steady increase of funds 
held for such a purpose over that period. (For example, if tax payable is 
$100, then $14 (approx.) is set aside each month.) In the 1973-74 budget it 
was announced that in future tax payments would be made in four instalments 
each year. These instalments were based on 1972-73 income but the first one 
was delayed until April 30th 1974 with the other instalments due in November 
1974 and February and April 1975. Tax based on 1973-74 income was paid in 
four instalments in August and November 1975 and February and April 1976.
For the following year tax instalments based on 1974-75 income were suspended 
and only one payment in April 1977 made. Finally the tax instalment for 
August 1977 based on 1975-76 income was suspended. In each case the tax 
based on a particular year's income is assumed to be equal to tax payable 
for that year. Because the tax is paid in instalments, smaller amounts are 
accumulated at different times of the year in order for payment to be made 
on the due dates. In most cases it is assumed that these funds are
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accumulated over approximately three months since the instalments are 
quarterly instalments.
It is impossible to remove some of the arbitrary aspects of such a 
constructed series but due to the use of additional information in this 
series one might expect it to be superior to seasonal dummies (which take 
no account of such information).
The Speculative Variable
As indicated in chapter 5 this variable originates from the idea of 
Porter (1974,1977) who constructed a speculative variable. His variable was 
simply the level of foreign reserves triggered in 1971 first quarter and 
zero before that date; it is adequate provided there is speculation 
of a revaluation only, or a devaluation only, during the sample period.
While this is the case in his study it is not the case here. During 1971-72 
there was speculation of a revaluation, while during 1975-76 there was 
speculation of a devaluation, so the same type of construction is 
inappropriate.
To obtain a series capable of handling both types of speculation, two 
periods are chosen in which the speculative variable is triggered. Firstly, 
in June 1971 the trigger comes on and the variable takes on positive values 
until February 1973 when the trigger is deactivated. Thöse positive values 
are obtained by subtracting from actual reserves a trend level of reserves, 
obtained by inflating the initial trigger level of reserves ($2300m.) by 
the consumer price index in each period.3 The figure so obtained represents
The consumer price index has to be interpolated from quarterly data to 
obtain monthly data but the inaccuracy in doing this is likely to be 
relatively smal1.
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the excess of reserves attributable to speculation of a revaluation. The 
change in this figure represents the additional speculative flow of foreign 
exchange into Australia. These changes are positive until February 1973 
which is the reason for deactivating the trigger at that point. (The 
revaluation actually took place in December 1972.) The second trigger comes 
on in July 1975 and by subtracting from actual reserves a trend level of 
reserves, obtained by inflating the initial trigger level of reserves 
($3500m.) as before, a series representing the reduction in foreign exchange 
due to speculation of a devaluation is obtained. The changes are then 
calculated and represent the outflow in each period. In November 1976 the 
change becomes positive as this is when the devaluation took place.
Therefore it is here that the trigger is deactivated.
Interpolated Series
Apart from the construction of these two series, some interpolation is 
necessary for other series. In particular a dummy variable intended to 
capture the growth of the unofficial STMM relative to the official STMM is 
obtained by taking the ratio of the USTMM assets to the OSTMM assets. Since 
these are only provided annually for the USTMM it is necessary to interpolate 
to obtain monthly observations. The dummy variable is meant to capture long 
run effects only, so the need to interpolate is not a serious problem. 
Similarly shareholders funds are only available annually from each dealer's 
financial reports, so interpolation is also necessary for this series.
Again this is not considered serious as the variable is meant only to 
capture long run effects. The financial reports are readily obtained from 
New South Wales Corporate Affairs Commission records.4
*♦ Financial statements of all dealers are obtainable in micro copy form. 
These records are complete from about 1965.
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For convenience a list of variables used in the model and their 
mnemonics are provided in the Append i x in order to
facilitate interpretation of results in subsequent sections of this chapter.
6.3 THE OPTIMIZATION PROCEDURE FOR MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION
Because the model being used is not large, maximum likelihood 
estimation using an optimization algorithm is regarded as feasible, 
especially since there are operational advantages in doing so. It has 
already been mentioned that non-linear constraints are readily imposed and 
that autocorrelation can be accounted for. Another advantage is that where 
composite parameters occur they can be specified in terms of the underlying 
structural parameters and so the asymptotically efficient estimates are 
directly available together with computed t-statistics.
The algorithm initially chosen is PRAXIS (Brent (1973)), which has the 
advantage of not requiring first or second derivatives. No difficulties are 
encountered using this method for the BW specification but in the case of 
the SMW specification discussed in section 6.7 it becomes necessary to put 
bounds on parameter values to restrict the area of search. Because PRAXIS 
is not designed to handle constrained problems, an alternative optimization 
program, E04JBF, which is part of the Numerical Algorithms Group Library 
(1978) and is a Quasi-Newton algorithm, is chosen. Like PRAXIS it does not 
require first or second derivatives. Where consistent least squares 
estimates are available they are used as starting values, but a check is 
made by starting from other points and observing whether convergence is to 
the same optimum. Once an acceptable optimum is reached, standard errors 
are computed using numerical second derivatives. Difficulties with this 
approach are discussed in Goldfeld and Ouandt ((1972),pp.18-21) and so
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Standard errors are regarded cautiously. When compared with those from 
least squares estimation they are quite similar, suggesting that the 
numerical second derivatives are sufficiently accurate to be used for 
inference.
Mien the SMW specification is used it is conceivable that the likelihood 
is unbounded and although some attempt has been made to avoid this problem 
the discussion in chapter 2 indicates that difficulties may arise if the 
algorithm chooses values close to this unbounded region.5 If | E | -* 0 there 
is a danger that this will occur. By programming E as PP’ where P is 
triangular, E will be positive definite, as required of the variance- 
covariance matrix, unless |e | = 0 in which case |P| = 0 . Since |P| is 
just the product of the diagonal elements of P , by observing whether 
these particular elements are decreasing toward zero it is possible to 
ascertain whether the algorithm is likely to choose values leading to 
unboundedness. The algorithm may also break down if tt^  and/or arc
-1T4t/2 ~ ' h t nso large that the computer cannot calculate e and/or e . This
is overcome by simply setting the result to zero if the event occurs. A
- ^ t 72 - V 2
similar strategy is adopted if the term ----j--  (1  - < J > ( £ .  )) + ----,-- ( 1 - < J > ( £  ))v 1 v
equals zero, since the logarithm of this value is required, as is clear from 
equation (2.92) of chapter 2. This is handled by setting the logarithm to a 
large negative value. In section 6.7 experience with the SMW specification 
is reported.
Another problem that must be considered is that of restricting the 
parameter space, as particular parameters must be in a specific region, in 
order that the model obey expected properties such as stability. It could 
be argued that if the unrestricted model yields parameter values that
5 See section 2.4.2.
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violate these a priori restrictions then it indicates that the model is 
misspecified. However, it is found during estimation that when parameters 
violate these restrictions, they are usually insignificant. Restricting 
the parameter space ensures that an acceptable model is used as a yardstick 
for subsequent hypothesis tests. When using PRAXIS a restriction of the
2form 0 > 0q is imposed in terms of an underlying parameter w as 0^  + oo , 
rather than the alternative of imposing a penalty whenever 0 < 0^ ; 
program E04JBF enables simple bounds to be set. Any of these methods will 
affect the distributional properties of 0 , as 0 can no longer be normally 
distributed, and there are implications for hypothesis testing. The effect of 
this on tests such as the t-test, Likelihood Ratio test, Wald test and Score 
test have been discussed in 4.1 and are recognized during hypothesis testing 
in sections 6.6 and 6.7.
6 . 4 P R E L I M I N A R Y  E S T I M A T I O N :  T H E  E Q U I L I B R I U M  H Y P O T H E S I S
While primary interest is in estimation of the OSTMM model under the 
disequilibrium hypothesis, it may be possible to gain some insight into the 
model by first performing some estimation under the equilibrium hypothesis.
In particular, such estimation may indicate which variables in the model are 
likely to be of major importance, and which are unlikely to be significant, 
when it comes to estimation of the disequilibrium model. However, not too 
much emphasis should be placed on these results, as the potential gain in 
improved specification by moving from an equilibrium to a disequilibrium 
framework may result in once highly insignificant variables becoming 
significant and vice versa. Another purpose of this preliminary estimation 
is to make comparisons with the results Allan and Valentine (1978) have
obtained.
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The equations are estimated using two stage and three stage NL 
estimation and because of reduced standard errors for the latter estimates, 
reflecting increases in efficiency from a full information approach, the 
subsequent move to a full information maximum likelihood approach (rather 
than a limited information approach) is supported. The results of three 
stage NL least squares estimation of the equilibrium model are presented in 
Table 6.1 and are now discussed equation by equation.
6.4.a Demand for Deposits by Dealers
In the final form chosen the differential between the bond rate and the 
average call rate, suggested by (5.31), is preferable to a version allowing 
coefficients to differ. The capital gains term is significant, but additional 
lags arising from adaptive expectations are never significant. Similarly 
the insignificance of the lagged capital gains term indicates rejection of 
the extrapolative expectations hypothesis. While reserving final judgement 
until ML estimation is performed, it is worth noting that a possible reason 
for rejection of the adaptive expectations hypothesis is the failure to 
correctly account for the disturbance term, which should be a moving average 
in this case. Such a reason does not apply to the extrapolative case, which 
has no effect on the structure of the disturbance term. The capital gains 
term uses p = 12 and m=2 (see section 5.3. a), rather than p=l or m = 1 
or 3 , as preliminary investigation revealed this to be the superior 
formulation. The value of p = 12 removes the seasonal influence by 
calculating the expected capital gain as an expected annual capital gain.
1 lie choice of m= 2 is possibly a result of the bond rate chosen in the 
formulation being the two year bond rate. Thus while m=2 is statistically 
preferred it is also preferable on a priori grounds. The liability 
composition variable performs poorly and is dropped. While this variable
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TABLE 6.1
PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES WITH AN EQUILIBRIUM SPECIFICATION 
(THREE STAGE LEAST SQUARES)
EQUATION SUPPLY OF 
DEPOSITS BY 
OTHER LENDERS 
(SO)
SUPPLY OF 
DEPOSITS BY 
TRADING BANKS 
(ST)
DEMAND FOR 
DEPOSITS BY 
DEALERS 
(D+L)
LAST RESORT 
BORROWING
VARIABLE
CONSTANT -23.86 17.30 21.7912.76
(-1.33) (0.99)
R2-RCA 22.76
(2.09*)
RCA-RT
33.17 12.05
-22.47
(-3.45
-9.77
CG12 8.22
6.56
RETAIL 0.030
AT BA -0.071
0.028
0.075
AM3/M3 15.47 14.16 -5.14
(4.66**)
33.55
-28.00
0.79 -0.18
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TABLE 6.1 continued
0.47
0.97
19.7241.37 26.38 36.70s. c.
Figures in parentheses are t-ratios 
* denotes significant at 5% level
** denotes significant at 1% level.
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could be replaced by lagged supply of deposits by trading banks and lagged 
supply of deposits by other lenders, this specification yields an 
insignificant interest rate term. More satisfactory is the lagged value of 
holdings of government securities although the lagged value of other assets is 
insignificant. Other significant variables arc the proportional change in the 
money supply, the dummy variable for introduction of certificates of deposit 
and the shareholders funds variable all with expected sign.
6 . 4 . b Supply of Deposits by Trading Banks
The supply of deposits by Trading Banks equation includes the 
differential between the Treasury Note rate and average of maximum and 
minimum call rates, retail sales, change in Trading Bank advances, a dummy 
for the introduction of Australian savings bonds and the lagged dependent 
variable. All parameters are significant and of correct sign. Other 
candidates for this equation are not significant. The most notable is the 
unused overdraft limit variable which is always insignificant. This is not 
what Allan and Valentine (1978) find. The fact that the data periods differ 
gives a clue as to why this may be so. The growth of the unofficial STMM, 
in which many dealers are affiliated with Trading Banks, means that this 
alternative is much more important for the sample period used here, with 
increased use of the unofficial market by Trading Banks as a means of 
holding liquid funds. This argument is somewhat weakened by the 
insignificance of the USTMM dummy, although this may equally reflect the 
inadequacy of such a dummy. An alternative reason, which is probably more 
cogent, is the expansion of the range of bank lending facilities in the 
1970's which has led to overdrafts becoming a smaller proportion of bank
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lending. Fully drawn advances and personal instalment loans have replaced 
mucli of overdraft lending and rural lending,previously done on an overdraft 
basis,is now handled through Term and Farm Development Loan Funds.6
The coefficient on the lagged dependent variable implies a mean lag of 
two to three months. This may appear to be rather slow, until one realizes 
that adjustment to the desired level of these deposits will be dictated by 
adjustments occurring in other more significant parts of the Trading Banks' 
portfolios, such as advances, for which such lags are quite plausible.
Other variables that are not accepted into the equation are the rate of 
interest on certificates of deposit, the SRD ratio, and the level of excess 
LGS assets.
6.4.C Supply of Deposits by Other Lenders
In this equation the average of minimum and maximum call rates and the 
two year bond rate are included together with the proportional change in 
money supply and the tax and speculative variables. A lagged dependent 
variable is also included. Seasonal dummies are generally insignificant and 
this suggests that the tax variable accounts for seasonality in deposits by 
other lenders. In the equation Allan and Valentine (1978) obtain, the 
significant seasonals are September, October, February and March. Since 
company financial reports are generally drawn up in August and tax payments 
usually have been made by April 1st, this strongly supports such a variable 
replacing the seasonal dummies, despite its construction having been some­
what artificial. Not accepted in this equation are a capital gains term 
and the USTMM dummy.
6 Sec Reserve Bank of Australia (1979), Submission to The Committee of
Inquiry into The Australian Financial System, pp.3.9-3.10.
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6.4.d Last Resort Borrowing
The call rate variable and the rate on last resort borrowing are both 
significant as are the proportional change in the money supply, lagged 
holdings of government securities, lagged deposits and lagged last resort 
borrowing. Again some differences to results of Allan and Valentine (1978) 
occur. Firstly, the lagged dependent variable has a positive sign in the 
model, which does not accord with the reluctance effect hypothesis that the 
greater borrowing is in the last period the less it is in the current
period. To ensure the positive sign is not just a result of the growth of 
last resort borrowing over time, a scaled last resort lending equation (last 
resort borrowing divided by total liabilities) is estimated, but the 
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable remains positive and significant. 
A second alternative is to try extra lags on the dependent variable, however 
this proves fruitless. Complete omission of the lagged dependent variable 
results in a significant loss of explanatory power and renders some other 
parameters insignificant. While in apparent disagreement with the results 
Allan and Valentine (1978) obtain, it should be noted that their last resort 
borrowing equation can be transformed to yield a positive coefficient on the 
lagged dependent variable. In section 5.3.c a possible explanation for a 
positive sign lias been given and it may be that this outweighs the reluctance 
effect. Lagged holdings of government securities lias a negative parameter 
value while lagged deposits lias a positive parameter value. This suggests 
that if the holdings of government securities are high relative to total 
deposits in the previous period, the dealer has more freedom in choosing 
which option to use in balancing the portfolio in the current period. 
Government securities can be run down or the level of deposits increased by 
offering a higher rate, with less likelihood of violating Reserve Bank
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requirements on security holdings, as an alternative to last resort borrowing. 
The lagged values are therefore likely to influence the dealers behaviour in 
the current period. Finally, a number of variabels accepted in the 
supply equations, such as the change in Trading Bank advances, the tax 
variable and the speculative variable, are not accepted in the final 
specification of the last resort borrowing equation.
6 . 4 . e  The E q u i l i b r i u m  I n t e r e s t  Rate
By solving for the four estimated equations using = ST^ + SO^ + L^. 
it is possible to derive the equilibrium interest rate as:
RCA -1.03 + 0.62 R2 + 0.075 RT + 0.13 RL
+ 0.11 CG12 + 0.089 SSF - 0.00041 RETAIL
+ 0.00097 AT BA - 0.00038 TAX - 0.0010 SPEC
+ 0.088 AM3/M3 + 0.46 D1 + 0.38 DASB
+ 0.013 C_1 - 0.064 L - 0.012 ST
+ 0.014 SO , .
If the equilibrium hypothesis is true the estimated equation for RCA 
should be reasonably similar to this equation. Fortunately this equation is 
available from the reduced form stage of estimation and is:
RCA -0.61 + 0.32 R2 - 0.048 RT + 0.44 RL
+ 0.10 CG12 + 0.082 SSF + 0.00001 RETAIL
+ 0.00069 ATBA - 0.00027 TAX - 0.0010 SPEC 
+ 0.015 AM3/M3 + 0.18 D1 + 0.30 DASB 
+ 0.008 G_1 -0.0031 L - 0.0080 ST
- 0.0098 SO , .
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Apart from the sign on the treasury note rate and retail sales parameters, 
all signs agree, but responses can be seen to differ substantially in a 
number of cases. This investigation suggests there may be gains from 
disequilibrium estimation.
6 . 4 . f  Maximum Likel ihood Estimation
Using consistent estimates from the least squares estimation as 
starting values it is now possible to carry out full information ML 
estimation. In the process it is possible to correct and test for auto­
correlation which is an advantage of the ML procedure over the least squares 
procedure. Of particular importance is the specification of the disturbance 
arising from the demand for deposits equation as the capital gains 
formulation lias special implications in this case. Recalling (5.31), it has 
the general form:
( 6 . D  ot  = x l t ( i + e 2L)B1 ♦ Tr1 ( I * 6 1+e2lg At - e ^ . j
+ (1 + 0?L)u^ • -1 < 0^  < 1 , -1 < ©2 < 0 •
If ut is white noise then (6.1) is estimated with a moving average 
disturbance of order one. However, it is possible that u = M(L)e^ , 
where is white noise in which case, if M(L) is of order m then the
disturbance in (6.1) will be a moving average of order m+1 . Finally, it 
is possible that u^ = A(L)u^  ^ + e where is white noise, so that an
autoregressive-moving average disturbance is obtained. This is a much wider 
range of possibilities than suggested by Valentine (1977) where only the 
first case is considered. However, tests for higher orders of autocorrelation 
in (6.1) lead to the acceptance of the simplest assumption, that u^ is 
white noise. Also, in other equations of the model higher orders of
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TABLE 6.2
PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES WITH AN EQUILIBRIUM SPECIFICATION 
(MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD)
EQUATION DEMAND FOR 
DEPOSITS BY 
DEALERS 
(D+L)
SUPPLY OF 
DEPOSITS BY 
TRADING BANKS 
(ST)
SUPPLY OF 
DEPOSITS BY 
OTHER LENDERS 
(SO)
LAST RESORT 
BORROWING
VARIABLE
CONSTANT 25.92-12.89 17.42 14.23
(1.05)
R2-RCA 47.38
RCA-RT 6.02
10.6137.42
-25.81
-9.34
CG12 15.37
6.05
RETAIL 0.034
ATBA -0.079
0.027
SPEC 0.085
AM3/M3 15.37 14.02 -5.50
47.38
0.78 -0.23
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T A B L E  6.2 c o n t i n u e d
(6 . 98**)
0 . 69
0.87
( 32.87
- 0.65
0.450 .97
l *  = - 2571.24
where £* i s  the  maximum va lu e  o f  the  l o g - l i k e l i h o o d
mTig n o r i n g  th e  a d d i t i v e  f a c t o r  —  ( log  2tt+1) .
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TABLE 6.3
MEAN LONG RUN ELASTICITIES WITH RESPECT TO INTEREST RATES 
FOR EQUILIBRIUM MODELS (3SLS AND ML ESTIMATES)
" ^ E Q U A T I O N
VARIABLE
D + L ST SO L
........ 3SLS ........
R2 1.03 -2.19
RCA LO00o1 0.74 2.68 6.07
RT i o ''j CO
RL -6.85
........ FIML ........
R2 2.04 -2.47
RCA -1.79 0.76 3.08 5.55
RT -0.80
RL -6.81
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autocorrelation arc rejected. The adaptive expectations hypothesis is 
preferred over the extrapolative expectations hypothesis. Firstly, 0^ is 
0.37 with a t-valuc of only 0.58 while 0^ is -0.65 with a t-value of 
-5.99. Secondly, the adaptive expectations hypothesis is superior to the 
extrapolative expectations hypothesis if Aikake's AIC is used to choose 
between them. The results for the equilibrium model with adaptive 
expectations are presented in Table 6.2. While they are similar to the 
three stage least squares results it is worth noting the higher interest 
rate coefficients in the demand equation, which imply a much higher short 
run and long run response to interest rates in that equation. The long run 
elasticities are presented in Table 6.3. The elasticities of supply by 
other lenders is seen to be much greater than for that of the Trading Banks. 
The elasticities of last resort borrowing to the average call rate and last 
resort borrowing rate are extremely high.
6.5 THE DISEQUILIBRIUM MODEL: LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATION
In chapter 5 the disequilibrium specification has been outlined and
some indication of the steps in estimation provided. The first step is to
investigate a model with a non-stochastic Walrasian equation explaining
interest rate variations. (i.e. with u, = 0). Such a model is amenablebt
to least squares estimation.
Initially estimation proceeds with the fullest possible model as 
specified in chapter 5, however it is found that the preferred model in the 
disequilibrium case only admits the parameters already in the equilibrium 
model of section 6.4, together with l/y+ , 1/y , e , and 0 which
are the disequilibrium parameters about which inferences are to be made.
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If the least restricted version of the model is estimated it is 
found that the coefficient of ARCA in the Trading Bank equation is 
positive, not negative as expected. Therefore the variable is excluded 
from this equation, which is equivalent to assuming 1/y = e and that 
OSTMM dealers are willing to accommodate Trading Bank needs at all 
times. If so, other lenders are expected to bear the brunt of any 
rationing and, supporting this contention, it is found that ARCA 
enters the other lenders equation with a negative and significant 
coefficient. Some support for the non-rationing of Trading Banks is 
available in the presentation by The Council of Authorized Short Term 
Money Market Dealers ((1979), p.42) where it is claimed that " .... wide 
swings in available bank money can only be accommodated by wide 
variations in the rates of interest paid .... [which] are reflected in 
rates paid to other users .... and have been the cause of .... loss of 
clients to other markets'1. There is an implication in this statement 
that Trading Banks are rarely rationed, while other lenders will often 
be, especially if a surfeit of Trading Bank funds becomes available to 
dealers.
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With 1/y = e the model is again estimated and
another restriction, 1/y = 1/y (symmetrical adjustment) is tested and in
this case accepted. The t-statistic for the Lagrangian Multiplier is 1.77 
making it insignificantly different than zero. However while there is some 
weak evidence that g^  is different from zero in this model, g^  is 
insignificantly different than zero. This suggests that 0 = 0 ,  implying 
that there is no unplanned last resort borrowing in response to a shortage 
of funds. Thus the final step is to estimate with g* = 0 as well.
• * +  —The result of this estimation is that with the restriction 1/y = 1/y
imposed, an acceptable specification is obtained. The restriction is 
accepted, the t-statistic for the Lagrange Multiplier being 1.64 and the 
parameter l/y(= l/y+ = 1/y ) being 14.709 and significantly different
nthan zero. This model is summarized in Table 6.4. The parameter values 
are generally similar to those estimated under equilibrium assumptions. The 
behaviour in the OSTMM suggested by this model is that there exists unplanned 
security sales in response to excess demand and rationing of other lenders, 
but not Trading Banks, in response to excess supply. At the same time there 
is no evidence for unplanned last resort borrowing. This could imply the 
absence of any unplanned borrowing or alternatively that becuase of the 
short life of such borrowings (7 days), monthly data cannot be expected to 
explain the unplanned component. Thus the caveat that model builders 
wishing to incorporate disequilibrium behaviour, should be mindful of the 
fact that the data may be available too infrequently to capture what is an 
essentially short term phenomenon.
7 A value of 0.82 is obtained for p in the PAMEQ specification which 
implies reasonably rapid adjustment to equilibrium.
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TABLE 6.4
THREE STAGE LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATES WITH A DISEQUILIBRIUM 
SPECIFICATION (PREFERRED MODEL)
SUPPLY OF 
DEPOSITS BY 
OTHER LENDERS 
(SO)
EQUATION DEMAND FOR 
DEPOSITS BY 
DEALERS 
(D+L)
SUPPLY OF 
DEPOSITS BY 
TRADING BANKS 
(ST)
LAST RESORT 
BORROWING
VARIABLE
22.43CONSTANT 12.81-20.65 17.32
(0.96)(-1.19)
20.58
RCA-RT 5.21
29.59 12.12
-19.67
-9.89
CGI 2 7.39
RETAIL 0.032
(4.80**)
-0.069
(-3.60**)
AT BA
0.027
SPEC 0.079
AM3/M3 15.00 14.20 -5.18
33.35
-29.20
-0.19
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T A B L E  6.4 c o n t i n u e d
0.48
0.70
(36.66
-14.71
-14.71
0.960.720.97
19.7136.7042.32 26.33s . e .
TEST OF RESTRICTION THAT l/y+ = 1/y
A = 0.075 t-statistic = 1.64
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As a matter of interest the least squares estimation is also performed 
using the NAIVE and CE techniques, as well as the NL technique. In Table 
6.5 a comparison is made for the specification just discussed and it is 
clear that the differences between estimators are very small. There is some 
evidence that the NAIVE and CE techniques are superior, but the differences 
are even smaller than those obtained in the simulation study of chapter 3.
This is probably due to the data being much more trend dominated and 
col linear. These results provide reassurance that the use of the NL 
technique instead of the NAIVE or CE techniques is not likely to have led to 
a different specification being preferred.
Returning to the question of model specification, another possibility 
is that l/y+ = 0 also and that the only disequilibrium phenomenon is 
rationing of other lenders (1/y- = £ / 0). The results of this model do not 
differ substantially from the model which includes unplanned security sales, 
except that without restricting l/y+ to equal 1/y the value of 1/y is 
much higher and more significant - its value is 32.374 and the t-ratio is 
-2.78. Also the interest rate differential R2-RCA is no longer significant 
in the demand equation. There is not much to choose between this and the 
previous model discussed but when the two equations are estimated using ML 
procedures there may be more detectable differences, since some overall 
hypothesis tests are available.
At this stage only one other model is considered a likely alternative 
to the versions discussed above. This is one where 0+ = 1 , 
l/y+ = 1/y = e . These parameter values imply no unplanned security sales,
8 A correspondingly lower value for y of 0.67 is obtained although, 
of course, y+ is equal to 1 .
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TABLE 6.5
COMPARISON OF ESTIMATES OBTAINED USING N L , NAIVE AND
CE ESTIMATION
DEPE N D E N T  VARIABLE: D+L NL NAIVE CE
R2-RCA 20.58 20.66 20.94
(1.97) (1.99) (1.99)
A R C A + -14.71 -15.00 -15.67
(-2.12) (-2.22) (-2.23)
C O N STANT -20.65 -20.68 -20.96
(-1.19) (-1.19) (-1.20)
1)1 35.35 33. 34 33.56
(3.67) (3.68) (3.65)
CG12 7.39 7.41 7.45
(3.73) (3.76) (3.75)
SSF 6.67 6.67 6.66
(9.73) (9.75) (9.65)
G - i .79 .79 .79(24.79) (24.87) (24.67)
AM3/M3 15.00 14.97 14.98
(4.44) (4.46) (4.43)
D E P E N D E N T  VARIABLE: ST
RCA-RT 5.21 5.18 5.22
(2.03) (2.02) (2.03)
CONST A N T 17.32 17.33 17.31
(2.61) (2.62) (2.61)
RETAIL .032 .031 .032
(4.80) (4.80) (4.82)
DA -29.20 -29.09 -29.60
(-2.52) (-2.52) (-2.55)
ST 1 .70 .70 .70
(13.74) (13.75) (13.68)
AT BA -.069 -.069 -.069
(-3.60) (-3.59) (3.59)
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TABLE 6.5 continued
D E P E N D E N T  V A R IA B L E :  SO NL N A IV E CE
RCA 2 9 . 5 9 2 9 . 6 4 2 9 . 7 4
( 3 . 6 1 ) ( 3 . 6 4 ) ( 3 . 6 2 )
ARC A - - 1 4 . 7 1 - 1 5 . 0 0 - 1 5 . 6 7
( - 2 . 1 2 ) ( - 2 . 2 2 ) ( - 2 . 2 3 )
C O N S T A N T 1 2 . 8 1 1 2 . 8 5 1 2 . 9 4
( 0 . 9 6 ) ( 0 . 9 6 ) ( 0 . 9 6 )
R2 - 1 9 . 6 7 - 1 9 . 7 0 - 1 9 . 7 7
( - 2 . 9 7 ) ( - 2 . 9 9 ) ( - 2 . 9 8 )
s o  1 . 8 8 . 8 8 . 8 8
( 3 6 . 6 6 ) ( 3 6 . 6 4 ) ( 3 6 . 3 0 )
AM3 / M3 1 4 . 2 0 1 4 . 2 1 1 4 . 1 9
( 4 . 4 9 ) ( 4 . 4 0 ) ( 4 . 4 6 )
T A X . 0 2 7 . 0 2 7 . 0 2 7
( 4 . 0 7 ) ( 4 . 1 0 ) ( 4 . 0 5 )
S P E C . 0 7 9 . 0 8 0 . 0 8 0
( 2 . 2 0 ) ( 2 . 2 1 ) ( 2 . 1 9 )
D E P E N D E N T  V A R IA B L E :  L
RCA 1 2 . 1 2 1 2 . 1 4 1 2 . 0 4
( 3 . 4 3 ) ( 3 . 4 4 ) ( 3 . 4 1 )
C O N S T A N T 2 2 . 4 3 2 2 . 4 3 2 2 . 5 4
( 2 . 3 4 ) ( 2 . 3 4 ) ( 2 . 3 5 )
G - i
- . 1 9 - . 1 9 - . 1 9
( - 2 . 8 5 ) ( - 2 . 8 4 ) ( - 2 . 8 6 )
RL - 9 . 8 9 - 9 . 9 0 - 9 . 8 5
( - 3 . 8 0 ) ( - 3 . 8 1 ) ( - 3 . 7 8 )
s - i
. 1 8 . 18 . 18
( 2 . 8 9 ) ( 2 . 8 9 ) ( 2 . 9 1 )
L - i
. 4 8 . 4 8 . 4 8
( 7 . 1 1 ) ( 7 . 1 1 ) ( 7 . 1 0 )
AM3 / M3 - 5 . 1 8 - 5 . 1 8 - 5 . 1 9
( - 3 . 0 9 ) ( - 3 . 0 9 ( - 3 . 1 0 )
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since 0+ = 1 means that unplanned last resort lending fills the gap 
between demand and supply. As before when funds are readily available it is 
the other lenders group that is rationed. However, the value obtained 
for the parameter 1/y = (l/y+ = 1/y ) is 6.12 with a t-value of only 1.41 
and the restriction is rejected, the Lagrange multiplier having a t-value of 
-2.53.
6.6 MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION OF THE BASIC WALRASIAN SPECIFICATION
In the results reported in this section the likelihood is of the form 
L(Bj,B2 ) where Bj are parameters of the equilibrium model chosen in 
section 6.4 and B2 is a vector of disequilibrium parameters 
(l/y+,l/y ,0+,e). Some initial experiments with a larger set of parameters 
than B^  prove to be unfruitful. Of these experiments two are of specific 
interest: firstly, the test for higher orders of autocorrelation and
secondly, the test for a preferred capital gains specification. These are 
now discussed.
A completely general model is estimated with first and twelfth order 
moving average or autoregressive terms. In either case the hypothesis of 
first and twelfth order autocorrelation is rejected. In the moving average 
case, for example, the value of -2 log X , where X is the ratio of the
restricted likelihood to the unrestricted likelihood, is 5.38 compared with
2a value for Xq g^(8) of 15.5. This joint test provides strong evidence 
that there is not much to be gained from a more complicated disturbance 
format. It also suggests that seasonality has been adequately accounted for 
in the model. For example, the percentage change in the money supply variable 
might be expected to capture much of the seasonal fluctuations in general 
liquidity and the tax variable, as explained earlier, appears to be a
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substitute for seasonal dummies. The second test, for the capital gains 
specification, can be tested, now that the question of preferred disturbance 
format has been resolved. If the extrapolative term is used the coefficient 
0^  is found to be 0.3S and insignificantly different from zero. On the 
other hand, the adaptive expectations coefficient is -0.67 and has a t-value 
of -7.02. Also comparison of the maxima of the likelihoods shows the 
likelihood with the adaptive term being higher than that with the 
extrapolative term. Given the alternative hypotheses contain the same number 
of parameters, Akaike's AIC and a direct likelihood comparison are equivalent, 
so such a comparison gives further support to the adaptive scheme.
Having resolved these initial questions of specification, attention is 
focussed exclusively on testing parameters included in , these being
specifically associated with the disequilibrium hypothesis. Strictly 
speaking, a totally exhaustive procedure for hypothesis testing would involve 
jointly testing for the disturbance structure, capital gains structure and 
existence of disequilibrium. However, the number of possible models would 
then be too large to be manageable. By ensuring that the initial disturbance 
structure and capital gains structure are correct for the most general model 
(and the results suggest the accepted structure is unlikely to change as B^  
is varied) considerable effort and computational time is saved.
For the overall test 11q : B? = 0 against 11^  \ f 0 to have 
significance level 0.05, the significance level for an individual 
restriction should be approximately 0.01 (see Mizon (1977)). However, 
matters are made more complex by the fact that B0 = 0 is on the boundary 
of the acceptable parameter space. As indicated in 4.1 this may be handled 
by doubling the overall significance level to 0.10, so that it becomes 
approximately 0.02 for an individual restriction. In subsequent tests
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accounting for the fact that the null hypothesis sets onto boundary
values is not found to change the results of hypothesis testing, however 
the modification of significance levels to account for increasing 
restrictiveness during the sequential testing procedure does have a bearing 
on model choice.
Firstly, the likelihood LCB^B^) is maximized with no restrictions at 
all on B2 . The results are presented in Table 6.6. The parameter 1/y 
and e are both significant but other parameters are not. While 0+ < 0 
and 1/y < e are violations of a priori restrictions the hypotheses 
0 = 0  and 1/y = e are accepted. Next, the likelihood is maximized with
the parameter space restricted in order that all elements of B2 satisfy 
a priori restrictions. When this is done the restrictions 1/Y+ - 0 and 
1/Y > e are binding and because l/y+ = 0, e+ is not
identified. This model is reported in Table 6.7. The value of -2 log X
for the test of the completely unrestricted model against this model is 1.32
2and given that three constraints are operative, the value of Xq g0(3) is in
the range (6*25,7.85) so the restrictions are easily accepted.9 This
restricted model is also suggested by the values of the t-statistics in the
original model, although, of course, the results of individual and joint test
of these restrictions may differ. The test of this model against the
equilibrium model gives a value for -2 log X of 11.76 compared with 
2Xq gg(l) in the range (5.02,6.63) thus the disequilibrium model is accepted. 
Hereafter, this model is referred to as disequilibrium model 1 or DM1.
9 Because the level of significance for the overall test is chosen to be
0.05 and must be doubled, the significance level for this test with four 
restrictions is 0.08. Note that even though 0+ is not identified in 
this model, the joint restriction J1 being accepted implies there are 
three restrictions in this model.
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TABLE 6.6
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES OF THE UNRESTRICTED MODEL
EQUATION SUPPLY OF 
DEPOSITS BY 
OTHER LENDERS 
(SO)
DEMAND F’OR 
DEPOSITS BY 
DEALERS 
(D+L)
SUPPLY OF 
DEPOSITS BY 
TRADING BANKS 
(ST)
LAST RESORT 
BORROWING
VARIABLE
CONSTANT - 8.01 17.06 18.05 26.31
(-1.00) (2.63*)(1.23)
R2-RCA 37.83
RCA-RT
(2.19*)
11.1137.25
(3.70**)
-25.50
-9.70
CG12 13.96'
(3.82**)
RETAIL 0.033
-0.070
(-3.20**)
0.024
SPEC 0.099
AM3/M3 14.68 14.69 -5.48
45.83
-31.20
-0.23
TABLE 6 .6  con t in ued
0.50
0.68
0.87
-0 .67
0.73
DISEQUILIBRIUM PARAMETERS
1/Y+ 3 .3 0 (0 .3 1 )
1/Y" 2 6 .5 2 ( 2 .0 3 * )
e 3 5 .1 2 ( 2 .9 3 * * )
0+ - 0 . 3 7 ( - 0 . 1 9 )
£* = -2564 .70
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TABLE 6.7
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES FOR DISEQUILIBRIUM 
MODEL 1 (l/y+ = 0)
SUPPLY OF 
DEPOSITS BY 
TRADING BANKS 
(ST)
EQUATION SUPPLY OF 
DEPOSITS BY 
OTHER LENDERS 
(SO)
DEMAND FOR 
DEPOSITS BY 
DEALERS 
(D+L)
LAST RESORT 
BORROWING
VARIABLE
CONSTANT 19.26 26.79-7.23 18.57
(2.68**)(-0.95) (1.30)
R2-RCA 34.38
RCA-RT
(2.29*)
11.5937.98
(3.28**)
-26.10
-10.08
CG12 13.23
6.45
RETAIL 0.034
ATBA -0.069
0.025
0.090
AM3/M3 14.90 
(4.20**)
45.25
14.27 -5.49
-33.31
0.76 -0.23
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TABLE 6 .7  con t in ued
0.49
(31.15
0.22
-0 .67
0.950.720.97
DISEQUILIBRIUM PARAMETERS
1 /Y + 0
1/Y" = 3 4 . 5 1 ( 2 . 9 1 * * )
e + o
£* = -2565.36
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The question arises as to whether, by not imposing all the a priori 
restrictions on the parameter space, any alternative acceptable models are 
to be found; in imposing the above restrictions some feasible models may have 
been bypassed. However these will only be models where restrictions move 
the value of a parameter off the boundary of the parameter space and the 
only ones that can possibly do this arc R2 : 0 = 1  and R5 : 1/y = 1/y 
The first will only be a meaningful restriction if 1/y / 0 and it
transpires that this is only the case if 1/y = 1/y is imposed. The
latter restriction is accepted when tested against a completely unrestricted 
model. If 0+ = 1 is then imposed the test statistic -2 log X is 8.78 
which implies rejection of the restriction. This model, referred to hereafter 
as disequilibrium model 2 or DM2, is presented in Table 6.8.
The two disequilibrium models chosen have the same number of degrees of 
freedom but neither nests the other, so a choice is made between them 
using Akaike's AIC which is equivalent to a direct comparison of the maxima 
of the two log-likelihoods. On this basis DM1 is preferred with 
being 1.19, however the properties of both these models are discussed as 
the difference is not substantial and symmetrical adjustment is quite commonly 
assumed in the literature. Also, the variability in Treasury Note holdings 
provides additional support to DM2, as this model includes unplanned security 
sales as a means of balancing dealers' portfolios. It should be noted that 
the preferred models arc precisely those two for which successful 
specifications using least squares techniques are reported in section 6.5.
The majority of parameters do not vary substantially when the ML estimates 
are compared with the least squares estimates. The exception is the interest 
rate and capital gains coefficients in the demand for deposits equation and 
this is mainly due to the introduction of the moving average disturbance.
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TABLE 6.8
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES FOR DISEQUILIBRIUM 
MODEL 2 (l/y+ = 1/y')
EQUATION DEMAND FOR 
DEPOSITS BY 
DEALERS 
(D+L)
SUPPLY OF 
DEPOSITS BY 
OTHER LENDERS 
(SO)
SUPPLY OF 
DEPOSITS BY 
TRADING BANKS 
(ST)
LAST RESORT 
BORROWING
VARIABLE
CONSTANT -10.60
(-1.15)
45.17
(3.00**)
14.3817.31 26.26
(1.06)
R2-RCA
RCA-RT 6.23
(2.29*)
33.56 10.50
-22.70
-9.34
CG12 14.86
6.15
RETAIL 0.034
-0.081
0.024
SPEC 0.095
(2.29*)
AM3/M3 15.00 14.41 -5.51
48.11
- 36.34
-0.23
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TABLE 6.8 continued
0.50
0.88
(33.82
0.23
MA (1) -0.65
0.960.96
DISEQUILIBRIUM PARAMETERS 
l/y+ = 1/y" = e 19.48(2.66**) 
6+ 0
£* = -2566.79
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The interest rate differential R2-RCA is more highly significant in the 
ML case being significantly different than zero at the 0.01 level of 
significance in both models, unlike in the least squares case when it is 
significant only at the 0.05 level for DM2 and insignificant at the 0.05 
level for DM1. Use of an ML estimator has therefore led to some improvements 
in specification. The differences between parameters in for ML
estimates of equilibrium model, DM1 and DM2 are not substantial, although 
DM1 gives a lower elasticity of demand for deposits with respect to R2 and 
RCA. Table 6.9 presents the elasticities for the three models using ML 
estimates.
Attention is now focussed on B0 . For DM1 , l/y+ = 0 and
1/y = £ = 34.51 which means that y = 0.029. Using the Walrasian equation
this implies that an excess supply of deposits to dealers of $5 million
dollars (which varies from about 0.5% to 1.5% of total deposits) will
generate a change in the average call rate, which proxies for the marginal
rate, of 0.145 percentage points. Further insight into the price response
can be gained by calculating y~ the adjustment parameter in the PAMEQ
alternative. It is found to be 0.72, so the mean lag for price adjustment
+ +is less than one month. Of course, since 1/y = 0 , y = 1 • The fact
that the equilibrium specification and its estimates are not substantially 
different from those in DM1 is possibly a result of the speed of adjustment 
being quite high. Turning to DM2, l/y+ = 1/y = £ = 19.48 , so 
y+ = y = 0.051 and excess demand for, or supply of, deposits of $5 million 
dollars now results in the average call rate changing by 0.255 percentage 
points. This can be seen to be a more rapid adjustment, with y+ = y = 0.83 , 
and estimates for DM2 are even closer to the equilibrium estimates than for 
DM1. Thus the fact that adjustment speeds in response to disequilibrium are
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TABLE 6.9
LONG-RUN MEAN ELASTICITIES
Equi1ibrium
Disequilibrium 
Model 1
Disequilibrium 
Model 2
Demand for Deposits*
R2 2.04 1.32 1.89
RCA -1.79 -1.16 -1.66
Supply by Trading Banks
RT 0.76 0.73 0.79
RCA -0.80 -0.77 -0.83
Supply by Other Lenders
R2 -2.47 -2.51 -2.40
RCA 3.08 3.13 2.93
Last Resort Borrowing
RL -6.81 -7.44 -6.87
RCA 5.55 6.13 5.66
Because the demand for deposits equation includes lagged government 
securities only, the long-run elasticity is obtained by adjusting 
the coefficient for this variable by the average proportion of 
government securities to the dependent variable.
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high suggests that the cost of using equilibrium assumptions in the OSTMM 
is not high. In fact, there are more changes at the estimation stage in 
moving to the ML estimator from a least squares estimator than in moving 
from an equilibrium model to a disequilibrium model. This is not to detract 
from the fact that the disequilibrium models are not only statistically 
preferred to the equilibrium model, but provide greater insight into market 
behaviour. In the conclusion to this chapter these insights are summarized. 
However, before doing this the results of using the SMW specification are 
discussed.
6.7 MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION OF THE STOCHASTIC WALRASIAN SPECIFICATION
Despite extensive experimentation with this specification, no success 
was achieved in obtaining reasonable estimates of the model. In this 
section a number of sources of difficulty arc outlined. Some have been 
presurmised in sections 2.4 and 6.3. It becomes apparent that algorithm 
PRAXIS is not suitable for this type of problem, as it is designed to handle 
unconstrained problems only. Also the search procedure incorporates a 
random search option which is designed to ensure that resolution ridges are 
avoided and also that no superior solution occurs in the neighbourhood of 
the apparent solution. This option appears to cause difficulties with the 
SMW likelihood with the parameters frequently straying into forbidden 
regions. To overcome this difficulty an alternative algorithm E04JBF is 
chosen which has already been mentioned in section 6.3. Because consistent 
starting values are not easy to obtain, there is no clear idea as to where 
precisely search should be started, so these bounds are set quite widely to 
minimize the chances of excluding the desired optimum. While in some cases 
the algorithm converges, this usually occurs with some parameters on the 
boundaries set for them. This is the case with some of the interest rate
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parameters and so from the point of view of specification, the solutions 
could not be regarded as satisfactory. Therefore SMW version of the model 
must be rejected. The constraints that are imposed in terms of specification, 
such as the inability to model simultaneous rationing of both groups of 
depositors and the inability to handle autocorrelation or lagged notional 
quantities reduce the attractiveness of this model, but it is still worth­
while trying to ascertain the possible causes of the problems encountered 
with it.
a) choice of starting values: given that consistent starting values
are not available, some choice of a set of starting values must be made (or 
more than one in order to ascertain whether convergence is always to the 
same optimum). If one chooses 3SIV disequilibrium estimates, expecting the- 
SMW estimates to be close to these, then it suggests the gains from the SMW 
specification are unlikely to be significant. If the SMW specification is 
valid the results of chapter 3 and results obtained by Bowden (1978a) 
suggest these 3SIV estimates may be a very poor choice of initial values.
The problem is further exacerbated by the fact that starting values are also 
required for elements of the variance-covariance matrix of residuals for 
each equation. Because demand and supply quantities are not observed it is 
not clear how to obtain a reasonable set of these values. In the notation 
of 5.5.b, the variance-covariance for the vector w^_ can be computed given 
the initial parameter values, but since the underlying vector of normal 
disturbances v^ , is equal to w^ + s^e^t + s^e^ with e^  and e^ 
unobservable, the variance-covariance for v cannot be computed. One way 
of overcoming this problem is to use starting values from an equilibrium 
specification, as then the disturbance variance-covariance matrix is known, 
however this set of starting values is not a very satisfactory alternative.
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b) l a rg e  number o f  p a r a m e te r s :  in  t h e  OSTMM model t h e r e  a r e  up to
31 s t r u c t u r a l  pa ram e te r s  and 15 d i s t u r b a n c e  v a r i a n c e s  or  c o v a r i a n c e s ,  making 
46 p a ra m e te r s  in  a l l .  Th is  i s  in  c o n t r a s t  to  th e  model Sea ley  (1979) 
e s t i m a t e d  which c o n s i s t s  o f  11 s t r u c t u r a l  p a ram e te r s  and (presumably) 6 
d i s t u r b a n c e  v a r i a n c e s  and c o v a r i a n c e s ,  making 17 pa ram e te r s  in  a l l .  Th is  
reduced number may r e s u l t  in a more manageable l i k e l i h o o d .  With th e  l a rg e  
number o f  p a ra m e te r s  in  t h e  OSTMM model i t  i s  ex t rem ely  d i f f i c u l t  to  moni tor  
t h e  p o t e n t i a l  sou rces  of  d i f f i c u l t y  and t a k e  a p p r o p r i a t e  a c t i o n .
D i a g o n a l i z a t i o n  o f  th e  v a r i a n c e - c o v a r i a n c e  m a t r ix  may s im p l i f y  m a t t e r s ,  but  
i t  i s  f e l t  t h a t  such a r e s t r i c t i o n ,  over  and above p r e v io u s  n e c e s s a r y  ones ,  
i s  u n d e s i r a b l e .
c) p r e c i s i o n  of  e v a l u a t i o n :  d u r in g  e v a l u a t i o n  t h e  cum ula t ive  normal
d i s t r i b u t i o n  i s  computed us ing  th e  method in  Abromowitz and Stegun ( (1970) ,  
p .9 3 3 ,  e q u a t io n  26 .2 .17 )  which has  a maximum e r r o r  o f  0.0000007.  Such an 
e r r o r  may become im por tan t  when t h e  va lue  o f  the  cum ula t ive  normal 
d i s t r i b u t i o n  approaches  u n i t y ,  f o r  in  such c a se s  th e  r a t e s  o f  convergence o f  
c e r t a i n  components o f  the  l i k e l i h o o d  may become s u f f i c i e n t l y  i n a c c u r a t e l y  
computed t o  cause  problems.  Cons ider  the  gene ra l  form o f  th e  p . d . f .  f o r  a 
s i n g l e  o b s e r v a t i o n ,  as  in (2.94)  in  s e c t i o n  2 .3
h (Qt , P t )
I l + y ( a 2 - a 1) |
(  2 tt ) %
- * 4 t /2 -<V2
l I L I  2  1Tt  tt'2  | S |  2 ^
Then as an example,  a va lue  o f  £ may be s u f f i c i e n t l y  h igh t o  make 
(JKß^j.) ve ry  c l o s e  to  u n i t y .  I f  cj)(£ ) i s  equal  t o ,  say ,  0.9999998 but  
i s  e v a l u a t e d  as  0.9999999 then  1 - (f>(£^) w i l l  be out  by a f a c t o r  of  
two. Where r a t e s  o f  convergence  a r e  im por tan t  such in a c c u ra c y  can have 
s e r i o u s  consequences .  In some o f  t h e  PRAXIS exper im en ts  t h i s  seems to have
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occurred, but the bounds placed on parameter values when E04JBF is used 
prevented such an occurrence.
d) unboundedness: while most of Quandt's (1978) failures with this
specification are attributed to problems with the Hessian of the log- 
likelihood, in a number of cases no optimum is reached. This may in fact 
be, as he has argued, related to the problem of likelihoods based on p.d.f's 
that resemble mixtures of normals. Some measures taken in order to observe' 
whether this unboundedness causes problems arc outlined in section 6.3, but 
this does not appear to have been the major problem.
e) mis-specification: a final possibility is that the model 
chosen is mis-specified. Two potential sources of this mis-specification 
can be identified. The first is that the overall idea of the stochastic 
specification, in introducing a disturbance into the Walrasian equation, is 
correct but that the choice of explanatory variables, arising as it does 
from the equilibrium or BW specification, is incorrect and leads to 
unacceptable results. The second is that there is no valid specification in 
the SMW case and that an equilibrium model or BW model is more acceptable. 
While the first type is clearly a possibility, attempts to resolve this 
problem come up against the problem of choice of appropriate starting values 
for parameters and covariances.
6.8 CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter the OSTMM model has been estimated using appropriate 
estimation techniques designed to provide consistent and asymptotically 
efficient estimates. Because the analysis of chapters 2 and 4 indicate that 
the disequilibrium hypothesis is a testable proposition some care has been
207
taken in developing satisfactory model selection procedures. The discussion 
in chapter 5 reveals that to do this may lead to a large number of testable 
models and militates against use of the Score test developed in chapter 4. 
Fortunately, it so happens that this number is dramatically reduced during 
ML estimation by restricting the parameter space to an acceptable region.
Thus it is reasonable to suppose that the final models chosen are the most 
acceptable ones and that no superior specification has been ignored. The 
models chosen enable a number of observations about dealers' behaviour in 
the OSTMM to be made.
Firstly, while dealers do ration depositors, they do not ration Trading 
Banks who wish to place money with them. This possibly reflects the 
importance of Trading Bank custom to the official dealers and may also 
suggest that in return Trading Banks are willing to assist dealers when the 
latter are short of funds. This might also account for the conflict between 
the two disequilibrium models as to the existence of unplanned security sales.
Secondly, the evidence suggests that unplanned last resort borrowing 
does not exist or else that it cannot be detected in a monthly model. The 
latter is perhaps more likely, given the ephemeral nature of such borrowings. 
If so, it emphasises the difficulties that may occur in using disequilibrium 
techniques when data is not available on a sufficiently frequent basis.
Thirdly, evidence varies as to existence of unplanned security sales.
The observed fluctuations in Treasury Note holdings, suggesting they are 
used as a buffer (and may even be a more significant longer term alternative 
to last resort borrowing) lends some support to the model that includes this 
phenomenon. At the same time the results of both models suggest very rapid 
movement to equilibrium and so the model without unplanned security sales is
acceptable.
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The crucial advantage of adopting the techniques of chapter 5 and this 
chapter, is in being able to not just assess whether disequilibrium occurs, 
and whether it is substantial, but if it does just how dealers react when it 
occurs. All these conclusions are drawn from models using the basic 
Walrasian specification. Unfortunately no acceptable specification has been 
obtained with the stochastic Walrasian specification, despite attempts to 
avoid problems associated with this alternative.
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APPENDIX
VARIABLES USED IN THE MODEL OF 
THE AUSTRALIAN SHORT TERM MONEY MARKET
(a) Data obtained from Reserve Bank of Australia, Statistical Bulletin3 
various issues.
R2 - rate of interest on two year non-rebatable bonds
(theoretical yields based on average for week centred 
on last Wednesday of the month).
RT - rate of interest on 13 week treasury notes (issue yields)
RCA - average of maximum rate on call deposits and minimum
rate on call deposits in the OSTMM 
RETAIL - monthly retail sales ($m)
TBA - Trading Bank advances ($m)
M3 - money supply (broadly defined) ($m)
TAX - tax variable, based on tax payable figures ($m)
SPEC - speculative variable based on gold and net foreign assets
figures ($m)
G - total holdings of governments bonds and treasury notes
in the OSTMM (average of weekly figures) ($m)
QT - deposits by Trading Banks with the OSTMM (average of weekly 
figures) ($m)
QO - deposits by other lenders with the OSTMM (average of 
weekly figures) ($m)
(b) Other data.
RL - monthly averages of last resort borrowing rates by dealers
from the Reserve Bank. Source: Confidential series provided 
by the Reserve Bank of Australia.
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(b) Other data (continued)
SSF total shareholders funds in the OSTMM (interpolated from 
annual data) ($m). Source: New South Wales Corporate Affairs
Commission, microcopy records, various.
D1 dummy for the introduction of certificates of deposit as an 
allowable asset in the OSTMM dealers' portfolios (= 0 until 
December 1975, = 1 thereafter).
Q QO + QT
L monthly averages of aggregate last resort borrowing by dealers 
from the Reserve Bank ($m). Source: Confidential scries
provided by the Reserve Bank of Australia.
ARCA+ -
[ ARCA if ARCA > 0 
( 0 otherwise
ARCA-
[-ARCA if ARCA < 0 
( 0 otherwise
CG12 capital gains term.
A number of other series used in earlier specifications are omitted 
from this list as they are not included in the final specifications reported 
in chapter t.
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CHAPTER 7
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The idea that markets may be in disequilibrium has become very popular 
recently with important contributions being made by both economists and 
econometricians. The former group has laid the foundations for analysis by 
econometricians, with the works by Alchian (1970), Clower (1965),
Leijonhufvud (1968) and Barro and Grossman (1971,1976) providing much of this 
development. The latter three have been instrumental in the reinterpretation 
of Keynes (1936). The single market disequilibrium models investigated by 
econometricians have evolved from the important paper by Fair and Jaffee 
(1972) while the econometric analysis of the multimarket case, in particular 
as applied to macroeconomic models, is a very recent development by writers 
such as Ito (1980), Gourieroux, Laffont and Monfort (1980) and Bowden (1979).
At the start of chapter 1 it is argued that the term disequilibrium 
itself is not without some definitional problems and the major thrust of 
section 1.1 is to show the problems of such a concept. These arise because 
if it is argued that disequilibrium occurs for some particular reason, then 
if this is recognized and so is adequately built into the underlying 
theoretical framework, the model once more falls into an equilibrium framework. 
It is the introduction of some arbitrary mechanism, in the absence of a clear 
alternative, that characterises a disequilibrium model as used in most of 
this thesis. The major justification is that there are information costs 
which, while difficult to include in the underlying choice theory, can be 
reasonably well accounted for using an equation for price dynamics (such as 
the Walrasian one) in which notional demand and supply are no longer always 
equal. Much of section 1.2 involves a discussion of the economic aspects of
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this Walrasian mechanism and the model into which it is embedded, especially 
where these aspects influence the approach to econometric estimation.
Finally, in section 1.3 the macroeconomic models are briefly discussed.
Actual estimation of this latter type of model does not appear to have yet 
been attempted and is not without substantial problems, as outlined in that 
section. Since an important test of the value of the disequilibrium 
assumption in macroeconomic models is to carry out econometric estimation 
using such assumptions, this is an important area of future research.
The major problems with the disequilibrium approach are increased 
difficulty in economic analysis of the model and increased difficulty in 
econometric estimation. The latter aspect is considered in chapter 2 and it 
is shown that for a broad class of models the problems that arise are not 
substantial. These are models with a non-stochastic Walrasian equation, 
which allow a number of consistent instrumental variables estimation 
techniques given further attention in chapter 3, and also cause no 
problems if maximum likelihood estimation is used. In the case where the 
Walrasian equation is stochastic, and sometimes includes additional variables, 
the problem of finding consistent estimates is considerable as is revealed 
in the results reported in section 6.7 for the empirical work in this thesis.
In chapter 4 the Score test which enables one to test for disequilibrium 
without actually needing to perform estimation under the disequilibrium 
hypothesis is discussed and in view of the preceding comments the desirability 
of such a test is evident. Of course, the equilibrium hypothesis may be 
rejected and estimation will then be necessary under the more complicated 
alternative, but one is more confident that the procedure is going to be 
worthwhile. The results of a simulation experiment suggest that the Score 
test works quite well when there is a reasonable distinction between the
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equilibrium and disequilibrium model. Unfortunately, in the empirical work 
in chapters 5 and 6 the wide range of alternatives militates against use of 
this test.
An empirical study of the Australian Official Short Term Money Market 
using some of the techniques discussed in chapters 1 - 4 is carried out in 
chapters 5 and 6. In chapter 5 the motivation for a disequilibrium approach 
is considered and the specification of the model developed. In order to 
properly test for hypothesised behaviour attention is also paid to developing 
rigorous model selection procedures.
In chapter 6 the results of estimation of the specified model are 
presented and support for disequilibrium behaviour has been found. However, 
the differences between the equilibrium model and the disequilibrium model 
are not found to be substantial. Another problem that has been found is the 
failure to achieve success in estimating the model with a stochastic 
Walrasian equation although it is possible that this is simply because such 
an alternative is inappropriate.
A final consideration is that before proceeding with disequilibrium 
estimation the model builder should carefully consider what potential gains 
are likely to occur. Often the frequency of available data should be 
sufficient to warn one that the gains may be slight. If the decision period 
of the agents in the market under consideration is considerably less than the 
time between successive observations, the data is unlikely to contain 
sufficient information to enable disequilibrium behaviour to be detected even 
when it does occur. The inability to obtain an explanation of unplanned last 
resort borrowing in this study may be partly explained by this factor. This 
suggests that further research using weekly, or even daily data, may prove 
more fruitful, although data availability then becomes a serious problem.
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